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Women's and Youth Empowerment in Rural Tunisia

An assessment using the Women's Empowerment
in Agriculture Index (WEAI)



International
Labour
Office

Women's and Youth Empowerment in Rural Tunisia

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Abbreviations

IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
MENA	Middle Eastern and North Africa
WEAI	Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index
WEAI-TN	WEAI-Tunisia
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
GDP	gross domestic product
TLMPS	Tunisia Labour Market Panel Survey
5DE/4DE	Five/Four Domains of Empowerment
GPI	Gender Parity Index
INS	National Statistics Institute Tunisia
TND	Tunisian dinar
PPP	purchasing power parity
UN	United Nations
PCA	principal component analysis
MCA	multiple correspondence analysis
FA	factor analysis
NGSE	New General Self-Efficacy Scale

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Preface

In June 2012, the International Labour Conference of the International Labour Organization (ILO) resolved to take urgent action to tackle the unprecedented youth employment crisis through a multi-pronged approach geared towards pro-employment growth and the creation of decent jobs. The resolution, “The youth employment crisis: A call for action”, contains a set of conclusions that constitute a blueprint for shaping national strategies for youth employment. In 2016, the Global Initiative on Decent Jobs for Youth, a United Nations system-wide initiative, was launched to facilitate increased impact and expanded country-level action on creating decent jobs for young people through multi-stakeholder partnerships, the dissemination of evidence-based policies and the scaling up of effective and innovative interventions.

The ILO has responded to this challenge by making greater investments in understanding “what works” in youth employment and supporting governments and social partners to translate evidence into integrated employment policy responses. In 2013, the ILO set up the Fund for Evaluation in Employment and established the Area of Critical Importance: “What Works in Youth Employment” to foster knowledge sharing and provide financial and technical assistance for the rigorous assessment of youth employment interventions. Regional approaches have since been established, including the Taqueem (meaning “evaluation” in Arabic) Initiative. Taqueem is a partnership with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), as part of an IFAD-financed project titled “Strengthening gender monitoring and evaluation in rural employment in the Near East and North Africa”. Through rigorous impact research, this capacity development and learning grant project aims to understand “what works” in the promotion of gender mainstreaming, with the ultimate goal of achieving gender equality in rural employment outcomes across the region.

The “Impact Report” series disseminates research reports from Taqueem-supported impact evaluations. Reports include baseline, endline and qualitative studies, which describe the research designs, methodologies, interventions under investigation, findings and policy and programmatic recommendations. The series is intended to support efforts to evaluate youth employment interventions and provide evidence to guide effective programme and policy design and implementation.

The “Women’s and Youth Empowerment in Rural Tunisia” study uses, for the first time in the Arab world, the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) to investigate the topic of gender equality. The study employs a large-scale survey of rural, semi-urban and urban Tunisia to map levels of empowerment among women and young people between the age of 18 and 30. The overall objective of the project is to provide new measurement tools and data to policymakers and organisations to allow them to better design, target, monitor and evaluate initiatives aiming to empower women and young people across Tunisia.

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Executive summary

Tunisia is among the few Arab countries that have recently made significant changes in their constitutional, legislative and policy framework, to facilitate and promote gender equality and eliminate gender-based discrimination. Yet, encouraging as this may seem, there is a substantial discrepancy between what law is and what is practised, both in public and private life. One of the main reasons for this is the existence of strong and persistent gender based norms and attitudes. This is reflected for example in low female labour market participation, despite that fact that Tunisian women (especially young women) have achieved similar education levels as those of men.

We conducted a large-scale survey in rural, semi-urban and urban Tunisia to map levels of empowerment among women and young people between the age of 18 and 30. The overall objective of this project was to provide new measurement tools and data to policymakers and organisations to better design, target, monitor and evaluate initiatives aiming to empower women and young people across Tunisia.

Our specific objectives are as follows: (i) we adapt the commonly used Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) to the more advanced and more diverse economy of (rural) Tunisia (WEAI-TN) relative to other countries where agriculture is the predominant activity and where the WEAI has been piloted; (ii) identify key individual and household correlates of women's and youth empowerment; (iii) compare our findings for the rural sample with those from three other countries in which the WEAI was implemented (Bangladesh, Guatemala, and Uganda); (iv) compare rural and urban areas to understand whether urbanization and economic development may affect empowerment and (v) explore attitudes towards the widespread phenomenon of domestic violence, and identify determinants of psychological well-being.

The WEAI-TN is a composite measurement tool, assessing the extent to which women can take control over critical parts of their life in the household, the community and the wider economy. We measure both absolute and relative levels of empowerment for women, where relative means relative to men. For our youth sample, we only compute absolute measures of empowerment for each relevant dimension, as there is no clear benchmark to measure relative youth empowerment against.

We measure absolute levels of women empowerment across five domains (production, resources, income, leadership and time use). Each domain receives the same weight (1/5) and we have one or two indicators per domain (thus, in case of two indicators, each indicator receives a weight of 1/10). Table 1 describes the five domains and their respective indicators.

Table 0.1 Domains and indicators used for WEAI-TN (women only)

Five domains of empowerment (5DE)	Indicators	Weight	Policy issues that are generally triggered
Production	1. Input in productive decisions	1/5	Economic empowerment
Resources	2. Ownership of assets	1/10	
	3. Access to and decisions on credit	1/10	
Income	4. Control over use of income	1/5	
Leadership	5. Group membership	1/10	Decision-making and representation
	6. Speaking in public	1/10	
Time use	7. Workload	1/10	Equitable workload balance
	8. Leisure	1/10	

Table 0.2 Domains and indicators used to measure youth empowerment

Four domains of empowerment (4DE)	Indicators	Weight	Policy issues that are generally triggered
Control over the future	1. Actual activity status	1/12	Economic empowerment
	2. Decisions about employment	1/12	
	3. Decisions about education	1/12	
Resources	4. Household assets	1/8	Decision-making and representation
	5. Access to and decisions on credit	1/8	
Leadership	6. Group membership	1/12	Freedom
	7. Use of social media	1/12	
	8. Speaking in public	1/12	
Personal freedom	9. Choice of partner/children	1/12	Freedom
	10. Interaction with friends	1/12	
	11. Hobbies	1/12	

The gender parity index (GPI) is used to compute relative measures of women empowerment, by comparing the 5DE profile of primary females in the household to that of the primary male in the household. The WEAI-TN is then computed as the weighted sum of 5DE and GPI, where 5DE receives a weight of 0.9 and GPI of 0.1.

We compute no WEAI-TN for youth but assess their levels of empowerment for each relevant dimension. The four domains depicted for the youth index are depicted in Table 2.

We selected a random sample stratified according to Tunisia’s administrative divisions (governorates, delegations and sectors) and further into rural and urban sectors. We collected data from 1,150 households and 2,511 individuals of which 1,320 females and 722 youth. Given the predominant focus of the study on rural areas we oversampled rural households to ensure a sufficiently large enough sample of this group (480 households).

Table 0.3 Key descriptives rural households sample

	Mean	SD
Household size	4.2	1.6
Children 0–5 years	0.4	0.7
Children 6–18 years	0.8	1.1
Adults 19–64 years	2.6	1.3
Older adults 65+ years	0.4	0.6
Children per adult	0.6	0.7
Average monthly household income (TND) ¹	513.7	376.8
Agricultural households (%) ²	25.4	
Household owns livestock (%)	13.1	
Household lives in coastal area (%)	47.9	
Number of households	480	

¹ Income is reported in income brackets. To calculate mean income, it was assumed that each household had an income corresponding to the mean income of the corresponding bracket. For the upper bracket, which had no upper bound, we used the lower bound as an income proxy.

² Agricultural households are defined as households that own agricultural land. Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

In each sector, we randomly selected 15 households, of which 10 were interviewed and 5 serving as possible replacements. Key descriptive statistics for our rural sample are presented in Table 3.

In addition to collecting information on variables included in the WEAI-TN and our measure of youth empowerment, we included modules on labour participation, (un)employment, migration, social media use, psychological well-being and attitudes towards domestic violence. Surveys were conducted between September and November 2017 by a Tunisia-based survey institute. Non-response rates were low (3.6 percent), and enumerators would try up to three times to visit and survey the households before substituting this specific household with a replacement household.

We find that 95 per cent of all women that live in households with another male primary decision-maker are not empowered, i.e. they do not have adequate achievements in at least four of the five domains of empowerment or in a combination of the weighted indicators that make up at least 80 per cent of the total. This result is driven by low levels of economic empowerment, meaning low levels of inputs into productive decisions; limited control over resources like assets and credit, and little say about how income is being spent. By contrast empowerment within the domains of leadership and time use is much higher. Gender parity within the household is also low; at just over one third (35.1 percent). Somewhat surprisingly we also find a relatively large percentage of men to be disempowered (74 percent).

Disaggregating the results by different groups (young versus older women; agricultural versus non-agricultural households and coastal versus non-coastal regions) shows that

Table 0.4 Results for WEAI-TN, for all primary decision-makers and their spouses

Indexes	Rural Tunisia	
	Women	Men
Disempowered headcount, H_n (%)	95.0	74.0
Average inadequacy score, A_n (%)	63.1	54.5
Disempowerment index, M_o	0.600	0.403
5DE Index ($1 - M_o$)	0.400	0.597
Number of observations	424	358
Percentage of data used ¹	93.6	95.7
Percentage of women with no gender parity, H_w	64.1	
Average empowerment gap, R_w (%)	40.6	
Gender Parity Index	0.739	
Number of women in dual household	329	
Percentage of data used ²	77.6	
WEAI	0.434	

¹ From the rural sample, 6.4% of female and 4.3% of male observations could not be included in the 5DE Index calculation because of missing information.

² From the 424 women included in the 5DE Index construction, only 77.6% lived in a dual household (i.e. with a primary male respondent present).

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

disempowerment levels for young people are relatively high (relative to older women) in domains that relate to economic and financial conditions. This is connected to the high youth unemployment rate, lack of income (opportunities) and a low level of asset ownership, which in turn results in low access to credit. The gender gap is not particularly large, but seem to increase with marriage.

Women in agricultural households are slightly more empowered than those in non-agricultural households, due to relatively higher levels of economic empowerment for the former, resulting from agricultural women maintaining their own sources of income through agricultural production and sale of own produce. As expected, women in the more developed and some even touristic rural coastal areas are typically more empowered than those in rural non-coastal areas that are characterised by higher levels of unemployment and a more traditional life-style.

Comparing our results to three other countries in which the WEAI has been implemented show that levels of economic empowerment are worse for women in Tunisia than for those in Bangladesh, Guatemala and Uganda, which is striking given the relatively high(er) levels of per capita GDP, educational attainment and many other indicators of development in Tunisia. This apparent puzzle may, however, be explained by high reservation wages and working conditions among Tunisian women, induced by strong religious and cultural norms that expect from women to do most, if not all, of the household chores. Moreover,

women prefer high-level formal private sector or government jobs over other work that may require (too) much interaction with male colleagues or clients. If they cannot get such jobs many women leave the labour force and remain inactive because working conditions are not compatible with traditional domestic roles or because jobs are only available in workplaces where women's sexual and reputational safety may not be preserved, due to direct contact with male clients, colleagues, owners or superiors.

When looking at the aggregates we find not much difference between urban and rural households in terms of overall levels of empowerment and gender parity, but drivers are different. Input in productive decisions, asset ownership and access to and decisions on credit contribute more to empowerment in rural areas than in urban areas, but the reverse applies to control over the use of income, group membership, speaking in public and leisure. Agriculture is much more prominent in rural areas than urban areas, and the dimensions that contribute to empowerment in the rural areas are exactly those that are associated with agricultural production, such as input in productive decisions, asset ownership and access to credit. Conversely, urban areas may provide more facilities for group membership related to sports, cultural activities or civil society and are more likely to have a diverse population living in non-traditional (single) households.

The final analysis relates to the topic of domestic violence and psychological well-being, in theory closely related to women's empowerment. We examined correlates of self-reported attitudes towards domestic violence and perform a similar analysis for measures of psychological well-being. Higher levels of women's empowerment are typically correlated with higher levels of psychological well-being as we would expect but results are less clear-cut for attitudes towards domestic violence.

The report shows that despite many legal achievements, Tunisia still has a long way to go when it comes to women's and youths' empowerment. The lack of decent formal jobs clearly contributes to these low levels of empowerment that we observe. The fact that traditional norms are strong and persistent points to a need to encourage equal participation in training, business opportunities and finance early on, that may help change female labour market participation and in the long run and also the social norms associated with it. All actors (NGOs, civil society, media, international organisations) should be aware of the discrepancy between what law is and what is practised on the ground and hold policy-makers and the national government accountable for the commitments they made.

Section 1: Introduction

Despite the fact that women comprise half the world's population, and thus half its potential to contribute to a prosperous, sustainable and peaceful global society, gender inequality persists worldwide, especially in low- and middle-income countries (UNDP, 2016). Women's empowerment – defined as women's enhanced access to and control over productive resources, strengthened participation in public decision-making processes and enhanced well-being through improved access to basic rural infrastructure and services – can help achieve gender parity, which is a desirable goal in itself. Moreover, women's empowerment is often seen as both a cause and a consequence of economic development (Cuberes and Teignier, 2014; Duflo, 2012; Klasen, 2002). Gender barriers can affect girls and women throughout their lives, through inadequate nutrition and poor (or no) access to health care, education and labour markets. Such barriers are often mutually reinforcing. The related issue of physical and sexual abuse of women and girls is widespread – it is estimated that one in three women will experience some form of physical or sexual assault during her life – affecting not only their health outcomes, but also their dignity and security, thereby putting another constraint on human development (WHO, 2017).

Gender inequality differs greatly between countries, but various indices reveal particularly striking gender inequality figures in countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. UNDP's Gender Inequality Index, Social Watch's Gender Equity Index, the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Index and the Economist Intelligence Unit's Women's Economic Opportunity Index all consistently show the MENA region to be performing worse than any other region in the world (UNDP, 2016; Social Watch, 2012; World Economic Forum, 2017; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012).

Our study focuses on Tunisia, a country that, since its independence from France in 1956, has experienced significant improvements in women's empowerment through changes in the legislative framework, institutional reforms and social policies. These changes have led, for example, to a female tertiary education ratio of 43.3 per cent in 2015 (versus only 26.2 per cent for men), a steep increase in women's life expectancy (from just over 43 years in 1960 to over 77 years in 2015), a decline in fertility, almost to replacement level, and an increase in the female labour force participation rate to 25.6 per cent¹ (Chambers and Cummings, 2014; World Bank, 2017; ILO, 2017a). Yet, despite impressive progress in recent decades, with Tunisia being somewhat of an exception compared with other MENA countries, gender equality in public and private life remains a challenge due to strong traditional cultural and religious gender norms, which have been reinforced in parts of Tunisian society since the 2011 revolution (Chambers and Cummings, 2014).² Examples

¹ Female labour force participation peaked in 2008, at a rate of 25.15 per cent and since then more or less stagnated (International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database: early release of the 2017 ILO Labour Force Estimates and Projections, retrieved in March 2018).

² Gender-based violence remains a widespread and persistent phenomenon, with more than 47 per cent of Tunisian women reporting having experienced violence at least once during their life (ONFP-AECID, 2010).

of such gender norms include: men being able to decide about their wife's actions; women being expected to prioritize family and domestic tasks over work aspirations, and at best having only a limited choice of employment sector (e.g. education or nursing); and women being expected to behave in public such that male dominance is respected (Oxfam, 2017; World Bank, 2014).

We expect these issues to be even more prevalent in rural areas, which typically have norms and expectations corresponding to a more traditional society. Women make up a large share of the agricultural workforce, or else work as unpaid family workers or in the informal sector.

The issue of youth presents a further area of concern. Thirty-nine per cent of the Tunisian population is younger than 24 years, but young people face disproportionately large challenges when it comes to labour market opportunities, political representation and participation in decisions affecting their lives. Unsurprisingly, this is more pronounced for girls and young women, especially those in rural areas (Bamyeh, 2011). This study therefore pays attention to the issue of youth empowerment in both urban and rural areas.

Scope and purpose of this report

This report has been funded through Taqueem (meaning “evaluation” in Arabic), which is a partnership between the ILO and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) as part of an IFAD-financed project titled “Strengthening gender monitoring and evaluation in rural employment in the Near East and North Africa”.

The report provides disaggregated statistics on women's and youth empowerment from a nationally representative survey of 1,150 households in Tunisia. Data were collected for 2,511 individuals from the survey households, of which 1,320 were female and 722 were youths, i.e. aged between 18 and 30.³ The sample included 1,079 individuals from rural areas, of which 576 were female and 398 were youths.

We aim to provide new data and tools to help improve the design, targeting, monitoring and evaluation of women's and youth empowerment programmes and initiatives in Tunisia, especially in rural areas. In contrast to some previous applications of the Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI), we do not focus on agriculture specifically. Given the advanced economic diversification in Tunisia, even in rural areas, we focus on rural women (and youth) more broadly, whether they are or are not directly involved in agricultural production.

Specifically, this study aims to achieve the following objectives:

- Assess the relevant dimensions of women's and youth empowerment in rural Tunisia by developing specific measures of women's and youth empowerment based on the Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI). The WEAI was originally developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in 2012 to track changes in women's empowerment levels following interventions under Feed the Future, the US Government's global hunger and food security initiative (Alkire et al., 2013).

³ We focus on the youths of full age, as for minors many of our survey questions are irrelevant or at least not obvious to interpret.

- Assess which individual and household characteristics are most strongly associated with women's and youth empowerment levels in rural Tunisia.
- Compare determinants of women's empowerment in rural Tunisia with those in other countries where the WEAI has been implemented (Bangladesh, Guatemala and Uganda) and explain possible differences in outcomes.
- Contrast women's empowerment in rural areas and lagging regions with women's empowerment in urban areas to understand how urbanization and economic development more broadly may shape women's empowerment.
- Explore attitudes towards domestic violence against women and determinants of women's psychological well-being.

