

Trade and Inequality: From Theory to Estimation

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Motivation

- Neoclassical trade theory (H-O, SF, R)
 - sector-level comparative advantage
 - focus on “**between**” effects
- New trade theory
 - Krugman: intra-industry trade
 - Melitz: firm-level comparative advantage
 - focus on “**within**” effects
- Trade and inequality
 - Heavily influenced by H-O framework
 - Empirically has limited explanatory power
- “New view” of trade and inequality
 - link wages to firm performance
 - **within**-industry, **between**-firm

This Paper

- Uses linked employee-employer data for Brazil from 1986-98
 - Distribution of wages across workers and firms
 - Firm trade participation
- Establishes stylized facts about Brazilian wage inequality
 - within sector-occupations
 - for workers with similar observables (residual inequality)
 - between firms
- Develops a structural model to quantify the role of firm heterogeneity in wage inequality
 - extension of HIR (2010)
 - a model of *within*-sector, *between*-firm *residual* inequality
 - wages and employment vary with firm productivity and trade participation

Related Literature

- Long and large tradition in labor literature
- “New view” empirics:
 - Bernard and