This report is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background information on Tunisia to help readers to put the results into perspective. Section 3 outlines the methodology and, especially, how the WEAI has been adapted to the context of rural Tunisia. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 presents a comparison of these results with those from previous applications in Bangladesh, Guatemala and Uganda. Section 6 offers various extensions: first, an extension to measure the empowerment among Tunisia's urban population; second, an empowerment measure specifically for youth; and third, an analysis of attitudes towards domestic violence against women and determinants of psychological well-being. Section 7 summarizes the main findings and concludes with some policy implications.

Section 2: Tunisia: Background and context

Tunisia is part of the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. It has a population of about 12 million and is considered to be the only democracy in the Arab world (the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2017 ranked Tunisia at 69 out of 167 countries – just below Indonesia and above Singapore⁴ (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018)). Tunisia gained independence from France in 1956, after Habib Bourguiba led a separatist movement against the French colonial protectorate from 1952. Bourguiba became the first president of the Republic of Tunisia. In 2011, the so-called “Dignity Revolution” resulted in the overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and was followed by parliamentary elections. The current government has been in place since 2016, although the cabinet of ministers has changed several times since then.

While agriculture has played an important role in Tunisia's development since its independence, the country has experienced substantial structural change over the past two decades. Services and industry make by far the largest contributions to GDP (AfDB, 2017). However, the agricultural sector is still considered an important source of income in rural areas: it contributes 11 per cent of GDP (AfDB, 2017) and agricultural products represent about 6 per cent of the country's export earnings. The most important agricultural export commodities are olive oil, dates and macaroni (FAO, 2017). Industry contributes about 36 per cent of GDP and services the remaining 53 per cent (AfDB, 2017).


In terms of employment, 15 per cent of the workforce is employed in agriculture, 33 per cent in industry and 52 per cent in the service sector (ILO, 2017a). In rural areas, about a quarter of the workforce is employed in agriculture. The share of the total workforce employed in the agricultural sector is continuously declining; ten years ago, 18.3 per cent of the workforce was employed in this sector. Among urban youth, 38 per cent of the labour force is employed in the service sector. Likewise, in rural areas, most youth jobs (including most informal employment) are in the service sector, which accounts for 29.7 per cent of all employed youth (World Bank, 2014). In Tunisia, traditional labour-intensive sectors, such as agriculture and construction, yield relatively low wages, which partly explains these trends (World Bank, 2014).

Tunisia is geographically divided into a relatively prosperous flat coastal zone and a poorer non-coastal zone (figure 2.1), which is partly hilly, even mountainous in places, and generally more arid and remote. The rural non-coastal zone is characterized by a higher share of agricultural activities, both in terms of GDP and employment, and shows less diversification into industry and services. A significant proportion of the zone's youth leave to look for jobs in the coastal regions or Greater Tunis, but most of them end up with low paid, precarious jobs in the informal sector. For women and, especially, young university graduates it is particularly difficult to find “good” jobs (Hanmer et al., 2017; Boughzala

⁴ Tunisia is the highest ranked MENA country (69), followed by Morocco (101).

and Hamdi, 2014). Inequality between the lagging western, non-coastal regions and the coastal regions and Greater Tunis – in terms of living conditions and access to economic opportunities and jobs – was one trigger of the revolution (Hanmer et al., 2017).

Figure 2.1 Map of Tunisia



Source: d-maps.com.

According to the ILO, in 2017 Tunisia's unemployment rate was 15.2 per cent (ILO, 2017a). The unemployment rate for men was just 13.0 per cent, but for women it stood much higher, at 21.5 per cent. The labour force participation rate, at 47 per cent, was very low by international standards. For women, labour force participation was only 26 per cent, much lower than in most other countries in the MENA region (ILO, 2017a). This low participation rate persists despite a low fertility rate (2.1 children on average over a women's lifetime) and decent access to health and education. Furthermore, the net enrolment ratio in secondary education is higher for girls than for boys (AfDB, 2017).

In terms of the Gender Development Index, which measures the ratio of the Human Development Index value calculated for females to that calculated for males, Tunisia has a value of 0.904, which ranks it above Algeria and Egypt, but below Morocco and Libya (UNDP, 2016). Based on UNDP's Gender Inequality Index – a composite measure reflecting inequality in achievement between women and men in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment (seats in parliament and education) and labour force participation – Tunisia performs better than all other countries in North Africa except Libya. In the Tunisian parliament, 31 per cent of the members are women, which is a higher share than in France, the United Kingdom and the United States (Chambers and Cummings, 2014; World Bank, 2018).

Over recent decades, Tunisia has been considered a showcase in terms of women's rights. The country has implemented significant changes in the constitutional, legislative and policy framework which promote gender equality and eliminate gender-based discrimination (Chambers and Cummings, 2014). The new constitution of January 2014 is seen by many as an indication that Tunisia has renewed its constitutional commitment not only to preserve its achievements in gender equality, but also to promote them, guaranteeing Tunisian women a full and equal place in society. In addition, in 2016, Tunisia officially adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The fifth Goal – to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls – is widely considered as a fundamental pillar of all the SDGs.

Yet, despite this progress, Tunisia still faces important challenges in terms of gender equality. It remains a patriarchal society and gender-based discrimination persists both in public and in private. Although women enjoy similar levels of education to men, this is not reflected in the labour market: women constitute just a quarter of the workforce and face an unemployment rate that is twice that for men. In contrast to the legal framework, conservative social norms give clearly distinct roles to men and women, not only in their private lives, but also in the labour market; i.e. traditional gender relations persist along many dimensions. In addition, women's access to land ownership is quite complex in rural areas, as ownership tends to be transferred to men, even in the case of inheritance. The predominance of a patriarchal culture in society means that women cannot even claim their rights.

The WEAI proposed in this report can describe the extent of female disempowerment, both in absolute terms and relative to men, along many dimensions and in a very detailed way. It can also be used to monitor progress in conjunction with policy interventions over time.

Section 3: The WEAI-Tunisia (WEAI-TN): Method and data collection

3.1 The WEAI methodology

The Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) measures the empowerment, agency and inclusion of women in the agricultural sector (Alkire et al., 2013). It is a composite measurement tool that measures to what extent women can take control over critical parts of their lives in the household, community and economy. The index makes it possible to document the extent to which women are disempowered, and to identify domains where action is needed to increase women's decision-making power and autonomy. It can also be used to track progress over time.

The WEAI exists in different versions. We refer to the "original WEAI" whenever we mean the "original" and "basic" methodology, on which all other versions, including ours, build (Alkire et al., 2013). There is also an "abbreviated WEAI" (A-WEAI), a shorter version of the original WEAI (Malapit et al., 2015), and a "project WEAI" (Pro-WEAI), which is broader and specifically targeted to agriculture and food security projects. This report presents an application of the WEAI to rural Tunisia; hereafter, we refer to it mostly just as "WEAI" or "WEAI-TN".

Compared with other countries to which the WEAI has been applied, such as Bangladesh (Sraboni et al., 2013), Guatemala (Peterman et al., 2012a) and Uganda (Peterman et al., 2012b), Tunisia has a higher GDP per capita and agriculture is less dominant. Moreover, women have a higher level of educational attainment and their role in society differs in many respects from those of women in the other cases. As highlighted in the previous section, in Tunisia, as in other countries of the MENA region, female labour force participation is low, also among the youth. This poor employment outcome is often attributed to prevailing cultural attitudes, gendered laws and weak support services. Women rarely take the top positions of power in companies, politics or within their communities (ILO, 2017b). This context has important implications for how female empowerment is measured. Hence, this report builds on the original WEAI, but adapts it to the specific context of the MENA region and, especially, Tunisia.

The WEAI measures absolute and relative empowerment (relative to men) at the individual level and aggregates it to a higher level, such as a socio-economic group, a region or a country. Absolute empowerment is measured across five domains and it counts for 90 per cent of the WEAI. This part of the index is called "Five Domains of Empowerment" (5DE). Relative empowerment is measured through the "Gender Parity Index". This part of the WEAI compares a woman's achievements with those of the primary male in the household. It counts for the remaining 10 per cent of the WEAI. We first discuss how we operationalized the five domains in the Tunisian context, and then we explain the construction of each sub-index and how we aggregate it into the overall index. In the explanations below, we use a

“woman” as the unit of analysis, but the calculation of the 5DE index for men follows the same procedure.

3.2 The Five Domains of Empowerment (5DE)

As in the original WEAI (Alkire et al., 2013), we measure empowerment within five domains: production, resources, income, leadership and time use. Table 3.1 shows the indicators we use for each domain and their respective weights. The weighting is such that each of the five domains is given a weight 1/5 (20 per cent). Within domains, each indicator is given an equal weight. The indicators are operationalized as follows.

Table 3.1 The domain indicators for empowerment used in the WEAI-TN

Five Domains of Empowerment (5DE)	Indicators	Weight	Policy issues that are generally triggered
Production	1. Input in productive decisions	1/5	Economic empowerment
Resources	2. Ownership of assets	1/10	
	3. Access to and decisions on credit	1/10	
Income	4. Control over use of income	1/5	Decision-making and representation
Leadership	5. Group membership	1/10	
	6. Speaking in public	1/10	
Time use	7. Workload	1/10	Equitable workload balance
	8. Leisure	1/10	

For the first domain, production, the indicator is **input in productive decisions**. For this, we check whether a woman has the power to make decisions in at least one economic activity in which she participates. The activities we consider are agriculture, livestock, fishery, non-agricultural independent activities and non-agricultural wage work. If a woman reports not being among the (up to) three persons who in most cases make decisions regarding the respective activity, we consider her input inadequate and hence she is not empowered. Conversely, a woman is empowered if, in at least one of the activities she participates in, she has some decision-making power or, if she has no decision-making power, she can exert influence on the decisions taken by others. If the woman does not participate in any of the economic activities in the household, we consider her to be disempowered.

For the resources domain, we focus on asset ownership and access to credit. For **ownership of assets**, we check whether a woman has sole or joint ownership of at least one large asset owned by the household. We consider as relevant assets agricultural land, land for construction, real estate (apart from the house the household lives in), the ownership of a non-farm enterprise and the ownership of a car and/or motorcycle. Also, if a household has none of these assets, we consider the woman to be disempowered. For **access to and decisions on credit**, we check whether a woman has taken credit, or at least could take credit if she wanted. A woman is not empowered if she does not have access to credit, or if

she has taken credit but has no power to decide on the use of the loan or its repayment. As well as formal credit, we also consider informal credit sources and microloans.

For the third domain, income, we use **control over use of income** as the sole indicator. For this indicator, we again consider all the activities the woman participates in. If in none of these activities the woman has at least moderate influence on the decision on how the income from that activity is spent, she is regarded as not empowered. As with the other indicators, if the woman does not participate in any of the household's economic activities, we consider the woman as not empowered. Conversely, a woman is empowered if she has a bank account (solely or jointly) and has decision-making power regarding the use of income stored in that account.

For the fourth domain, leadership, the first indicator is **group membership**. A woman is empowered if she is free to join at least one group if she wants to. We consider civic groups, cultural associations, sport clubs, political parties and religious associations. The second indicator considers **speaking in public**. If a woman is free to speak in public or be a candidate for a position in a political party or a social institution, she is considered empowered.

The fifth domain is time use. First, we check a woman's empowerment regarding her **workload**. A woman is not empowered if her daily working time (in November, i.e. the month of the survey) exceeds 10.5 hours. Work includes agricultural and/or non-agricultural work, domestic work and taking care of other household members (children and parents/parents-in-law). Second, we consider the woman's empowerment in terms of leisure. Empowerment is considered inadequate if the woman rates her own leisure time as "very unsatisfying" or "not satisfying" (in contrast to "neither satisfying nor unsatisfying", "satisfying" or "very satisfying").

3.3 The Five Domains of Empowerment Index (5DE Index)

The 5DE Index is constructed using a robust multidimensional methodology known as the Alkire-Foster method (Alkire and Santos, 2010; Alkire and Foster, 2011a, 2011b). The measure shows in how many domains women are empowered. This method can, for example, distinguish between women who are disempowered in just one domain and those disempowered across several domains at the same time. The 5DE index is calculated according to the following formula:

$$5DE = H_e + (H_n \times A_a)$$

where:

$$H_e + H_n = 100\% \text{ and } 0 < A_a < 100\%.$$

In the above formula, H_e is the percentage of empowered women, where empowered means that a woman has adequate achievements in four of the five domains or is empowered in a combination of the weighted indicators that make up at least 80 per cent of the total. H_n is the percentage of women not yet empowered, and A_a is the percentage of domains in which disempowered woman have adequate achievements. Hence, the 5DE Index yields a value between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater empowerment. The index value can

be increased by increasing the number of empowered women and by increasing the number of domains in which disempowered women are empowered.

Another way of writing the 5DE Index is:

$$5DE = 1 - M_0 = 1 - (H_n \times A_n)$$

Where M_0 is the disempowerment index, calculated as the product of the proportion of disempowered women (H_n) and the percentage of domains in which disempowered women do not have adequate achievements (A_n).⁵

3.4 The Gender Parity Index (GPI)

The GPI compares the 5DE profile of the primary adult female in a household with that of the primary adult male. Typically, the primary adult female and primary adult male will be husband and wife, but the relationship between the two does not necessarily matter. Households without a primary adult male are excluded from the computation of the GPI. The GPI shows the share of woman who are as empowered as their male counterparts. For those pairs where there is a disparity, the GPI shows the relative empowerment gap between the woman's 5DE score and the man's. The GPI is calculated according to the following formula:

$$GPI = H_p + (H_w \times R_p)$$

where:

$$H_p + H_w = 100\% \text{ and } 0 < R_p < 100\%.$$

Here, H_p is the percentage of women with gender parity and H_w is the percentage of women without gender parity. R_p is the average parity score that women without gender parity experience relative to the primary male in the household. Hence, the GPI can be increased by increasing the share of women who have parity with their male counterparts or by reducing the gap for those women who are less empowered.⁶

3.5 Aggregation to the WEAI

The WEAI methodology gives a weight of 90 per cent to the 5DE Index and a weight of 10 per cent to the GPI. The weighting is obviously arbitrary – alternative weights could be used, for instance by giving more weight to gender imbalances – but to ensure comparability with previous applications, we stick to this weighting. Hence, the WEAI is computed as follows:

$$WEAI = (5DE \times 0.9) + (GPI \times 0.1).$$

⁵ This formula is obtained by substituting above as follows: $5DE = (1 - H_n) + H_n \times (1 - A_n)$.

⁶ Another way of writing the GPI is $GPI = 1 - (H_w \times R_w)$, where R_w is the average percentage shortfall women without gender parity experience relative to the male in the household. This formula is obtained by substituting above as follows: $GPI = (1 - H_w) + H_w \times (1 - R_w)$.

3.6 Data collection

The data used to calculate the WEAI were collected using a survey designed specifically for that purpose. In total, 1,150 households were interviewed. The objective was not only to measure female empowerment in rural areas, but also to allow for comparisons of female empowerment in rural areas and in urban areas. For this purpose, households were sampled in both rural and urban areas. However, rural households were oversampled to ensure there would be a sufficiently large sample size to allow the calculation of indicators that apply to rural areas only. The sample is representative in both urban and rural areas at the household level, and survey weights can be used to generate results that are also representative for households at the national level. This is also illustrated in Appendix 3.1, where the sample structure of our survey is compared with that of the Tunisia Labour Market Panel Survey from 2014.

Households were selected based on a stratified random sampling methodology, where the stratification was made at the level of governorates, delegations and sectors.⁷ Sectors are divided into rural and urban ones. A total of 115 sectors were randomly selected, 48 of which were rural and 67 semi-urban and urban (referred to as “urban” hereafter). Ten households from each sector were interviewed (see Appendix 3.2 for the household selection methodology).

In each household, the household head, his spouse and up to two young adults (aged 18–30) living in the household, whether children of the primary or secondary respondent or of other household members, were randomly sampled and interviewed. If more than two young adults were living in the household, two were randomly selected (see Appendix 3.3 for an explanation of the young respondent selection methodology). This led to a total sample size of 2,793 individuals, of which 1,172 were from rural areas. Around 11 per cent of these 2,793 individuals were not considered due to refusal, sickness, the age restriction of the sample or other reasons. This resulted in a useable sample of 2,511 individuals. Of these, 1,079 were from rural areas, 722 were youth and 1,320 were female. The rural sample comprised 576 women and 398 youth. Given the sampling strategy, the survey was representative for primary decision-makers (household heads) in the households, but not for the population in general.

The survey was jointly implemented with BJKa, a Tunisian-based survey institute. The interviewer training took place in October 2017. Interviews started directly after the training and were completed by December 2017. In total, 29 enumerators were used in the field to conduct the interviews. The survey was conducted using tablet computers and the survey software SurveyToGo. This helped to ensure a high quality of data, as many consistency checks could be built into the survey and the data did not have to be typed into a database after collection. The data quality could be verified in the field, while the interviews were ongoing.

⁷ Following the 2014 census, *Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat* (RGPH 2014), by National Statistics (INS: www.ins.nat.tn).

3.7 Survey modules

We followed the structure of the general WEAI methodology and developed a household questionnaire that gathered questions on the socio-economic composition, the activities and the owned assets of the household and its members. The household head (only) answered the household questionnaire, while for the individual questionnaires, each individual respondent answered a questionnaire separately. The individual questionnaire included detailed modules on labour market participation, psychological well-being and decision-making power in relevant domains. Hence, in line with the WEAI methodology, we included the core domains of empowerment for the two main respondents, including production, resources, income, leadership and time use, which allowed us to measure empowerment on the five core domains and to calculate a GPI score as outlined above. Furthermore, modules on labour market participation and (un)employment, migration, the use of social media, psychological well-being and attitudes towards domestic violence were also included.

For young household members, some sections of the questionnaire were skipped, such as household decision-making. But some sections that directly relate to young persons were added, for example regarding their autonomy in decision-making and concerns for their future and current life. As a result, the survey not only allowed us to measure female empowerment, as outline above, but also enabled an analysis of youth empowerment. This is discussed in more detail in Section 6 of this report.

3.8 Sample structure in rural areas

Since the focus of this report is on rural areas, we briefly describe in this section the rural sample of our survey. The rural sample consisted of 480 households in total. As shown in table 3.2, the average household size was 4.2 persons. There were on average 2.6 members per household in the 19–64 years age group, 1.2 members below the age of 19 and 0.4 members above the age of 64. This indicates that Tunisia is about to complete its demographic transition and could, in principle, benefit from its low dependency ratio (0.6 children per adult) and relatively large workforce. The literature refers to such a situation as a demographic gift or dividend (Bloom and Williamson, 1998). However, without the creation of new jobs, this could instead turn into a demographic burden. The average monthly household income in our sample was 514 Tunisian dinars (TND) (equivalent to US\$215 using the official exchange rate, or US\$410 using PPP conversion factors⁸). A quarter of rural households owned agricultural land and 13 per cent owned livestock. Nearly half of rural households in the sample (48 per cent) were located in the coastal area.

Table 3.3 describes the sample at the individual level. Almost all household heads were older than 30 and hence were not included in our youth sample. Spouses were somewhat younger, but again most were older than 30. About a quarter of our sample were individuals aged 30 or younger. Note that this may not correspond to the Tunisian average, as the age structure of our sample was, to a large extent, driven by our sampling strategy. The average age in our sample was 53 years for men and 49 years for women. There were more women than men without any formal education: 46 per cent of all men had at least completed

⁸ See UN Database (<http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=MDG&f=seriesRowID:699>).

Table 3.2 Structure of the rural sample, households

	Mean	SD
Household size	4.2	1.6
Children 0–5 years	0.4	0.7
Children 6–18 years	0.8	1.1
Adults 19–64 years	2.6	1.3
Older adults 65+ years	0.4	0.6
Children per adult	0.6	0.7
Average monthly household income (TND) ¹	513.7	376.8
Agricultural households (%) ²	25.4	
Household owns livestock (%)	13.1	
Household lives in coastal area (%)	47.9	
Number of households	480	

¹ Income is reported in income brackets. To calculate mean income, it was assumed that each household had an income corresponding to the mean income of the corresponding bracket. For the upper bracket, which had no upper bound, we used the lower bound as an income proxy.

² Agricultural households are defined as households that own agricultural land.

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

Table 3.3 Structure of the rural sample, all primary decision-makers and their spouses

	Men		Women	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Respondent types				
Head of household and > 30 years (%)	98.1		17.2	
Head of household and ≤ 30 years (%)	1.9		0.2	
Spouse and > 30 years (%)	0.0		73.1	
Spouse and ≤ 30 years (%)	0.0		9.5	
Demographics				
Age (years)	52.6	12.5	48.8	13.1
Married (%)	96.0		86.3	
Level of education¹				
No education (%)	19.5		39.3	
Primary education (%)	45.7		39.3	
Secondary education (%)	23.5		17.4	
Tertiary or higher education (%)	11.2		1.1	
Vocational training (%)	11.3		8.4	

Table 3.3 continued on page 16

Table 3.3 continued from page 15

	Men		Women	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<i>Employment status (last 12 months)¹</i>				
Agriculture, livestock or fish farming (%)	17.1		6.6	
Wage worker, incl. agriculture (%)	36.6		8.2	
Entrepreneur/independent worker (%)	28.1		7.1	
Unemployed (%)	19.0		11.9	
Inactive or student (%)	28.1		76.6	
Number of individuals	374		453	

¹ An individual can have vocational training on top of formal schooling and possibly had various employment statuses within the 12 months before the survey. Hence, numbers do not add up to 100%.

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

secondary, tertiary or any other higher education or vocational training, while for women the share was 27 per cent. If one focuses just on youth, as we do later in the report, the gap is much smaller. Regarding employment status, 17 per cent of all men worked on their own farm in the 12 months before the survey, 37 per cent were wage workers (partly also in agriculture), 28 per cent had a non-agricultural firm, mostly informal, and 19 per cent reported being unemployed in the last 12 months. For women, inactivity was much more frequent, although it is likely that a substantial fraction of women who were classified as inactive undertook some form of hidden unemployment. Among employed women, 7 per cent worked on their own farm, 8 per cent worked as wage workers and 7 per cent worked in their own non-agricultural firm.

Appendix 3.1 Comparison of the WEAI Tunisia Survey 2017 and the TLMPS 2014

To validate our sampling strategy, table 3.4 shows a comparison of the summary household statistics from our survey with those from the nationally representative Tunisia Labour Market Panel Survey (TLMPS) of 2014, implemented by National Statistics Tunisia (INS). TLMPS 2014 used an initial sample of around 5,160 households drawn from a larger sample that is regularly used to conduct the quarterly survey on population and employment in Tunisia. This larger sample contained 18,000 households as of the last quarter of 2012. TLMPS experienced a rather high rate of attrition, so the statistics shown in table 3.4 have been reweighted using weights provided by the INS. Although the TLMPS data were collected three years before the WEAI Tunisia Survey data, and hence are imperfect benchmarks, our survey results show almost exactly the same household structure, suggesting that our sampling procedure achieved representativeness. We cannot validate the sample of individuals, as our sampling strategy did not aim for representativeness at that level, but rather targeted specific people in the household.

Table 3.4 Test of representativeness

	WEAI-TN 2017	TLMPS 2014
Share rural	0.33	0.31
Age of household head	53.8	52.0
Household head is male	0.81	0.83
Household head is married	0.81	0.80
Household head has secondary education	0.30	0.28
Household head is entrepreneur	0.19	0.17
Household size	3.93	4.38
Household members aged 19–64	2.51	2.53
Household monthly income (TND)	666	533
Household has agricultural land	0.14	0.12
Household owns a car	0.20	0.20
Household owns a motorcycle	0.14	0.14
Household owns a computer	0.29	0.27
Household owns a fridge	0.97	0.97

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey 2017 and TLMPS 2014.

Appendix 3.2 Method for selection of households

Households were selected based on a stratified random sampling methodology, where the stratification was made at the level of governorates, delegations and sectors. Tunisia counts 3035 sectors, being villages or towns or neighbourhoods thereof, of which 1135 are rural.

Each sampled sector had several possible starting points, which are defined as public locations with high visibility, such as administrative buildings, schools, mosques, hotels or particularly notable shops (supermarkets, souks etc.), and which are well known to the public and the survey team. Upon arriving into the sector, the team supervisor selected the starting point by locating the midpoint(s) of the main road(s) through the sector. The nearest public location to this midpoint served as the starting point. A team of interviewers was responsible for all the interviews from one starting point.

A total of 15 households were selected in each sampled sector. Ten households were selected to be interviewed. An additional five households were selected to serve as possible replacements if any of the ten households could not be surveyed; for instance, if none of the potential respondents were eligible, if a household refused to participate or if respondents were not found after three visits. The first household was selected using the “date + 1” method (summing the numbers of the day of the interview and adding one), being the “date + 1”-th household on the left side of the street. Then, to select the following households, the interviewer skipped a certain number of households (every five households in urban sectors; every three households in rural sectors), also on the left side of the street. Selected households were given a rank number.

Appendix 3.3 Method for selection of young household members

If there were more than two young members in a household, the Kish grid method (Kish, 1949) was applied to select two of those youths randomly. In the Kish grid method, first, the number of eligible members is determined (e.g. four youth between 18 and 30 years old). Next, these are ordered oldest to youngest and given a number, the oldest being the first, the youngest being the last. Then, one uses a Kish grid, such as the one shown in table 3.5, using the household rank number and the number of young members (eligible respondents). The intersection of the respective row and column then determines which youth to select first. For example, in table 3.5, if there are four youth household members in household 7, the third young member will be selected, as well as the one following in the age rank, youngster number 4. If the Kish grid had indicated the youngest member (at the bottom of the list) (e.g. in household 8), then the first member of the age list (the oldest) would be chosen as second respondent.

Table 3.5 Kish grid

Number of young household members	Household Rank									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1
4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2
5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
6	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4
7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3
8	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	1	2
9	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1
10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Section 4: The WEAI-TN: Women’s empowerment in rural Tunisia

4.1 A description of the key findings

For the sample of rural adult women co-residing with at least another adult man, the WEAI is 0.434 (see table 4.1). Descriptive statistics for all variables that were used to build the WEAI can be found in the statistical appendix at the end of this report. The WEAI is a weighted average of the 5DE Index value of 0.400 and the GPI value of 0.739, where the former contributes 90 per cent and the latter 10 per cent. In total, 95 per cent of all women are disempowered, i.e. they do not have adequate achievements in at least four of the five domains or in a combination of the weighted indicators that make up at least 80 per cent of the total. This means that a mere 5 per cent of women are empowered, i.e. do have adequate achievements in at least four of the five domains. This is a very low share, which, as figure 4.1a shows, is mainly due to women’s very low economic empowerment, i.e. their low input in productive decisions, limited control over resources (assets and credit) and

Table 4.1 Results for WEAI-TN, all primary decision-makers and their spouses


Indexes	Rural Tunisia	
	Women	Men
Disempowered headcount, H_n (%)	95.0	74.0
Average inadequacy score, A_n (%)	63.1	54.5
Disempowerment index, M_o	0.600	0.403
5DE Index ($1 - M_o$)	0.400	0.597
Number of observations	424	358
Percentage of data used ¹	93.6	95.7
Percentage of women with no gender parity, H_w	64.1	
Average empowerment gap, R_w (%)	40.6	
Gender Parity Index	0.739	
Number of women in dual household	329	
Percentage of data used ²	77.6	
WEAI	0.434	

¹ From the rural sample, 6.4% of female and 4.3% of male observations could not be included into the 5DE Index calculation because of missing information.

² From the 424 women included into the 5DE Index construction, only 77.6% lived in a dual household (i.e. with a primary male respondent present).

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

Figure 4.1 Contribution of each indicator to disempowerment, by sex




Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

very low control over the use of income. The leadership and time use domains are not such important drivers of disempowerment; rural women in Tunisia are “relatively” free to speak in public and have an acceptable workload and leisure time. This is, as we discuss further below, quite different from the findings for Bangladesh, Uganda and Guatemala, where rural women are more empowered with respect to productive decisions and resources, but less empowered when it comes to leadership and time use (Alkire et al., 2013).

The share of Tunisian men who are disempowered is 74 per cent, which is substantially lower than the share of Tunisian women (95 per cent, as described above). However, it is striking to see such a high absolute level of disempowerment among men. Only about a quarter of all men can be considered as empowered. Disempowered men have inadequate achievements in almost 60 per cent of all indicators.

Figure 4.1b shows that for men, like women, low participation in production and productive decisions and limited control over resources and the use of income from productive activities

Figure 4.2 Percentage of men and women disempowered, by indicator

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

substantially contribute to their high level of disempowerment.⁹ Almost two-thirds (64.1 per cent) of women lack gender parity with the primary male in their household. This is a relatively high share. Among those 64.1 per cent, the empowerment gap between them and the male counterpart in their household is 40.6 per cent.

For each indicator used to construct the 5DE Index, figure 4.2 shows a direct comparison of the shares of men and women who are disempowered. Again, men and women both show high levels of disempowerment in the economic sphere, but women lag significantly behind men in all indicators in the production, resources and income domains. Levels of disempowerment are much lower for leadership and time use, and gender differences are relatively small. The only exception is group membership. While almost half of the women in our sample reported being free to join at least one of the listed types of group (civic groups, cultural associations, sport clubs, political parties and religious associations), the proportion is substantially higher for men.

Next, we compare levels of disempowerment for subgroups, namely by age (aged 30 or below vs over 30), by main economic activity of the household (agricultural vs non-agricultural) and by location (coastal vs non-coastal areas). Table 4.2 shows the results for all eight indicators.

⁹ The percentage contribution of each indicator to overall disempowerment is calculated by dividing the weighted censored headcount ratio for a particular indicator by the population's five domains of disempowerment index. The former describes the share of people in a given population who are disempowered in the respective indicator, whereas the population's five domains of disempowerment index is composed of the weighted sum of all the indicators' censored headcount ratios for a given population (Alkire et al., 2013).

Table 4.2 Number and percentage of men and women disempowered per indicator, by age and household characteristics

	Access										N	Disem- powerment Index	5DE Index	Gender Parity Index	WEAI	
	Input in productive decisions	Ownership of assets	Access to and decisions on credit	Control over use of income	Group member- ship	Speaking in public	Workload	Leisure	%	%						
Age group																
Men																
adult (>30)	68.9	60.1	58.7	51.0	37.3	5.7	8.3	24.5	351	0.403	0.597					
youth (≤30)	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	7	•	•					
Women																
adult (>30)	88.6	88.6	73.5	84.2	54.8	46.2	12.5	24.2	385	0.600	0.400	0.736	0.433			
youth (≤30)	92.3	84.6	74.4	84.6	46.2	5.1	10.3	17.9	39	0.592	0.408	0.766	0.443			
Household activity																
Men																
agricultural	56.5	26.6	58.1	45.2	35.5	4.0	10.5	16.9	124	0.315	0.685					
non-agricultural	82.8	77.3	82.0	81.3	53.9	7.0	6.3	16.4	234	0.450	0.550					
Women																
agricultural	76.1	78.2	58.5	54.3	38.5	6.8	6.8	28.2	128	0.564	0.436	0.734	0.466			
non-agricultural	91.6	92.9	69.9	85.5	54.1	8.8	14.9	26.7	296	0.615	0.385	0.742	0.421			
Location																
Men																
coastal	68.2	63.1	60.5	46.5	24.8	4.5	8.3	21.7	157	0.379	0.621					
non-coastal	84.7	86.7	71.9	79.6	43.9	7.1	16.3	20.4	201	0.422	0.578					
Women																
coastal	70.1	58.2	56.7	54.7	47.3	7.0	8.0	26.4	196	0.565	0.435	0.735	0.465			
non-coastal	92.5	89.5	75.0	88.2	62.7	9.2	8.8	26.3	228	0.629	0.371	0.743	0.408			

• = sample of male youth is smaller than 10 and hence no value is shown.

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

Comparing women aged 30 or below with those above 30 reveals only minor differences in terms of economic empowerment. Younger women are somewhat more often disempowered regarding their input in productive decisions and somewhat less often disempowered regarding their ownership of assets, but otherwise it is obvious that the dominant share of women is systematically disempowered irrespective of the age group. This is different for the leadership and time use domains. Here, younger women show higher empowerment throughout, i.e. younger women in rural areas are less constrained in joining a group and speaking in public than their older counterparts. This seems to reflect a difference in attitudes and values in the environment in which younger women grow up. They also have a smaller workload and more leisure time than their older counterparts, which might be connected to the fact that they may still be studying, be doing less domestic work or facing higher youth unemployment rates. For men, such a comparison across age groups is not possible as there were too few male primary decision-makers below the age of 30 in our sample. However, in section 6.2 we focus on the youth more broadly, independent of their position in the household.

A disaggregation of the results for groups of individuals living in agricultural and non-agricultural households can also provide additional interesting insights. Agricultural households are defined as households that own agricultural cultivated land. Since agriculture in rural areas offers a large and diverse set of production activities, economic empowerment is for both men and women significantly higher in agricultural households than in non-agricultural households. Whereas 92 per cent of all women in non-agricultural households are disempowered with respect to productive decisions, only 76 per cent of all women in agricultural households are disempowered in that respect. The differences are similar for asset ownership and access to and decisions on credit, but even larger for control over the use of income. Women in agricultural households have significantly more control over the use of income than women in non-agricultural households, presumably because women in agriculture may grow and sell their own crops, generating a distinct source of income for the women themselves. For men, the differences between agricultural and non-agricultural households are also very pronounced, in particular for the ownership of assets and the control over the use of income. Men and women in agricultural households are also more empowered regarding leadership. In terms of time use, women in agricultural households seem to enjoy a lower workload than women in non-agricultural households, although the level of disempowerment in both categories of household is very low to begin with. Overall, one can state that absolute female and male empowerment is higher in agricultural households than in non-agricultural households, but that gender inequality in economic empowerment is equally pronounced in both types of household. There are significant gaps between women and men but for access to and decisions on credit.

Women's empowerment is higher overall in the rural coastal areas than in the rural non-coastal areas. In rural non-coastal areas, more than in other areas, women work in unpaid family labour, particularly women in their mid-30s to mid-50s. Among younger women, unemployment is more widespread and higher than in coastal areas and higher than in Greater Tunis (see also Hanmer et al., 2017). The same can be observed for men. Strikingly, in coastal areas the shares of women who are disempowered in the production and resources domains are lower than the shares of disempowered men in these domains.

4.2 A discussion of the key findings

The findings from the WEAI-TN survey are striking in several respects. Women in rural areas show a very low level of economic empowerment, i.e. with respect to production, access to resources and control over use of income, but relatively high levels of empowerment in the leadership and time use domains. This raises the question of why female empowerment in the economic domains is so low, lower even than in countries that have significantly lower levels of GDP per capita, such as Bangladesh, Guatemala and Uganda. An important explanatory factor behind this apparent puzzle is the lack of formal wage employment opportunities for women, in conjunction with the unattractiveness of agricultural and, especially, non-agricultural informal activities.

Women in Tunisia, particularly younger women, have relatively high levels of education and hence have high reservation wages. Table 4.3 shows that in the year 2000, women and men had comparable enrolment rates in upper secondary and tertiary schooling, but that in 2015 women had significantly higher enrolment rates. Furthermore, while Tunisian households in rural areas are poor, the fact that their incomes are still well above subsistence level, and above the international poverty line of US\$1.90 per day, can also help to explain why female reservation wages are relatively high. In other words, many women can afford to remain inactive in the absence of formal job opportunities and hence show low levels of economic empowerment.

Another factor affecting inactivity among women in Tunisia, besides wages, is that the working conditions in the jobs available are considered inappropriate in the cultural context. The requirements of such jobs complicate the reconciliation of traditional domestic roles with economic roles, or the jobs are in workplaces where women's sexual and reputational safety may not be preserved, due to direct contact with male clients, colleagues, owners or superiors. Indeed, Mouelhi and Goaid (2017) state that "women have a preference for good jobs (formal jobs or public/government jobs). If they can't get such jobs many women leave the labour force entirely rather than settle for informal jobs." Hence women have high "reservation working conditions" (Assaad, 2017). Appropriate working conditions and reservation wages are determined by social norms in the society, which forbid – or at least do not tolerate – women working in many of the typical activities that the informal sector offers. These norms also expect women to take care of most of the household chores, leaving little time for an additional market activity.

Table 4.3 Gross educational enrolment rates 2000 and 2015, by sex

	Men		Women	
	2000	2015	2000	2015
Primary	118.2	115.8	111.4	112.5
Lower secondary	101.7	103.5	102.1	101.9
Upper secondary	51.0	70.31	55.7	84.01
Tertiary	18.9	26.2	19.6	43.3

¹ Data for 2011.

Source: <http://data.uis.unesco.org>.

Table 4.4 Labour force participation (percentages), by sex

	Men		Women	
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
Wage worker	35.2	40.3	12.3	14.7
Entrepreneur/independent worker	23.7	22.7	5.9	4.7
Unemployed	27.2	15.3	18.1	15.1
of which registered with BETI	14.6	18.1	27.9	29.5
Inactive or student	26.6	34.4	68.4	71.2

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

However, it is almost equally striking to see that a substantial share of men who are also economically disempowered. For men, disempowerment reflects a lack of quality jobs and the unattractiveness of jobs in traditional labour-intensive sectors, such as agriculture and construction, which pay relatively low wages, though not to the same extent as for women. Many jobs that are not acceptable for women can be done by men.

These findings also imply that there is not only strong competition among men and among women for decent jobs, but also between men and women. Men and women compete at least partly for the same quality jobs. As a result, given the specific context, it is not surprising to see women being crowded out by men; the “few good jobs” that exist are filled by men rather than women. Table 4.4 shows that in our sample women are less likely than men to be a wage worker or own account worker, but face a comparable rate of unemployment and are substantially more often inactive. It must be assumed that a significant share of women classified as inactive are in fact discouraged women, i.e. women who in principle would like to work but have given up the idea of finding a job. Mouelhi and Goaid (2017) report that women suffered the most job losses during the revolution, losing 53.7 per cent of the estimated 137,000 jobs lost in 2011. A crisis in the textile sector, where the female share of the labour force has always been very high, had already started in 2009, following the recession among European trading partners and increased competition from Asia, which also took away many female jobs.

The suggestion that women are crowded out of the labour market by men is consistent with attitudes that we collected in our survey. We asked men and women whether they agree with the statement that jobs should rather be given to men than to women. Interestingly, as table 4.5 shows, among the rural population about 62 per cent of all men and 52 per cent of all women agreed. Young persons, particularly men, agreed less frequently. In urban areas, however, where one may expect the share to be much lower, we still find that 56 per cent of men agree, although only 40 per cent of women do. Among youth, an equal share of young men agree, i.e. 55 per cent, but few young women, only 31 per cent. This may reflect, on the one hand, young men’s fear of not being able to find a job, and by extension take care of a family, and on the other hand, the aspirations of highly educated women regarding their professional careers. This conflict has also been described by Chambers and Cummings (2014) in a recent report published by the Overseas Development Institute. The authors defend the hypothesis that rising unemployment in the context of the global

Table 4.5 Attitudes towards female employment: Agreement with the statement “Jobs should rather be given to men than to women” (percentages)

	Men (household heads/ primary decision- makers)	All men	Young men (≤ 30)	All women	Young women (≤ 30)
Rural areas	65.0	61.5	51.6	51.5	48.0
coastal	71.3	67.0	53.6	48.7	35.3
non-coastal	59.8	57.1	50.0	53.8	58.5
Urban areas	56.1	55.8	55.3	40.4	31.3

Note: Agreement means the respondent strongly or somewhat agrees.

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

crisis has meant that women’s work is more precarious and that high male unemployment may in such a context indeed feed negative attitudes to women’s paid work. This in turn can lead to women’s wages being systematically lower than men’s and men typically being given priority in employment opportunities.

From a policy point of view, this means that the creation of new and decent jobs needs absolute priority. These jobs must target both men and women. For women, this may require support not only for classical value chains in the manufacturing sector, where women work in safe and female-friendly conditions, but also for value chains that produce more sophisticated products and services, where secondary and tertiary education are appropriately rewarded. In addition, traditional mindsets may have to be changed, i.e. men and women should agree that they have the same right to get a job. There is still a difference between what legislation says and what occurs in practice in the labour market. Although the labour code and the new constitution prohibit any gender discrimination in the labour market, women’s labour market participation lags far behind that of men and the female unemployment rate is almost double the male rate. De Silva de Alwis et al. (2017) attribute this paradox to, among other things, ambiguities in the constitution, which on the one hand prescribes gender equality, and on the other hand anchors the political and cultural system in religion.

Section 5: Comparing the WEAI-TN with other WEAI pilot studies

Since its conception, the WEAI has been piloted in several countries. WEAI was initially developed as a tool to monitor any changes in women's empowerment that resulted from the US Government's Feed the Future initiative, but it has received increasing attention in the literature and policy programming, including further developments of the index. In this section, we place the results from the WEAI survey in rural Tunisia into context by comparing them with the findings from other WEAI studies. A full cross-country comparison is not appropriate as methodologies differ between country studies, with a special design being used for Tunisia. However, it is of interest to investigate which dimensions contribute to (dis)empowerment and how they differ for men and women across the various countries where WEAI methodologies have been applied.

Alkire et al. (2013) provide an in-depth discussion on the inception and methodology behind the WEAI and discuss the results from the first pilot studies in which the WEAI was tested. These studies took place in Bangladesh, Guatemala and Uganda, covering examples of the Asian, Latin American and African contexts. Our study is the first to apply the WEAI to the MENA region.

Table 5.1 shows the results from our study compared with those from the pilot studies, as described in Alkire et al. (2013). The WEAI for the pilot study conducted in Bangladesh was 0.762. Only 39 per cent of women in the sample area were empowered. Likewise, 40 per cent of men were empowered. The 61 per cent disempowered women in Bangladesh had on average inadequate achievements in 42 per cent of the 5DE, and the 60 per cent of disempowered men had inadequate achievements in 34 per cent of the domains. The main contributions towards women's disempowerment were weak leadership and lack of control over resources (Alkire et al., 2013). A little less than half of the women were not empowered and lacked access to credit and a third of the women were not empowered and had no decision-making power over transfer of assets. Men's disempowerment was characterized by lack of leadership, lack of influence in the community and "time poverty". In contrast, they reported very little disempowerment in control over income and decision-making around agricultural production domains. In the pilot areas of Bangladesh, almost 60 per cent of women had gender parity with the primary male in the household. However, for the remaining 40 per cent that were less empowered, the empowerment gap between them and the primary male of the household was 25 per cent.

In Guatemala, the WEAI was 0.702, slightly lower than in Bangladesh. The share of disempowered women was 71 per cent, in contrast to 39 per cent for men, showing a large difference in empowerment between men and women. These disempowered women had inadequate achievements in 44 per cent of the domains, while the disempowered men had inadequate achievements in around a third of the domains. The main contributions to women's disempowerment were lack of leadership and control over the use of income (see figure 5.1). The decomposition of the 5DE Index shows a similar picture for men, where

Table 5.1 Comparison of WEAI Tunisia study results with WEAI results for Bangladesh, Guatemala and Uganda

Indexes	Rural Tunisia		Southwestern Bangladesh		Western Highlands, Guatemala		Uganda	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Disempowered headcount, H_n (%)	95.0	74.0	61.0	59.8	71.3	39.1	56.7	37.0
Average inadequacy score, A_n (%)	63.1	54.5	41.6	33.7	43.5	32.9	37.2	32.8
Disempowerment index, M_0	0.600	0.403	0.254	0.201	0.310	0.129	0.211	0.122
5DE Index ($1 - M_0$)	0.400	0.597	0.746	0.799	0.690	0.871	0.789	0.878
Number of observations	424	358	436	338	237	197	335	262
Percentage of women with no gender parity, H_{GPI} (%)	64.1		40.2		64.2		45.6	
Average empowerment gap, I_{GPI} (%)	40.6		25.2		29.1		22.4	
Gender Parity Index	0.739		0.988		0.813		0.898	
Number of women in dual households	329		350		276		275	
WEAI	0.434		0.762		0.702		0.800	


Note: Disempowerment cut-off $k = 20\%$.

Sources: WEAI Tunisia Survey 2017; Alkire et al., 2013.

the largest contributors to men's disempowerment were lack of access to and decisions on credit and low group membership. However, men were more empowered in absolute terms on all domains than women (see figure 5.1c). The GPI for Guatemala shows that 64 per cent of women did not have gender parity with the primary male in the household. For those less-empowered women, the gender gap between them and the primary male of the household was 29 per cent (Alkire et al., 2013).

The Uganda pilot results gave the highest WEAI from the three countries, at 0.800. In this study, 43 per cent of women were empowered, compared with 63 per cent of men. The 57 per cent women who were disempowered lacked empowerment in 37 per cent of the domains. For the disempowered women, the time burden and lack of control over resources were the main contributors to their disempowerment. The men's deprivation in empowerment, on the other hand, was largely characterized by a lack of decision-making power around agricultural resources. In terms of gender parity, 55 per cent of women had parity with the primary male in their household; for the 47 per cent that were less empowered than their male counterpart, the empowerment gap was 22 per cent.

Figure 5.1 A comparison of the disempowerment index in Tunisia, Bangladesh, Guatemala and Uganda



Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey 2017

Source: Alkire et al., 2013., p. 79, Table 3

Source: Alkire et al., 2013., p. 80, Table 5

Source: Alkire et al., 2013., p. 81, Table 7

A comparison of the pilot results described in Alkire et al. (2013) shows that despite the limited sample sizes and despite not being representative for each country, several insights can be gained from the WEAI values. In Bangladesh, the domains in which men and women lack empowerment vary greatly: while women lack empowerment through weak leadership and little control over resources, men lack empowerment through weak leadership, little influence in the community and time poverty. In addition, almost the same shares of men and women were disempowered. These results stand in contrast to the findings from Guatemala and Uganda, where a disproportionately high percentage of women are disempowered compared with men. In Uganda and Guatemala, men are more empowered than women in every domain.

The results from Tunisia show a different picture. In rural Tunisia, 95 per cent of women are disempowered, meaning that a mere 5 per cent of women are empowered. In contrast, 74 per cent of men are disempowered and 26 per cent of men are empowered. Like in the pilot study in Guatemala, a disproportionate percentage of women are disempowered compared to men, although in absolute terms more men and women are disempowered in Tunisia than in Guatemala (and even more so when comparing Tunisia with the cases of Uganda and Bangladesh). Decomposing the 5DE Index even further shows that for disempowered rural Tunisian women, the main contributors to disempowerment are lack of input in productive decisions, limited control over resources and very low control over the use of income. Contrary to the pilot studies in Alkire et al. (2013), rural Tunisian women are highly empowered in the leadership domains, i.e. can speak in public and are members of groups, and are not time poor. For rural Tunisian women, economic disempowerment contributes largely to their disempowerment overall. Interestingly, men are similarly disempowered in these domains, as input in productive decisions and control over use of income contribute 32 per cent and 23 per cent, respectively, to their disempowerment. With the exception of the leisure indicator, women lag behind men in all domains.

In rural Tunisia, 64 per cent of women do not have gender parity with the primary male in the household, which is close to the percentage found for women in Guatemala, a country that unquestionably has high gender inequality. In contrast, significantly fewer women lack gender parity with the primary male in the household in Uganda and Bangladesh. Moreover, the gender gap in rural Tunisia for those women stands at 41 per cent, which is much higher than in all three pilot countries in Alkire et al. (2013).

Several observations could explain these differences. First, the WEAI for Tunisia was adapted to the Tunisian context by omitting two indicators. Only eight indicators were considered (input in productive decisions, ownership of assets, access to and decisions on credit, control over use of income, group membership, speaking in public, workload and leisure); the two indicators that were omitted were: autonomy in production; and purchase, sale or transfer of assets.¹⁰

Second, the rural Tunisian context might rely less heavily on the agricultural sector, while the other pilot cases might still be heavily characterized by agriculture. As explained in Section 4, agricultural activities and non-agricultural informal activities are less attractive for Tunisian rural women as their education levels are higher, implying higher reservation wages for women.

More generally, Tunisia has a GDP per capita that in PPP terms is 1.5 times that of Guatemala, 3.3 times that of Bangladesh and 6.7 times that of Uganda.¹¹ All three pilot countries also lag significantly behind Tunisia in terms of the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2016). Although Tunisia is still not yet making full use of its economic potential, it has reached a development stage at which its people no longer strive purely for survival and so do not have to engage in whatever economic informal activity is accessible to them. With one or two earners in a household, it is possible to secure a household income well above the absolute poverty line, so that other household members can “afford” to be unemployed or to

¹⁰ Here, we partly followed the abbreviated WEAI, which retains the five domains of empowerment, but reduces the number of indicators to six instead of ten. This change was designed to reduce survey implementation time and to address challenges (i.e. problematic modules) that had arisen during the conduct of the original WEAI survey (Malapit et al., 2015).

¹¹ Values for 2016, taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, July 2017.

stay out of the labour market. In contrast, in Bangladesh and Uganda, at least, these other household members would have to engage in economic activities that could contribute to the household's income.

Employment differences are also visible in Tunisia's high unemployment rate, especially for educated youth. In Tunisia, the total unemployment rate stands at 15.2 per cent, whereas it is 2.7 per cent in Guatemala, 4.4 per cent in Bangladesh and 2.1 per cent in Uganda.¹² In this context, the lack of formal job opportunities can explain low economic empowerment for both men and women. For women, the lack of empowerment is amplified by the unattractiveness of the agricultural and non-agricultural informal sectors. This is coupled with gender norms that might restrict a women's ability to work in certain occupations or environments. This includes workplaces that are considered inappropriate, such as where women's sexual and reputational safety may not be preserved (due to direct contact with male clients, colleagues, owners or superiors), or jobs that do not sufficiently allow women to fulfil their traditional domestic roles. Hence women have high "reservation working conditions", as Assaad (2017) has framed it, and refrain from taking up jobs that do not comply with these norms.

¹² ILO Statistics (<http://www.ilo.org/ilostat>). According to the ILO's definition, the unemployed comprise all persons of working age who were: (a) without work during the reference period, i.e. were not in paid employment or self-employment; (b) currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment during the reference period; and (c) seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in a specified recent period to seek paid employment or self-employment.

Section 6: Extensions

In this section, we propose various extensions to the WEAI-TN. First, we provide a comparison of women’s empowerment in rural areas and in urban areas. Second, we design a WEAI that focuses on (female) youth empowerment. Third, we measure attitudes towards (domestic) violence and psychological well-being, as the literature shows that these are potentially interesting correlates of women’s empowerment which have not been sufficiently covered by previous studies.

6.1 A comparison of rural women’s vs urban women’s empowerment

To provide insights into the dynamics of women’s empowerment in the course of migration, modernization and economic development more broadly, we also computed the WEAI-TN for urban women and men and compared this with the WEAI-TN computed for rural women.

The urban sample consisted of 670 households in total. Table 6.1 shows that the average household size was 3.8. In terms of household composition, the urban sample was very similar to the rural sample (see table 3.2 and table 3.3). There were on average 2.5 members per

Table 6.1 Structure of the urban sample, households

	Mean	SD
Household size	3.8	1.5
Children 0–5 years	0.2	0.6
Children 6–18 years	0.7	1.0
Adults 19–64 years	2.5	1.3
Older adults 65+ years	0.4	0.6
Children per adult	0.5	0.6
Average monthly household income (TND) ¹	738.6	534.2
Agricultural households (%) ²	9.3	
Household owns livestock (%)	1.6	
Household lives in coastal area (%)	71.6	
Number of households	670	

¹ Income is reported in income brackets. To calculate mean income, it was assumed that each household had an income corresponding to the mean income of the corresponding bracket. For the upper bracket, which had no upper bound, we used the lower bound as an income proxy.

² Agricultural households are defined as households that own agricultural land.

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

Table 6.2 Structure of the urban sample, all primary decision-makers and their spouses

	Men		Women	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Respondent types				
Head of household and > 30 years (%)	94.5		20.6	
Head of household and ≤ 30 years (%)	4.9		1.5	
Spouse and > 30 years (%)	0.6		71.2	
Spouse and ≤ 30 years (%)	0.0		6.7	
Demographics				
Age (years)	53.6	13.1	50.3	13.1
Married (%)	93.7		81.9	
Level of education¹				
No education (%)	10.8		22.4	
Primary education (%)	37.8		36.2	
Secondary education (%)	37.2		30.0	
Tertiary or higher education (%)	14.1		4.7	
Vocational training (%)	15.8		13.2	
Employment status (last 12 months)¹				
Agriculture, livestock or fish farming (%)	6.1		1.2	
Wage worker, incl. agriculture (%)	42.7		13.7	
Entrepreneur/independent worker (%)	25.4		5.5	
Unemployed (%)	8.6		9.7	
Inactive or student (%)	34.4		76.0	
Number of individuals	489		597	

¹ An individual can have vocational training on top of formal schooling and possibly had various employment statuses within the 12 months before the survey. Hence, numbers do not add up to 100%.

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

households in the age group 19–64 years, 0.9 members below the age of 19 and 0.4 members above the age of 64. However, the average monthly urban household income was higher than that of rural households, at TND 739 (equivalent to US\$309 using the official exchange rate, or US\$589 using PPP conversion factors¹³). Very few urban households owned agricultural land or livestock. Nearly three-quarters (72 per cent) of the urban households sampled were located in the coastal area.

Table 6.2 describes the urban sample at the individual level. Almost all household heads were older than 30 and hence were not included in our youth sample. Spouses were somewhat younger, but again most were older than 30. The average age in our sample

¹³ See UN Database (<http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=MDG&f=seriesRowID:699>).

Table 6.3 WEAI components for the urban population in Tunisia

Indexes	Urban Tunisia	
	Women	Men
Disempowered headcount, H_n (%)	94.8	74.4
Average inadequacy score, A_n (%)	61.1	53.5
Disempowerment index, M_0	0.580	0.398
5DE Index ($1 - M_0$)	0.420	0.602
Number of observations	562	453
Percentage of data used ¹	94.1	92.6
Percentage of women with no gender parity, H_w	63.0	
Average empowerment gap, R_w (%)	42.4	
Gender Parity Index	0.733	
Number of women in dual household	381	
Percentage of data used ²	67.8	
WEAI	0.452	

¹ From the urban sample, 5.9% of female and 7.4% of male observations could not be included into the 5DE Index calculation because of missing information.

² From the 562 women included into the 5DE Index construction, only 67.8% lived in a dual household (i.e. with a primary male respondent present).


Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

was 54 years for men and 50 years for women. As in the rural sample, more women than men had not completed any formal education. A considerably higher share, i.e. 67 per cent, of all men had completed at least secondary, tertiary or any other higher education or vocational training. For women, the share was 48 per cent. The urban setting limits the scope for agricultural activities: only 6 per cent of all men had worked on their own farm in the 12 months before the survey. In contrast, 43 per cent were wage workers, 25 per cent had a non-agricultural firm and 9 per cent reported being unemployed during the last 12 months. For women, inactivity was much more prevalent. Only 1 per cent worked on their own farm, 14 per cent worked as wage workers and 6 per cent worked in their own non-agricultural firm.

The main results of the urban WEAI are displayed in table 6.3. Descriptive statistics for all the variables that were used to build the WEAI can be found in the statistical appendix at the end of this report. Comparing table 6.3 with table 4.1 shows that the percentages of disempowered women and men are almost the same for both rural and urban areas. In urban areas, as in the rural areas, the proportion of women lacking gender parity in their household was over 60 per cent, and the mean empowerment gap between a woman and her male counterpart in the household, at 42.4 per cent, was even slightly higher than in the rural areas.

Figure 6.1a presents the relative contribution of each indicator to empowerment for the urban sample and shows that limited input in productive decisions and little control over

Figure 6.1 Contribution of each indicator to disempowerment for each sex, urban areas




Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

the use of income are the most dominant indicators in both the urban and rural sample (see Section 4). Ownership of assets and access to and decisions on credit also contribute substantially to female disempowerment.

For the urban male subsample, input in productive decisions and control over the use of income took even larger shares in terms of their relative contributions to disempowerment.

Figure 6.2 compares the shares of men and women who are disempowered for each indicator. Compared with figure 4.2, we find that the percentages of disempowered men and women are higher for input in productive decisions, asset ownership and access to and decisions on credit, and so these contribute more to disempowerment in urban areas. The reverse applies to control over use of income, group membership, speaking in public and leisure. Lower percentages of disempowerment for these indicators may reflect the prevalence of facilities and opportunities to, for example, become a member of a group associated with a sport,

Figure 6.2 Percentage of disempowered men and women, by indicator, urban areas

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

cultural activity, civil society or religion. The fact that a lower share of urban men and women are disempowered in terms of control over the use of income may reflect the fact that non-traditional household compositions are more common in the urban areas, where men and women may comprise single-person households, and who have their own job, their own income and leisure time.

Table 6.4 presents comparisons across subgroups (adult vs youth, agricultural vs non-agricultural and coastal vs non-coastal). Comparing to the rural sample (Table 4.2), we find a higher percentage of urban male adults to be disempowered in input in productive decisions, ownership of assets, access to and decisions on credit and workload. Conversely, we find the percentage to be lower for urban than rural males when looking at control over use of income, group membership, speaking in public and leisure. The patterns are somewhat similar for adult women. Here, the percentage of women in urban areas who are disempowered is also higher for input in productive decisions, ownership of assets and access to and decisions on credit, but lower on all the other indicators. While in Section 4 we observe that young women are doing better than their older counterparts in terms of group membership, speaking in public, workload and leisure, the differences are less pronounced in the urban sample. In fact, the percentages for youth and adult women in urban areas are similar; the exception being the indicator speaking in public, where there is a stark age difference. This difference is qualitatively similar to that identified in Section 4 for the rural sample. Note that it is not possible to make a meaningful comparison between rural and urban young male primary decision-makers due to an insufficient number of observations for these groups.

Looking at agricultural and non-agricultural households in urban areas, we find a similar pattern to that found for the rural sample: women and men in agriculture seem to be able to access a more diverse set of options than those outside of agriculture, with men doing much better in terms of empowerment in both urban and rural areas.

Table 6.4 Number and percentage of men and women disempowered per indicator, by age and household characteristics, in urban areas

	Input in productive decisions		Ownership of assets		Access to and decisions on credit		Control over use of income		Group membership		Speaking in public		Workload		Leisure		N	Disempowerment Index		Gender Parity Index		WEAI
	%		%		%		%		%		%		%		%			Index	5DE Index	Parity Index	WEAI	
Age group																						
Men																						
adult (>30)	72.7		64.1		59.7		45.0		32.9		4.4		8.4		21.0		429	0.393	0.607			
youth (≤30)	(75.0)		(70.8)		(66.7)		(62.5)		(50.0)		(4.2)		(16.7)		(29.2)		(24)	(0.488)	(0.513)			
Women																						
adult (>30)	91.2		90.1		73.7		78.4		44.0		39.6		10.5		22.0		514	0.577	0.423	0.739		0.454
youth (≤30)	95.8		97.9		79.2		77.1		39.6		8.3		14.6		25.0		48	0.606	0.394	0.671		0.421
Household activity																						
Men																						
agricultural	57.4		25.5		57.4		27.7		21.3		6.4		10.6		19.1		47	0.268	0.732			
non-agricultural	87.7		70.2		77.2		77.2		31.6		7.0		10.5		24.6		406	0.413	0.587			
Women																						
agricultural	74.6		69.0		60.3		48.0		35.2		4.2		8.6		21.7		57	0.544	0.456	0.646		0.475
non-agricultural	92.1		93.1		73.9		78.4		45.0		5.7		10.9		22.0		505	0.584	0.416	0.743		0.449
Location																						
Men																						
coastal	71.3		64.7		59.6		42.6		35.3		3.2		7.3		21.5		317	0.387	0.613			
non-coastal	92.5		90.3		76.1		79.6		46.4		5.5		10.2		22.9		136	0.424	0.576			
Women																						
coastal	76.5		64.0		61.0		53.7		30.1		7.4		12.5		21.3		401	0.588	0.412	0.716		0.442
non-coastal	89.4		91.9		69.6		75.2		36.6		6.8		12.4		20.5		161	0.558	0.442	0.772		0.475

() = sample of male youth is smaller than 30.

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

Finally, we compare figures for coastal and non-coastal regions across the rural–urban divide. Consistent with the results reported for the rural sample in Section 4, people in the urban hinterland tend to be worse off in all domains of empowerment relative to their counterparts in the coastal areas. The rural sample showed a consistent pattern of coastal women displaying lower percentages of disempowerment for input in productive decisions, ownership of assets and access to credit and decisions, while men in the non-coastal regions were consistently more empowered than women in these domains. Such patterns are absent in the urban sample. If anything, urban coastal women displayed marginally lower percentages of disempowerment in ownership of assets and access to credit and decisions than men, while non-coastal urban women are doing better than men in input in productive decisions and, again, access to credit and decisions.

6.2 Measuring youth empowerment

Over a third (39 per cent) of the Tunisian population is younger than 24 years old. Young people face disproportionately large challenges when it comes to labour market opportunities, political representation and participation in decisions affecting their lives, a situation that is, unsurprisingly, even more pronounced for girls (Bamyeh, 2011). Moreover, young adults often continue to live in the household of their parents due to a lack of economic opportunities to be independent or according to conservative practice, limiting the amount of control that young people can take over their lives, independently from their parents.

In addition to the modules highlighted in Section 3, our survey tool included special questions on the issue of youth empowerment, which allowed the construction of an empowerment index adapted to the special challenges faced by youth, particularly young rural women. A lack of youth empowerment can be linked to unemployment, a lack of perspectives, rural–urban migration and support for violent extremism. Some of the young adults (18–30 years) in the survey were household heads and spouses, but the largest share of the youth sample consisted of young adults living in the household of their parents (see table 6.5). Our survey tool and selected sample has allowed us to compare the empowerment levels of young men vs young women, of youth living in urban area vs those in rural areas, and of youth living in the household of their parents vs those living independently, as household head or spouse.

The average age in our youth sample was 24 years for both men and women. Only a very small share of young men and women had no formal education. As already mentioned in Section 2, the levels of educational attainment of young Tunisians are relatively high: 67 per cent of all young men and 74 per cent of all young women have at least completed secondary, tertiary or any other higher education. Only very few young men and women had worked on their own farm in the 12 months before the survey. Among young men, 35 per cent were wage workers, 15 per cent had a non-agricultural firm and 37 per cent report being unemployed during the last 12 months. For young women, the share of unemployed, at 34 per cent, was similar to that for men, while the share of young women who were inactive or students was much higher. Nearly a fifth (19 per cent) of young women worked as wage workers, while only 2 per cent had worked in their own non-agricultural firm in the last 12 months.

We limit the measurement of youth empowerment to absolute empowerment, i.e. the degree to which they can, for instance, decide on issues that relate to their educational and professional career. We do not relate youth empowerment to the decision-making power

Table 6.5 Structure of the youth sample, individuals

	Men		Women	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Respondent types				
Head of household (%)	9.1		3.1	
Spouse (%)	0.0		22.4	
Youth (%)	90.9		74.5	
Demographics				
Rural area (%)	29.5		36.9	
Age (years)	24.0	3.6	24.2	3.6
Married (%)	5.2		27.7	
Level of education				
No education (%)	1.8		2.9	
Primary education (%)	31.2		18.3	
Secondary education (%)	45.4		41.8	
Tertiary or higher education (%)	21.5		32.2	
Vocational training (%)	19.9		16.2	
Employment status (last 12 months)¹				
Agriculture, livestock or fish farming (%)	0.3		0.7	
Wage worker (%)	35.2		18.9	
Entrepreneur/independent worker (%)	14.8		1.7	
Unemployed (%)	36.9		34.3	
Inactive or student (%)	29.3		52.6	
Number of individuals	359		363	

¹ An individual can have vocational training on top of formal schooling and possibly had various employment statuses within the 12 months before the survey. Hence, numbers do not add up to 100%.

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

of adults or any other group as none of these would constitute an obvious benchmark. The aim, therefore, is not to develop a tool that can monitor youth empowerment relative to the empowerment of others, but rather one that can monitor youth empowerment in absolute terms. Our survey questions and the proposed index had a different scope than the ILO's survey on school-to-work transitions (Elder, 2009), but the two studies complement each other very fruitfully.

Our empowerment measure for youth is based on the Four Domains of Empowerment (4DE): control over the future, resources, leadership and personal freedom. Table 6.6 shows the indicators chosen for each domain and their respective weights. As for the WEAI-TN, we give each domain the same weight (in this case 1/4) and adjust the weights of the indicators within each domain accordingly. Control over the future, for example, has three indicators, and hence each indicator has a weight of 1/12.

Table 6.6 The domain indicators for youth empowerment used in the Youth Index

Four Domains of Empowerment (4DE)	Indicators	Weight	Policy issues that are generally triggered
Control over the future	1. Actual activity status	1/12	Economic empowerment
	2. Decisions about employment	1/12	
	3. Decisions about education	1/12	
Resources	4. Household assets	1/8	
	5. Access to and decisions on credit	1/8	
Leadership	6. Group membership	1/12	Decision-making and representation
	7. Use of social media	1/12	
	8. Speaking in public	1/12	
Personal freedom	9. Choice of partner/children	1/12	Freedom
	10. Interaction with friends	1/12	
	11. Hobbies	1/12	

The indicators are operationalized as follows. For the control over the future domain we use three indicators: **actual activity status**, **decisions about employment** and **decisions about education**. We consider a person to be empowered if he or she was either employed as a wage worker or own account worker/employer in the last 12 months or was in education or vocational training at the time of the interview. Persons working without a salary, either as an apprentice or in a family firm or farm, are not considered empowered. Persons are considered empowered with respect to decisions about employment if they report that they can freely decide on aspects related to their employment. Likewise, persons are considered empowered with respect to decisions about education if they report that they can freely decide on the type and level of education they pursue or have pursued.

For the second domain, resources, we focus on asset ownership and access to and decisions on credit. For **asset ownership**, we check whether the person lives in a household that possesses the following relevant assets: land (for construction or agriculture), buildings, a non-agricultural economic activity or business, cattle or a motorized vehicle. If a household has none of these assets, we consider the person to be not empowered. For **access to and decisions on credit**, we check whether a person has taken credit, or could at least take credit if she or he wants to. A person is not empowered if she or he has not taken credit or does not have the potential to take credit, or if she or he has taken credit but has no power to decide on the use or repayment of the loan. As well as formal credit, we also consider informal credit sources and microloans.

The third domain, leadership, has three indicators: **group membership**, **use of social media and speaking in public**. A person is empowered if she or he feels free to join at least one group if she or he wanted. We consider civic groups, cultural associations, sport clubs, political parties and religious associations. The second indicator considers the use of the internet and social media. If the person is actively participating in online discussion fora or makes use of at least one of four social media platforms – Facebook, Instagram, Twitter or LinkedIn – we consider the person empowered. The third indicator considers speaking in public. If the person is not free or only very weakly free to speak in public or

to be a candidate for a position in politics or in a social institution, she or he is considered not empowered.

The fourth domain measures personal freedom. The first indicator, **choice of partner/children**, considers whether a young adult is free to choose his or her own spouse, or – in case the young adult is already married – free to engage in family planning to determine the number of children they have. We consider a person disempowered if the person is not free or only very weakly free to decide on a partner or to engage in family planning. The second indicator, **interaction with friends**, considers a person's freedom to go out with friends. A person is considered disempowered if he or she is not free or only very weakly free to go out with a group of friends of the same sex or a mixed group. The third indicator, **hobbies**, considers a person to be disempowered if he/she is not free or only very weakly free to decide on which hobbies to have.

As in the WEAI-TN, the 4DE Index is constructed using the Alkire–Foster method, i.e. it is a measure of empowerment and shows in how many domains youth are empowered. The 4DE Index for youth is calculated according to the following formula:

$$4DE = H_{ey} + (H_{ny} \times A_{ay})$$

where:

$$H_{ey} + H_{ny} = 100\% \text{ and } 0 < A_{ay} < 100\%.$$

In the above formula, H_{ey} is the percentage of empowered youth, where empowered means that the person has adequate achievements in three of the four domains or is empowered in a combination of the weighted indicators that make up at least three-quarters of the total. H_{ny} is the percentage of youth not yet empowered, and A_{ay} is the percentage of domains in which disempowered youth have adequate achievements. Hence, like the 5DE Index, the 4DE Index yields a value between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate greater empowerment. The index value can be increased by increasing the number of empowered youth and by increasing the number of domains in which disempowered youth are empowered. We calculate the 4DE Index for male and female youth separately based on the alternative formula:

$$4DE = 1 - M_{oy} = 1 - (H_{ny} \times A_{ny}).$$

In this formula M_{oy} represents the youth disempowerment index, calculated as the product of the proportion of disempowered youth (H_{ny}) and the percentage of domains in which they do not have adequate achievements (A_{ny}).


Table 6.7 shows that 61 per cent of young women and 49 per cent of young men are disempowered, i.e. do not reach the critical threshold of empowerment. Descriptive statistics for all variables that were used to build the 4DE Index can be found in the statistical appendix at the end of this report. For both young women and young men the inadequacy score is about 40 per cent. At first sight, it appears that youth are more empowered than adults; however, it is not possible to make a true comparison because the indicators used to compose the index differ between the two cases. Nevertheless, like in the case of adults, adverse economic indicators – access to credit, household assets and activity status – are largely responsible for the observed levels of disempowerment of both young men and young women, with the two first indicators being a bit more severe for young men, while activity status has slightly more effect on the disempowerment of young women (see figure 6.3).

Table 6.7 Youth absolute empowerment index


Indexes	Youth Tunisia	
	Women	Men
Disempowered headcount, H_{ny} (%)	61.3	49.4
Average inadequacy score, A_{ny} (%)	40.8	40.5
Disempowerment index, M_{0y}	0.250	0.200
4DE Index ($1 - M_{0y}$)	0.750	0.800
Number of observations	312	317

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017

Figure 6.3 Contribution of each indicator to disempowerment, youth



Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

Figure 6.4 Percentage of youth disempowered, by indicator

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017

To investigate the empowerment determinants for youth in greater detail and from a different angle, figure 6.4 shows the disempowerment levels of young men and young women on the various indicators. Overall, high levels of disempowerment are indeed found in the economic empowerment indicators access to and decisions on credit and actual activity (employment and study) status. Young people also live in households with relatively few assets, which is reflected in high disempowerment on household assets. The overall disempowerment reaches 54 per cent on this indicator.

In the leadership domain, somewhat surprisingly on average 35 per cent of all young people do not use social media or access the internet to take part in online discussion fora. Disempowerment is also relatively high in group membership. Perhaps the groups that we included for consideration are not particularly attractive to the young people surveyed. For example, while it is easy to imagine that sport clubs are popular among children and teenagers, it is likely that the popularity of sports dissipates when individuals reach adulthood, when playing sports is substituted with working, going out with friends, studying or raising a family. By the same token, membership of political parties and civil society organizations may be more appealing to adults who are a bit older and have more (free) time. In contrast, young people report generally high levels of freedom and decision-making ability, specifically regarding decisions about employment and decisions about education and in the personal freedom domain.

When investigating gender gaps between male and female youth, in most domains we observe relatively small discrepancies between young men's and young women's disempowerment levels. This does not, however, hold for actual activity status (employment and study), where about 57 per cent of young women have not been working or studying in the previous year

against 38 per cent of men. It is seen that young women feel freer in their choice of partner than young men, but they are less empowered in their freedom to go out with friends.

If we limit the sample to young men and women living in rural areas only, comparable patterns emerge (see table 6.8). One major difference is the higher levels of empowerment in the household assets indicator, possibly because in rural areas families own land or cattle for agricultural production. However, the employment status of young people in rural areas is worse, as is the use of social media. Also, as rural areas tend to be more conservative, young women feel less free to go out with friends.

Another interesting comparison emerges when we split young people according to whether they live in their parents' household or if they live in their own young household, probably after marriage (see figure 6.5). The most striking finding is that setting up home independently from parents increases the gender gap for various indicators: for young people living in their parents' house, 39 per cent of men and 48 per cent of women are disempowered in the activity status indicator, a gender gap of 9 percentage points. For youth who have married or settled independently, the disempowerment level falls to 22 per cent for men, a vast improvement, but rises to 81 per cent for women, resulting in a 59 percentage point gender differential. The transition from the parental household into a new household, often after marriage, requires many women to quit the labour force and to engage in household work. Household chores are still widely seen as a woman's responsibility. After marriage and at the age of childbearing, activity rates to drop significantly (see also Hanmer et al., 2017; Mouelhi and Goaid, 2017).¹⁴

In a similar way, the data suggest that young women living independently have lower levels of empowerment in their activity status, use of social media and going out with friends indicators than the dependent young women still living in their parents' household. Young men, by contrast, become more empowered as household heads in the access to and decisions on credit and speaking in public indicators. They are less empowered with respect to household assets, as young households tend to have fewer assets than established households with adult children. If we only consider young adults in rural areas, the same results are observed, but with an even wider gender gap in the speaking in public indicator than for the sample as a whole. Overall, if we compare independent and dependent youth, the gender gap increases significantly for the indicators activity status and use of social media and, to lesser extents, also for interaction with friends and hobbies

In summary, we can conclude that disempowerment is quite strong in the domains that relate to economic and financial conditions, which relate to the high youth unemployment rate, a lack of income and little ownership of assets, resulting in low access to credit. The gender gap for the overall sample is not particularly large, but when we compare young people living in their parents' household with independent young couples and household heads, the latter display an increased gender gap in a number of indicators. This points to the existence of conservative gender roles that are induced through marriage, even among young couples.


¹⁴ Assaad et al. (2017) report that for a small fraction of women employed in the (mostly) formal private sector there is a recovery in their labour force participation rate 10 years after they got married.

Table 6.8 Number and percentage of young men and women disempowered per indicator, by region and household status

Region		Access to										N	
		Actual activity status	Decisions about employment	Decisions about education	Household assets	Access to decisions on credit	Group membership	Use of social media	Speaking in public	Choice of partner/ children	Interaction with friends		Hobbies
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Total youth	women	56.7	7.2	10.2	54.6	81.1	35.0	39.0	3.3	5.2	8.2	8.5	364
	men	37.8	10.3	7.0	53.9	78.3	28.6	32.1	3.3	9.9	3.2	7.3	359
	women	63.7	10.7	13.7	51.2	81.0	44.0	52.4	3.6	5.4	12.5	10.7	168
	men	50.0	10.3	6.6	45.6	77.9	29.4	41.2	3.7	8.8	4.4	6.6	136
Rural youth	HHM	22.1	9.3	11.7	61.6	62.7	48.8	34.9	5.9	0.0	8.2	9.3	31
	HHF	80.9	15.4	12.0	57.4	78.7	40.9	60.2	6.8	0.0	18.0	12.9	93
	YM	39.4	10.4	6.5	53.1	79.9	26.6	31.8	3.0	10.9	2.7	7.1	328
	YF	48.4	4.4	9.6	53.7	81.9	32.9	31.8	2.0	7.0	4.8	7.0	271
Household status	HHM	20.8	8.3	8.3	62.5	66.7	50.0	33.3	4.2	0.0	4.2	8.3	24
	HHF	77.6	12.2	8.2	59.2	79.6	40.8	51.0	8.2	0.0	12.2	8.2	49
	YM	34.2	10.6	7.0	56.8	79.9	25.6	27.6	3.0	11.6	2.5	7.5	199
	YF	44.2	2.7	8.2	55.8	81.6	25.9	24.5	1.4	6.8	3.4	6.8	147

HHM = household head male; HHF = household head female; YM = young male dependant; YF = young female dependant

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017

Figure 6.5 Percentage of disempowered youth, by household status, by indicator

HHM = household head male; HHF = household head female; YM = young male dependant, YF = young female dependant

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017

6.3 Measuring attitudes towards (domestic) violence and psychological well-being

To document attitudes towards (domestic) violence and psychological well-being, we also added a module on domestic violence to our survey. According to the *National survey report on violence against women* (UNFP-AECID, 2010), the prevalence of various forms of violence – including physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence – is high. Nearly half (47 per cent) of surveyed women reported having been a victim of violence at some time in their life, and 31 per cent reported an incidence of physical violence. In over 90 per cent of the cases, the physical violence was inflicted by a family member. Therefore, this module asks both men and women (separately and confidentially, where relevant) about their attitudes towards domestic violence.

6.3.1 Attitudes towards (domestic) violence

The questions we used were taken from the Demographic and Health Surveys¹⁵ and hence have already been asked in exactly the same way in many countries for many years, including in Tunisia. We believe attitudes towards domestic violence are another dimension of female empowerment. Actual domestic violence against women is a very direct and substantial threat to women's empowerment. But even if women are just exposed to the

¹⁵ <https://dhsprogram.com>

menace of violence, or perceive that the violence against women is justified in certain cases, it represents a serious threat to their empowerment.

The module covers the following six statements,¹⁶ to which men and women had to answer on a five-point Likert scale, where: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = somewhat agree and 5 = strongly agree (refusal/don't know was also an option):

It is justified that a man hits or beats his wife...

- if she goes without telling him.
- if she neglects the children.
- if she argues with him.
- if she buys things without his consent.
- if she applies for a new job or engages in a new livelihood without his consent.
- if she files a complaint against him to a higher authority or the police.

The answers to these statements are plotted in figure 6.6. The most striking feature of these graphs is that men systematically have a higher tolerance for physical violence against women than women. The second most striking feature is that most men and women disagree with all the statements, and hence at least report that they do not accept domestic violence towards women. Yet, a few do agree with the statements, including women, which may be a surprise: 10 per cent of all men and 6 per cent of all women somewhat agree or strongly agree that it is justified for a man to hit or beat his wife if she argues with him. Violence is most tolerated if the woman seems to have neglected the children or goes out without telling her husband. Yet, a correlation analysis suggests (results not reported here) that the response behaviour is strongly correlated across statements. Overall, these figures can be read in two ways – a positive and a negative. First, the positive: the clear majority of both men and women disagree with all these statements. Second, the negative: 15–25 per cent on average are indifferent or agree that it is justified for a man to beat his wife.

As the responses to the various statements are highly correlated and capture partly the same underlying attitudes, it is useful to aggregate the responses from each interviewee into a single index number for that individual. We used three different methods to calculate such an index: multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), factor analysis (FA) and principal component analysis (PCA). All three methods are statistical data-reduction procedures that combine a set of variables (i.e. the responses to statements on domestic variables) into a single weighted index, based on the variance and covariance of the variables (StataCorp, 2013). Both FA and PCA create linear combinations of the variables in order to capture the most information. While FA invokes a particular model, no explicit model is assumed in PCA (Jolliffe, 2002; StataCorp, 2013). MCA is perceived as a generalization of PCA, where the former is suitable when the variables are categorical instead of continuous (Abdi and Valentin, 2007). Considering the categorical nature of the responses to the domestic violence statements, the index constructed using MCA may be considered the more

¹⁶ The DHS version also includes the statement “it is justified that a man hits or beats his wife if she refuses to have sex with him”. After discussing this statement with the survey institute and the enumerators, we decided to omit this statement as it was judged as being too sensitive and hence carried a risk that many respondents would, at best, refuse to answer the question or, at worst, end the interview.

Figure 6.6 Attitudes towards domestic violence against women





Figure 6.6 continued on page 50

Figure 6.6 continued from page 59



Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

appropriate solution. Ultimately, the three methods all create similar indexes, with high positive values representing strong agreement and high negative values representing strong disagreement with the statements on violence towards women.

Next, we use regression analysis to associate the respondents' attitudes with their individual characteristics. The results are shown in columns 1–3 of table 6.9. It can be seen that agreement with domestic violence correlates negatively with education and is higher among men and unemployed individuals. Agreement with domestic violence also decreases with income.¹⁷ Surprisingly, there is no difference between rural and urban areas. The findings are to a large extent robust to the choice of the index aggregation method.

In columns 4–6 of table 6.9, we add two further empowerment indicators: access to and decisions on credit (to capture economic empowerment) and group membership (to capture social empowerment). The significant correlations observed in columns 1–3 remain, but in addition a negative correlation is observed with social empowerment (i.e. being empowered in the indicator group membership), while a slightly positive correlation is found with economic empowerment (i.e. being empowered in the indicator access to and decisions on credit), although this effect is very small.

¹⁷ Income/wealth is proxied using an asset index that contains information on a household's durable asset ownership (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). The weights were derived using PCA.

Table 6.9 Attitudes towards domestic violence against women, regression analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Domestic Violence Index					
	FA	PCA	MCA	FA	PCA	MCA
Age (years)	0.001 (0.760)	0.001 (0.583)	-0.0001 (-0.256)	0.002 (0.769)	0.001 (0.578)	-0.0001 (-0.220)
Male (=1)	0.188*** (4.050)	0.196*** (4.097)	0.186*** (4.041)	0.204*** (4.381)	0.212*** (4.421)	0.206*** (4.506)
Married (=1)	-0.012 (-0.319)	-0.020 (-0.320)	0.035 (0.538)	-0.032 (-0.531)	-0.034 (-0.538)	0.019 (0.295)
No education (=1)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary education (=1)	-0.093 (-1.261)	-0.101 (-1.324)	-0.114 (-1.608)	-0.082 (-1.113)	-0.090 (-1.194)	-0.098 (-1.383)
Secondary education (=1)	-0.168** (-2.090)	-0.186** (-2.248)	-0.191** (-2.412)	-0.162** (-2.025)	-0.182** (-2.208)	-0.180** (-2.290)
Tertiary or higher education (=1)	-0.378*** (-4.107)	-0.407*** (-4.293)	-0.401*** (-4.285)	-0.318*** (-3.528)	-0.349*** (-3.760)	-0.319*** (-3.471)
Wage worker (=1)	0.108* (1.854)	0.108* (1.786)	0.121** (2.054)	0.0992* (1.679)	0.097 (1.581)	0.113* (1.909)
Entrepreneur (=1)	0.075 (1.009)	0.082 (1.075)	-0.009 (-0.120)	0.075 (0.990)	0.079 (1.029)	-0.006 (-0.079)
Unemployed (=1)	0.206*** (2.841)	0.212*** (2.844)	0.186** (2.438)	0.202*** (2.799)	0.208*** (2.792)	0.182** (2.404)
Household in rural area (=1)	-0.001 (-0.020)	-0.001 (-0.002)	0.005 (0.083)	0.001 (0.014)	0.001 (0.022)	0.009 (0.141)
Household size	-0.007 (-0.338)	-0.008 (-0.411)	-7.93e-05 (-0.004)	-0.006 (-0.295)	-0.007 (-0.373)	0.001 (0.062)
Asset index						
1st quintile	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
2nd quintile	-0.019 (-0.193)	-0.028 (-0.281)	0.047 (0.478)	-0.031 (-0.332)	-0.040 (-0.416)	0.030 (0.317)
3rd quintile	-0.120 (-1.343)	-0.127 (-1.376)	-0.096 (-1.063)	-0.116 (-1.326)	-0.123 (-1.363)	-0.091 (-1.028)
4th quintile	-0.052 (-0.553)	-0.056 (-0.572)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.039 (-0.419)	-0.042 (-0.443)	0.019 (0.200)
5th quintile	-0.194** (-2.125)	-0.202** (-2.142)	-0.150 (-1.563)	-0.188** (-2.117)	-0.196** (-2.141)	-0.141 (-1.530)
Access to and decisions on credit				0.085 (1.515)	0.096* (1.662)	0.096* (1.679)
Group membership				-0.246*** (-5.044)	-0.247*** (-4.893)	-0.322*** (-6.398)

Table 6.9 continued on page 52

Table 6.9 continued from page 51

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Domestic Violence Index					
	FA	PCA	MCA	FA	PCA	MCA
Constant	0.032 (0.211)	0.065 (0.423)	0.043 (0.269)	0.085 (0.569)	0.120 (0.781)	0.110 (0.706)
Observations	2132	2132	2132	2132	2132	2132
R-squared	0.040	0.041	0.036	0.056	0.056	0.060

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at household level. 'Ref.' stands for reference category.

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

6.3.2 Psychological well-being

Psychological well-being is another important correlate to empowerment. Having no control over the important aspects affecting one’s life may create feelings of frustration, life dissatisfaction and a loss of self-esteem, leading to isolation and marginalization. We measure psychological well-being using three established psychological scales.

The first scale is the New General Self-Efficacy (NGSE) scale, validated by Chen et al. (2001). The General Self-Efficacy scale captures differences between individuals regarding their tendency to view themselves as capable of meeting task demands in a broad array of contexts. The NGSE scale is based on the following eight statements (Chen et al., 2001):

1. I will be able to achieve most of the goals that I have set for myself.
2. When facing difficult tasks, I am certain that I will accomplish them.
3. In general, I think that I can obtain outcomes that are important to me.
4. I believe I can succeed at most any endeavour to which I set my mind.
5. I will be able to successfully overcome many challenges.
6. I am confident that I can perform effectively on many different tasks.
7. Compared to other people, I can do most tasks very well.
8. Even when things are tough, I can perform quite well.

The NGSE scale is scored on a five-point Likert-type scale, from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). Scores are summed and averaged over all eight items and kept on a continuous scale. Higher scores indicate higher general self-efficacy.

The second scale measures self-esteem, a related but distinguishable construct. Self-esteem relates to individuals’ overall subjective emotional evaluation of his or her own worth. We use a five-item scale based on Rosenberg (1965) that measures global self-worth by measuring both positive and negative feelings about the self. The scale uses the following statements:

1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
2. I take a positive attitude toward myself.

3. I certainly feel useless at times.
4. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
5. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.

The scale is unidimensional. All items are answered using a 4-point Likert scale format, ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (4). Items 3 and 4 measure negative feelings and are reverse scored. Scores are averaged over all five items and kept on a continuous scale. Higher scores indicate higher self-esteem.

Finally, we also asked three questions about life satisfaction:

1. Overall, to what extent are you currently satisfied with your life in general?
2. Overall, to what extent were you satisfied with your life before the revolution?
3. Overall, in your opinion, what will be the life satisfaction you expect in five years from now?

The items are scored using a five-point Likert scale format, ranging from very dissatisfied (1) to very satisfied (5).

The results of the psychological test scales are presented in table 6.10. The average score for the **New General Self-Efficacy scale** for the overall sample is 3.7. Hence, the average lies between a neutral position and a positive agreement with the statements of the scale. General self-efficacy is higher among younger people (30 years or below) and people who are still living in their parent's household. It is also higher in urban areas. The highest level of self-efficacy is found among young women living in their parent's household. **Self-esteem** is equally higher among the urban population. However, when we look at age and position in the household, we observe a difference between men and women. For men, self-esteem goes up with age and a household head position, but for women, self-esteem goes down with age and a household head/spouse position. So, the pattern of self-esteem is reversed when women grow older. **Life satisfaction** is higher among women than among men. This may have to do with the fact that men are expected to deliver economically. For young men, life satisfaction scores 3.37, whereas for young women the score is 3.63. Life satisfaction before the revolution was higher than current life satisfaction, but it is expected that life satisfaction will be higher in five years' time.

Table 6.11 presents the psychological well-being scores in relation to a selection of empowerment indicators (namely access to credit and group membership) and by employment status. For men, general self-efficacy and self-esteem are higher when men are empowered in access to credit. For women, general self-efficacy and self-esteem are also higher when women are empowered in the economic indicator, but it does not affect their life satisfaction in the same way. Surprisingly, employed men have a lower general self-efficacy score than unemployment or inactive men, but for women the opposite is clearly observed.

These tables reveal a complex interaction between empowerment, gender roles and psychological well-being. Young dependent women have the feeling that they can achieve their goals in life, but as they grow older this feeling regresses. So does their self-esteem. The minority of women that remain economically empowered have higher levels of self-esteem and self-efficacy. The level of self-efficacy for men is less dependent on age or household

Table 6.10 Psychological well-being scores, by gender, age, position in household and rural/urban

	NGSE			SE			LS			LS-7			LS+5		
	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	
Men	1185	3.64	1180	2.87	1166	3.43	1156	3.65	869	3.56					
Age															
adult (>30)	828	3.62	825	2.90	813	3.46	810	3.70	594	3.60					
youth (≤30)	357	3.68	355	2.83	353	3.37	346	3.54	275	3.47					
Household position															
household head and secondary	858	3.62	854	2.90	843	3.46	840	3.68	622	3.59					
tertiary	327	3.68	326	2.82	323	3.37	316	3.57	247	3.46					
Region															
urban	686	3.70	683	2.91	676	3.47	670	3.68	507	3.61					
rural	499	3.51	497	2.79	490	3.37	486	3.59	362	3.45					
Women	1301	3.66	1296	2.90	1289	3.52	1276	3.68	941	3.64					
Age															
adult (>30)	944	3.61	942	2.87	935	3.48	928	3.65	681	3.59					
youth (≤30)	357	3.79	354	2.96	354	3.63	348	3.77	260	3.77					
Household position															
household head and secondary	1035	3.62	1033	2.88	1025	3.51	1015	3.68	748	3.60					
tertiary	266	3.81	263	2.96	264	3.57	261	3.70	193	3.77					
Region															
urban	738	3.70	733	2.92	730	3.55	722	3.66	540	3.67					
rural	563	3.57	563	2.85	559	3.47	554	3.71	401	3.57					
Total	2486	3.65	2476	2.89	2455	3.48	2432	3.67	1810	3.60					

NGSE = New General Self-Efficiency [1, 5]; SE = self-esteem [1, 4]; LS = life satisfaction [1, 5]; LS-7 = life satisfaction before revolution [1, 5]; LS+5 = expected life satisfaction in 5 years' time [1, 5]

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

Table 6.11 Psychological well-being scores over selected empowerment indicators

	NGSE		SE		LS		LS-7		LS+5	
	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean
Men										
no access to credit	766	3.55	761	2.79	752	3.43	744	3.63	598	3.53
access to credit	419	3.80	419	3.02	414	3.43	412	3.69	271	3.61
no group membership	669	3.64	664	2.82	655	3.53	646	3.63	500	3.58
group membership	516	3.63	516	2.94	511	3.30	510	3.67	369	3.52
no employment	367	3.68	367	2.88	361	3.45	362	3.73	267	3.63
employment	651	3.65	648	2.92	641	3.48	636	3.64	473	3.57
Women										
no access to credit	972	3.59	967	2.88	961	3.55	952	3.68	742	3.62
access to credit	329	3.85	329	2.94	328	3.45	324	3.67	199	3.68
no group membership	866	3.64	861	2.87	856	3.57	845	3.66	624	3.64
group membership	435	3.69	435	2.95	433	3.43	431	3.72	317	3.63
no employment	910	3.61	908	2.90	903	3.52	894	3.67	664	3.60
employment	225	3.79	225	2.91	903	3.52	221	3.67	148	3.67

NGSE = New General Self-Efficacy [1, 5]; SE = self-esteem [1, 4]; LS = life satisfaction [1, 5]; LS-7 = life satisfaction before revolution [1, 5];

LS+5 = expected life satisfaction in 5 years' time [1, 5]

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

position, probably because the social norms about what men can do are less restrictive for men of all ages, hence men's feelings about whether they can achieve their set goals tend not to vary with age. Men's self-esteem increases with age and being a household head and is dependent on economic empowerment, underscoring the role of men as breadwinners and the head of the family. This also puts greater pressure on men which, in the current economic climate, may also lead to a lower life satisfaction for men than for women.

To shed further light on the correlates of well-being, we performed a multivariate analysis, adding education, marital status and household size as additional variables. The results are presented in table 6.12. They confirm the better psychological well-being scores for women and for the urban population. Higher levels of education increase all psychological well-being scores significantly. With respect to occupational status, the findings are more in line with expectations, namely unemployment decreases the well-being scores, whereas entrepreneurship has a positive correlation with self-efficacy. Adding the empowerment indicators, this effect disappears, due to the obvious correlation between empowerment and occupational status. Being economically empowered adds to the feeling of self-efficacy and self-esteem. Marriage increases self-esteem and life satisfaction. However, due to the

Table 6.12 Results of regression analysis of psychological well-being indicators

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Psychological well-being indicators					
	NGSE	SE	LS	NGSE	SE	LS
Male	-0.084** (-2.507)	-0.066*** (-3.097)	-0.129** (-2.553)	-0.085** (-2.535)	-0.071*** (-3.337)	-0.117** (-2.307)
Married	0.002 (0.035)	0.076* (1.815)	0.166 (1.643)	0.012 (0.170)	0.078* (1.875)	0.167* (1.677)
Youth (≤30) and household head/spouse	0.004 (0.048)	-0.004 (-0.074)	0.168 (1.475)	0.032 (0.384)	0.011 (0.191)	0.153 (1.330)
Youth (≤30) and dependant	-0.018 (-0.241)	0.006 (0.128)	0.065 (0.566)	0.040 (0.548)	0.031 (0.649)	0.050 (0.443)
No education	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary education	0.217*** (3.758)	0.156*** (4.879)	0.196** (2.552)	0.198*** (3.444)	0.140*** (4.390)	0.221*** (2.835)
Secondary education	0.417*** (6.668)	0.234*** (6.479)	0.431*** (5.326)	0.379*** (6.042)	0.209*** (5.805)	0.461*** (5.657)
Tertiary or higher education	0.619*** (8.088)	0.345*** (7.312)	0.419*** (3.915)	0.588*** (7.591)	0.305*** (6.418)	0.495*** (4.539)
Wage worker	-0.018 (-0.419)	0.026 (0.980)	-0.075 (-1.161)	-0.0637 (-1.485)	0.000 (0.010)	-0.0484 (-0.736)
Entrepreneur/independent worker	0.098* (1.909)	0.033 (0.981)	0.085 (1.095)	0.062 (1.218)	0.008 (0.246)	0.116 (1.478)
Unemployed	-0.065 (-1.325)	-0.092*** (-2.930)	-0.260*** (-3.552)	-0.076 (-1.575)	-0.097*** (-3.116)	-0.257*** (-3.528)
Rural	-0.102** (-2.177)	-0.061** (-2.182)	-0.051 (-0.819)	-0.111** (-2.391)	-0.067** (-2.397)	-0.044 (-0.708)
Household size	0.0224 (1.428)	0.000 (-0.0207)	0.036* (1.691)	0.021 (1.376)	0.000 (0.004)	0.0343 (1.639)
Access to and decisions on credit				0.240*** (5.955)	0.116*** (4.306)	-0.088 (-1.394)
Group membership				-0.052 (-1.194)	0.061** (2.306)	-0.203*** (-3.447)
Constant	3.329*** (38.34)	2.711*** (55.14)	3.056*** (25.67)	3.307*** (38.06)	2.678*** (54.22)	3.120*** (26.19)
Observations	2,431	2,421	2,400	2,431	2,421	2,400
R-squared	0.055	0.049	0.032	0.070	0.062	0.040

NGSE = New General Self-Efficiency; SE = self-esteem; LS = life satisfaction

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at household level. 'Ref.' stands for reference category.

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

addition of important educational and occupational variables, the variables capturing the position in the household for young and older respondents seem to lose their significance.

Various alternative specifications were estimated based on combinations of marital status, position in the household and age, but they did not provide significant results. We also estimated the equations on a sample split by gender. The results are presented in the appendix and indicate that marriage adds to the self-esteem and life satisfaction of women and that young women with an own household have the highest self-esteem. Education has a comparable influence on well-being for both men and women, while unemployment has a larger negative impact on well-being for men.

Appendix 6.1

Table 6.13 Results of regression analysis of psychological well-being indicators, split sample by gender

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Psychological well-being indicators					
	Men			Women		
	NGSE	SE	LS	NGSE	SE	LS
Married	-0.113 (-0.893)	-0.060 (-0.903)	0.138 (0.606)	0.044 (0.560)	0.080* (1.674)	0.196* (1.757)
Youth (≤30) and household head/spouse	-0.055 (-0.354)	-0.070 (-0.786)	-0.001 (-0.001)	0.0440 (0.445)	0.001 (0.022)	0.252* (1.930)
Youth (≤30) and dependant	-0.051 (-0.395)	-0.087 (-1.216)	0.009 (0.038)	0.011 (0.117)	0.027 (0.428)	0.089 (0.653)
Primary education	0.277*** (3.004)	0.116** (2.167)	0.234* (1.805)	0.160** (2.314)	0.154*** (3.962)	0.230** (2.472)
Secondary education	0.463*** (4.937)	0.169*** (3.072)	0.578*** (4.432)	0.328*** (4.201)	0.237*** (5.419)	0.356*** (3.557)
Tertiary or higher education	0.641*** (5.927)	0.261*** (3.960)	0.500*** (3.129)	0.549*** (4.993)	0.312*** (4.559)	0.480*** (3.409)
Wage worker	-0.132** (-2.396)	-0.006 (-0.177)	-0.114 (-1.347)	0.035 (0.524)	0.016 (0.320)	0.037 (0.391)
Entrepreneur/independent worker	0.0226 (0.370)	0.009 (0.226)	0.109 (1.134)	0.086 (0.794)	-0.012 (-0.164)	0.042 (0.271)
Unemployed	-0.204*** (-3.214)	-0.139*** (-3.244)	-0.398*** (-3.910)	0.063 (0.953)	-0.038 (-0.889)	-0.130 (-1.345)
Rural	-0.126** (-2.310)	-0.087** (-2.567)	-0.014 (-0.182)	-0.092* (-1.649)	-0.049 (-1.443)	-0.064 (-0.878)
Household size	0.015 (0.791)	-0.011 (-0.955)	0.071*** (2.663)	0.030* (1.715)	0.012 (1.094)	0.004 (0.181)
Access to and decisions on credit	0.255*** (4.902)	0.198*** (5.831)	-0.037 (-0.437)	0.217*** (3.804)	0.019 (0.456)	-0.137 (-1.571)
Group membership	-0.068 (-1.290)	0.079** (2.452)	-0.258*** (-3.263)	-0.035 (-0.615)	0.042 (1.183)	-0.155** (-2.049)
Constant	3.360*** (21.15)	2.794*** (32.36)	2.884*** (11.18)	3.244*** (32.05)	2.629*** (45.88)	3.218*** (23.98)
Observations	1,184	1,179	1,165	1,247	1,242	1,235
R-squared	0.088	0.094	0.055	0.063	0.051	0.034

NGSE = New General Self-Efficiency; SE = self-esteem; LS = life satisfaction

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at household level.

Source: WEAI Tunisia Survey, 2017.

Section 7: Conclusion

Women's empowerment is a complex issue. To monitor and evaluate the impact of interventions aimed at strengthening women's empowerment requires measuring them along multiple dimensions. The methodology underlying the Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) has been designed to address this challenge. This report presents a version of the WEAI adapted to the specific context of Tunisia, which hopefully has broader application to other countries in the MENA region. In contrast to previous applications of the index, which all targeted poorer countries, including Bangladesh, Guatemala and Uganda, this version had to take into account that the role of agriculture in the economy is different, that most households incomes (even in rural areas) are well above subsistence level, and that young women enjoy relatively high levels of education (not lower than the levels achieved by young men). Yet, gender equality in both public and private life remains a challenge in Tunisia due to strong traditional cultural and religious gender norms.

Another important issue in the case of Tunisia, as well as most other MENA countries, is the very high level of unemployment. This is partly due to a mismatch between what employers need and what jobseekers offer, but more importantly to a general lack of jobs. Industrialization has slowed down significantly over the past two decades, so that the creation of new jobs has not kept up with the numbers of youths entering the labour market.

This report shows that these two issues together – i.e. the strong traditional cultural and social norms, particularly in the rural areas, and the very tight labour market, with too few job opportunities – erode women's empowerment. These norms prevent women from engaging in many activities in the labour market because of incompatible working conditions. The same norms are also responsible for the fact that jobs are preferentially given to men, rather than to women. On the other hand, Tunisian men show also relatively low levels of empowerment.

We find that 95 per cent of all women that live in dual households with another male primary decision-maker are disempowered, i.e. they do not have adequate achievements in at least four of the five domains of empowerment or in a combination of the weighted indicators that make up at least 80 per cent of the total. In total, 64 per cent of women lack gender parity with the primary male in their household. The main reason for this low overall level of empowerment is that women have very low levels of economic empowerment, i.e. little input in productive decisions, limited control over resources (assets and credit) and very little control of the use of income. In contrast, the leadership and time use domains are not such important drivers of disempowerment; rural women in Tunisia are “relatively” free to speak in public and have acceptable workloads and leisure time. Among Tunisian male primary decision-makers, the proportion that are disempowered (74 per cent) is substantially lower than for Tunisian women, but it too is high in absolute terms, again mirroring the difficult situation in the labour market. Disempowered men have inadequate achievements in almost 60 per cent of all domains.

Looking at the differences between agricultural and non-agricultural households, the results show that in fact both women and men in agriculture seem to be able to access a more diverse set of options than those outside of agriculture. While this may be striking at first sight, it becomes easier to understand if we zoom in on the dimensions. Comparing rural and urban areas, the results suggest that input in productive decisions, asset ownership and access to and decisions on credit contribute more to empowerment in rural areas than in urban areas, but that the reverse applies to control over the use of income, group membership, speaking in public and leisure. Agriculture is much more prominent in rural areas than urban areas, and the dimensions that contribute to empowerment in the rural areas are exactly those that are associated with agricultural production, such as input in productive decisions, asset ownership and access to credit.

Among Tunisian youth, i.e. adults aged 30 or below, disempowerment is particularly strong in domains that relate to economic and financial conditions. This is connected to the high youth unemployment rate, lack of income and low level of ownership of assets, which in turn result in low access to credit. The gender gap for the overall sample is not particularly large, but when we compare young people who are living in the same household as their parents with independent young couples and household heads, we observe a widening of the gender gap among the latter. This suggests that conservative gender roles are enhanced through marriage, even among young couples.

Attitudes towards domestic violence correlate with female empowerment. The results in this report show that the rate of acceptance of domestic violence is still high, particularly among men and unemployed individuals, although the rate declines with higher education and more income. There is no difference between rural and urban areas, which is somewhat surprising given that we would expect social and cultural norms to be more relaxed among the more liberal urban people relative to those living in the more traditional and conservative rural regions. In contrast, we find that rural and urban areas have similar values on various other domains of empowerment. This is counter to what we would have expected and suggests that compared to other countries the typical rural–urban divide may be less prominent in Tunisia.

When comparing the results from Tunisia with those from the countries in which the WEAI was piloted – Bangladesh, Guatemala and Uganda – we find echoes of the earlier evidence, in that despite having a higher overall level of economic and human development, Tunisia is doing worse on women's empowerment than any of the three pilot countries. This is driven by a lack of input in productive decisions, limited control over resources and little control over the use of income. Yet women in rural Tunisia have higher empowerment in the leadership domain and are less often time poor. Rural Tunisia offers fewer employment opportunities than rural areas in these other countries, women have a lower need to engage in subsistence activities, and norms prevent Tunisian women from engaging in many activities that in Bangladesh, Guatemala or Uganda may be considered as acceptable income-generating activities for women. Women in Tunisia often remain inactive because working conditions are not compatible with traditional domestic roles or because jobs are only available in workplaces where women's sexual and reputational safety may not be preserved, due to direct contact with male clients, colleagues, owners or superiors.

The key challenge for Tunisia is to close the gap between what is written in law and what is done in practice. The country shows a very strong commitment to preserving and further promoting its achievements in gender equality. Tunisia has adopted the Sustainable

Development Goals, adapted its constitution, emphasizes gender equality and has a large number of female members of parliament. Traditional gender norms will hopefully adapt to these developments, but this may need more time than it takes to adjust legal texts. Non-governmental organizations (especially those focusing on gender equality and empowerment), civil society and the media should all stress the importance of closing the gap between legal rights and practices on the ground, and they should coordinate actions to hold policy-makers and the national government accountable for the commitments they made.

It is also obvious that the relatively low levels of empowerment cannot be separated from the lack of formal employment opportunities, particularly for youth. Providing formal, decent and safe jobs and social security is probably the most direct way to enhance women's empowerment. Lack of formal education is not a barrier in Tunisia, as a large part of the Tunisian population is well educated. Rather, deficits in soft skills and on-the-job training seem to be a major barrier for young people in Tunisia entering the labour market. Until 2009, the textiles, clothing and footwear sector was one of the largest providers of jobs in Tunisia, but over recent years it has seen its share in the manufacturing sector fall, from 45 per cent of the labour force in 2007 to 38 per cent in 2016 (Ghali and Zitouna, 2017), hence other sectors must be identified as sources of jobs. This may require a collective search for industrial self-discovery, in a structured and inclusive public-private dialogue, with both the domestic and the foreign private sector (Asche and Grimm, 2017). Agribusiness, sophisticated manufacturing and quality services could constitute possible new directions. An increased use of technology in agriculture, to leapfrog traditional systems, may also create additional jobs.

Yet, having said that, for lagging regions, especially the rural non-coastal regions, the set-up of agricultural value chains needs to be designed so that they reach older women, who typically have received little education. Younger women in these areas will benefit from tailor-made training, mentorship and access to finance, which will enable them to become entrepreneurs and integrate into new value chains. Encouraging equal participation in training and providing young women with new skills, including ICT, science, technology, engineering and mathematics, could eventually help to address and change social norms about female labour market participation (see also Hanmer et al., 2017).

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Statistical appendix

Table A.1 Summary statistics on variables that went into the calculation of the rural WEAI

	Men			Women		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Indicator 1: Input in productive decisions						
Activity: Agriculture						
Individual participated in activity in last 12 months (=1)	14.0		358	5.4		424
Individual participated in decisions made regarding activity (=1)	100.0		50	73.9		23
Extent to which individual feels free to participate in decisions regarding activity (1 Never, 2 Rarely, 3 Sometimes, 4 Often, 5 Always)	.	.	0	2.4	1.3	5
Activity: Livestock						
Individual participated in activity in last 12 months (=1)	9.5		358	4.2		424
Individual participated in decisions made regarding activity (=1)	100.0		34	83.3		18
Extent to which individual feels free to participate in decisions regarding activity (1 Never, 2 Rarely, 3 Sometimes, 4 Often, 5 Always)	.	.	0	3.0	0	2
Activity: Fishery						
Individual participated in activity in last 12 months (=1)	0.6		358	0.0		424
Individual participated in decisions made regarding activity (=1)	100.0		2	.		0
Extent to which individual feels free to participate in decisions regarding activity (1 Never, 2 Rarely, 3 Sometimes, 4 Often, 5 Always)	.	.	0	.	.	0
Activity: Non-agricultural entrepreneurship and/or independent work						
Individual participated in activity in last 12 months (=1)	3.6		358	2.4		424
Individual participated in decisions made regarding activity (=1)	100.0		13	100.0		10
Extent to which individual feels free to participate in decisions regarding activity (1 Never, 2 Rarely, 3 Sometimes, 4 Often, 5 Always)	.	.	0	.	.	0

	Men			Women		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Activity: Wage work						
Individual participated in activity in last 12 months (=1)	12.3		358	3.5		424
Individual participated in decisions made regarding activity (=1)	97.7		44	86.7		15
Extent to which individual feels free to participate in decisions regarding activity (1 Never, 2 Rarely, 3 Sometimes, 4 Often, 5 Always)	5.0		1	4.0		1
Indicator 2: Ownership of assets						
Asset: Agricultural land						
Individual lives in household with asset (=1)	30.2		358	25.7		424
Individual solely or jointly owns asset (=1)	27.4		358	6.4		424
Asset: Land for construction						
Individual lives in household with asset (=1)	7.5		358	5.9		424
Individual solely or jointly owns asset (=1)	9.5		358	3.1		424
Asset: Real estate						
Individual lives in household with asset (=1)	2.0		358	2.1		424
Individual solely or jointly owns asset (=1)	2.8		358	2.1		424
Asset: Economic activity/independent (non-agricultural) business						
Individual lives in household with asset (=1)	4.5		358	4.7		424
Individual solely or jointly owns asset (=1)	4.7		358	2.4		424
Asset: Car						
Individual lives in household with asset (=1)	15.4		358	14.9		424
Individual solely or jointly owns asset (=1)	12.9		358	2.4		424
Asset: Motorcycle						
Individual lives in household with asset (=1)	15.4		358	13.2		424
Individual solely or jointly owns asset (=1)	12.6		358	1.9		424

	Men			Women		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Indicator 3: Access to and decisions on credit						
Source: Bank or other financial institution						
Individual has borrowed from source in the last 12 months (=1)	6.4		358	3.6		424
Individual is free to borrow from source (=1)	18.0		327	7.6		397
Individual participates in decisions about borrowing from source (=1)	100.0		23	80.0		15
Individual participates in decisions about use of funds borrowed from source (=1)	100.0		23	73.3		15
Individual participates in decisions about repaying funds borrowed from source (=1)	100.0		23	73.3		15
Source: Informal moneylender						
Individual has borrowed from source in the last 12 months (=1)	12.4		358	8.5		424
Individual is free to borrow from source (=1)	20.3		305	10.4		384
Individual participates in decisions about borrowing from source (=1)	100.0		44	88.9		36
Individual participates in decisions about use of funds borrowed from source (=1)	100.0		44	86.1		36
Individual participates in decisions about repaying funds borrowed from source (=1)	100.0		44	66.7		36
Source: Microloans						
Individual has borrowed from source in the last 12 months (=1)	7.8		358	7.8		424
Individual is free to borrow from source (=1)	22.0		309	13.4		381
Individual participates in decisions about borrowing from source (=1)	96.4		28	93.9		33
Individual participates in decisions about use of funds borrowed from source (=1)	96.4		28	87.9		33
Individual participates in decisions about repaying funds borrowed from source (=1)	96.4		28	81.8		33

	Men			Women		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Indicator 4: Control over use of income						
Influence in decisions about income generated from agriculture (1 No influence, 2 Little influence, 3 Medium influence, 4 Important influence, 5 Very important influence)	3.6	1.5	49	2.7	1.4	21
Influence in decisions about income generated from livestock (1 No influence, 2 Little influence, 3 Medium influence, 4 Important influence, 5 Very important influence)	4.1	1.1	34	3.6	0.9	17
Influence in decisions about income generated from fishery (1 No influence, 2 Little influence, 3 Medium influence, 4 Important influence, 5 Very important influence)	1.0	.	2	.	.	0
Influence in decisions about income generated from non-agricultural entrepreneurship and/or independent work (1 No influence, 2 Little influence, 3 Medium influence, 4 Important influence, 5 Very important influence)	3.9	1.3	12	4.0	1.2	10
Influence in decisions about income generated from wage work (1 No influence, 2 Little influence, 3 Medium influence, 4 Important influence, 5 Very important influence)	4.0	1.1	43	3.9	1.2	15
Individual (solely or jointly) owns bank/postal account (=1)	36.9		358	8.8		424
If joint account, individual decides (solely or jointly) about use of funds on account (=1)	100.0		1	100.0		1
Indicator 5: Group membership						
Individual is free to join religious association (=1)	53.6		358	38.4		424
Individual is free to join civic group (=1)	55.9		358	36.3		424
Individual is free to join cultural association (=1)	54.5		358	34.9		424
Individual is free to join sport club (=1)	52.5		358	32.1		424
Individual is free to join political party (=1)	54.7		358	36.8		424
Indicator 6: Speaking in public						
Extent to which individual feels free to speak in public (1 Not at all, 2 To a certain extent, 3 To a medium extent, 4 Completely free)	3.8	0.6	358	3.7	0.7	424
Extent to which individual feels free to run for public office (1 Not at all, 2 To a certain extent, 3 To a medium extent, 4 Completely free)	3.7	0.7	358	3.6	0.8	424

	Men			Women		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Indicator 7: Workload						
Hours worked in non-/agricultural activity on a regular day (in November)	3.2	3.4	358	0.9	2.0	424
Hours of domestic work on a regular day (in November)	0.9	1.4	358	4.0	1.8	424
Hours of caring for household members on a regular day (in November)	1.4	1.5	358	2.6	3.6	424
Indicator 8: Leisure						
Satisfaction with leisure time (1 Very dissatisfied, 2 Not satisfied, 3 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 4 Satisfied, 5 Very satisfied)	3.3	1.1	358	3.4	1.2	424

Table A.2 Summary statistics on variables that went into the calculation of the urban WEAI

	Men			Women		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Indicator 1: Input in productive decisions						
Activity: Agriculture						
Individual participated in activity in last 12 months (=1)	4.9		453	0.5		562
Individual participated in decisions made regarding activity (=1)	100.0		22	66.7		3
Extent to which individual feels free to participate in decisions regarding activity (1 Never, 2 Rarely, 3 Sometimes, 4 Often, 5 Always)	.	.	0	3.0	.	1
Activity: Livestock						
Individual participated in activity in last 12 months (=1)	1.1		453	0.4		562
Individual participated in decisions made regarding activity (=1)	100.0		5	100.0		2
Extent to which individual feels free to participate in decisions regarding activity (1 Never, 2 Rarely, 3 Sometimes, 4 Often, 5 Always)	.	.	0	.	.	0
Activity: Fishery						
Individual participated in activity in last 12 months (=1)	1.8		453	0.4		562
Individual participated in decisions made regarding activity (=1)	100.0		8	.		2
Extent to which individual feels free to participate in decisions regarding activity (1 Never, 2 Rarely, 3 Sometimes, 4 Often, 5 Always)	2.0	.	1	2.0	.	1
Activity: Non-agricultural entrepreneurship and/or independent work						
Individual participated in activity in last 12 months (=1)	8.2		453	2.0		562
Individual participated in decisions made regarding activity (=1)	100.0		37	81.8		11
Extent to which individual feels free to participate in decisions regarding activity (1 Never, 2 Rarely, 3 Sometimes, 4 Often, 5 Always)	.	.	0	4.0	0.71	2

	Men			Women		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Activity: Wage work						
Individual participated in activity in last 12 months (=1)	13.5		453	6.0		562
Individual participated in decisions made regarding activity (=1)	100.0		61	91.2		34
Extent to which individual feels free to participate in decisions regarding activity (1 Never, 2 Rarely, 3 Sometimes, 4 Often, 5 Always)	.	.	0	4.5	0.7071068	2
Indicator 2: Ownership of assets						
Asset: Agricultural land						
Individual lives in household with asset (=1)	9.5		453	9.3		562
Individual solely or jointly owns asset (=1)	9.2		453	3.8		562
Asset: Land for construction						
Individual lives in household with asset (=1)	5.5		453	4.8		562
Individual solely or jointly owns asset (=1)	5.8		453	3.6		562
Asset: Real estate						
Individual lives in household with asset (=1)	4.9		453	5.3		562
Individual solely or jointly owns asset (=1)	4.0		453	3.0		562
Asset: Economic activity/independent (non-agricultural) business						
Individual lives in household with asset (=1)	5.7		453	4.4		562
Individual solely or jointly owns asset (=1)	6.7		453	2.3		562
Asset: Car						
Individual lives in household with asset (=1)	24.7		453	21.4		562
Individual solely or jointly owns asset (=1)	19.5		453	4.6		562
Asset: Motorcycle						
Individual lives in household with asset (=1)	17.9		453	15.7		562
Individual solely or jointly owns asset (=1)	15.1		453	1.6		562

	Men			Women		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Indicator 3: Access to and decisions on credit						
Source: Bank or other financial institution						
Individual has borrowed from source in the last 12 months (=1)	6.9		453	5.7		562
Individual is free to borrow from source (=1)	20.9		412	6.1		509
Individual participates in decisions about borrowing from source (=1)	100.0		31	87.5		32
Individual participates in decisions about use of funds borrowed from source (=1)	93.5		31	84.4		32
Individual participates in decisions about repaying funds borrowed from source (=1)	93.5		31	84.4		32
Source: Informal moneylender						
Individual has borrowed from source in the last 12 months (=1)	12.1		453	8.4		562
Individual is free to borrow from source (=1)	19.3		389	11.8		501
Individual participates in decisions about borrowing from source (=1)	100.0		54	91.5		47
Individual participates in decisions about use of funds borrowed from source (=1)	100.0		54	87.2		47
Individual participates in decisions about repaying funds borrowed from source (=1)	100.0		54	72.3		47
Source: Microloans						
Individual has borrowed from source in the last 12 months (=1)	2.4		453	3.9		562
Individual is free to borrow from source (=1)	20.7		411	12.4		510
Individual participates in decisions about borrowing from source (=1)	100.0		11	90.9		22
Individual participates in decisions about use of funds borrowed from source (=1)	100.0		11	81.8		22
Individual participates in decisions about repaying funds borrowed from source (=1)	100.0		11	90.9		22

	Men			Women		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Indicator 4: Control over use of income						
Influence in decisions about income generated from agriculture (1 No influence, 2 Little influence, 3 Medium influence, 4 Important influence, 5 Very important influence)	3.5	1.5	22	3.3	1.5	3
Influence in decisions about income generated from livestock (1 No influence, 2 Little influence, 3 Medium influence, 4 Important influence, 5 Very important influence)	4.0	2.0	4	3.5	0.7	2
Influence in decisions about income generated from fishery (1 No influence, 2 Little influence, 3 Medium influence, 4 Important influence, 5 Very important influence)	3.1	.	8	2.0	.	2
Influence in decisions about income generated from non-agricultural entrepreneurship and/or independent work (1 No influence, 2 Little influence, 3 Medium influence, 4 Important influence, 5 Very important influence)	4.5	0.8	37	3.8	1.3	11
Influence in decisions about income generated from wage work (1 No influence, 2 Little influence, 3 Medium influence, 4 Important influence, 5 Very important influence)	4.1	1.1	61	4.2	0.8	34
If joint account, individual decides (solely or jointly) about use of funds on account (=1)	45.6		453	17.8		562
If joint account, individual decides (solely or jointly) about use of funds on account (=1)	100.0		2	50.0		2
Indicator 5: Group membership						
Individual is free to join religious association (=1)	55.0		453	42.5		562
Individual is free to join civic group (=1)	57.4		453	47.0		562
Individual is free to join cultural association (=1)	56.5		453	44.8		562
Individual is free to join sport club (=1)	54.5		453	40.9		562
Individual is free to join political party (=1)	55.4		453	44.8		562
Indicator 6: Speaking in public						
Extent to which individual feels free to speak in public (1 Not at all, 2 To a certain extent, 3 To a medium extent, 4 Completely free)	3.8	0.5	453	3.7	0.6	562
Extent to which individual feels free to run for public office (1 Not at all, 2 To a certain extent, 3 To a medium extent, 4 Completely free)	3.8	0.6	453	3.6	0.7	562

	Men			Women		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Indicator 7: Workload						
Hours worked in non-/agricultural activity on a regular day (in November)	3.3	3.8	453	0.7	2.0	562
Hours of domestic work on a regular day (in November)	0.8	1.2	453	3.8	1.7	562
Hours of caring for household members on a regular day (in November)	1.1	1.5	453	2.1	2.8	562
Indicator 8: Leisure						
Satisfaction with leisure time (1 Very dissatisfied, 2 Not satisfied, 3 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 4 Satisfied, 5 Very satisfied)	3.5	1.1	453	3.4	1.1	562


Table A.3 Summary statistics on variables that went into the calculation of the Youth Index

	Men			Women		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Indicator 1: Actual activity status						
Individual had wage work in last 12 months (=1)	35.2		359	18.9		364
Individual was entrepreneur/had independent work in last 12 months (=1)	14.8		359	1.7		364
Individual was unemployed and looking for work in last 12 months (=1)	36.9		359	34.4		364
Individual is (currently) unemployed and looking for work (=1)	70.8		138	70.2		126
Individual was inactive or student in last 12 months (=1)	29.3		359	52.5		364
Individual is (currently) student (=1)	18.5		359	23.6		364
Indicator 2: Decisions about employment						
Extent to which individual feels free to make decisions about employment (1 Not at all, 2 To a certain extent, 3 To a medium extent, 4 Completely free)	3.7	0.6	359	3.8	0.5	364
Indicator 3: Decisions about education						
Extent to which individual feels free to make decisions about (type and level of) education (1 Not at all, 2 To a certain extent, 3 To a medium extent, 4 Completely free)	3.8	0.5	359	3.8	0.5	364
Indicator 4: Ownership of assets						
Individual lives in household with agricultural land (=1)	15.3		359	15.1		364
Individual lives in household with land for construction (=1)	5.7		359	4.6		364
Individual lives in household with real estate (=1)	4.6		359	6.6		364
Individual lives in household with economic activity/independent (non-agricultural) business (=1)	6.0		359	6.7		364
Individual lives in household with car (=1)	19.5		359	18.9		364
Individual lives in household with motorcycle (=1)	19.5		359	13.0		364

	Men			Women		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Indicator 5: Access to and decisions on credit						
Source: Bank or other financial institution						
Individual has borrowed from source in the last 12 months (=1)	2.2		359	1.1		364
Individual is free to borrow from source (=1)	11.6		338	8.5		351
Individual participates in decisions about borrowing from source (=1)	100.0		8	79.6		4
Individual participates in decisions about use of funds borrowed from source (=1)	85.8		8	79.6		4
Individual participates in decisions about repaying funds borrowed from source (=1)	100.0		8	79.6		4
Source: Informal moneylender						
Individual has borrowed from source in the last 12 months (=1)	7.9		359	3.5		364
Individual is free to borrow from source (=1)	10.4		319	10.8		341
Individual participates in decisions about borrowing from source (=1)	89.2		27	77.9		12
Individual participates in decisions about use of funds borrowed from source (=1)	89.2		27	75.0		12
Individual participates in decisions about repaying funds borrowed from source (=1)	89.2		27	55.8		12
Source: Microloans						
Individual has borrowed from source in the last 12 months (=1)	1.0		359	1.4		364
Individual is free to borrow from source (=1)	12.8		335	11.5		339
Individual participates in decisions about borrowing from source (=1)	77.6		4	84.5		6
Individual participates in decisions about use of funds borrowed from source (=1)	77.6		4	69.0		6
Individual participates in decisions about repaying funds borrowed from source (=1)	77.6		4	53.5		6

	Men			Women		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Indicator 6: Group membership						
Individual is free to join religious association (=1)	54.0		359	53.9		364
Individual is free to join civic group (=1)	52.7		359	50.4		364
Individual is free to join cultural association (=1)	55.6		359	58.1		364
Individual is free to join sport club (=1)	65.4		359	56.9		364
Individual is free to join political party (=1)	49.2		359	47.2		364
Indicator 7: Use of social media						
Individual uses internet regularly (=1)	78.0		359	31.5		364
Individual participates actively in online discussion fora (=1)	45.7		275	42.5		251
Individual has Facebook account (=1)	98.9		275	98.3		251
If individual has Facebook account, frequency of posts (1. Every day, 2. Once a week, 3. Once a month, 4. Less than once a month, 5. Never)	1.9	1.1	244	1.9	1.0	223
Individual has Instagram account (=1)	35.3		275	31.5		251
If individual has Instagram account, frequency of photo posts (1. Every day, 2. Once a week, 3. Once a month, 4. Less than once a month, 5. Never)	2.4	1.3	87	2.2	1.1	67
Individual has Twitter account (=1)	7.2		275	3.6		251
If individual has Twitter account, frequency of tweets (1. Every day, 2. Once a week, 3. Once a month, 4. Less than once a month, 5. Never)	3.2	1.3	17	3.2	1.7	8
Individual has LinkedIn account (=1)	3.7		275	4.2		251

	Men			Women		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Indicator 8: Speaking in public						
Extent to which individual feels free to speak in public (1 Not at all, 2 To a certain extent, 3 To a medium extent, 4 Completely free)	3.8	0.6	359	3.8	0.5	364
Extent to which individual feels free to run for public office (1 Not at all, 2 To a certain extent, 3 To a medium extent, 4 Completely free)	3.7	0.6	359	3.7	0.6	364
Indicator 9: Choice partner/children						
Extent to which individual feels free to make decisions about choice of spouse (1 Not at all, 2 To a certain extent, 3 To a medium extent, 4 Completely free)	3.8	0.5	359	3.8	0.5	364
Extent to which individual feels free to make decisions about family planning (1 Not at all, 2 To a certain extent, 3 To a medium extent, 4 Completely free)	3.7	0.6	359	3.7	0.5	364
Indicator 10: Interaction with friends						
Extent to which individual feels free to make decisions about going out with a same sex group of friends (1 Not at all, 2 To a certain extent, 3 To a medium extent, 4 Completely free)	3.8	0.5	359	3.7	0.6	364
Extent to which individual feels free to make decisions about going out with a mixed-sex group of friends (1 Not at all, 2 To a certain extent, 3 To a medium extent, 4 Completely free)	3.8	0.6	359	3.3	1.1	364
Indicator 11: Hobbies						
Extent to which individual feels free to make decisions about choice of hobbies (1 Not at all, 2 To a certain extent, 3 To a medium extent, 4 Completely free)	3.8	0.5	359	3.8	0.5	364



The ILO Taqueem “Impact Report” series disseminates research reports from Taqueem-supported impact evaluations. The goal is to improve the evidence base for “what works” in the effective design and implementation of integrated employment policy responses for youth and women’s employment.

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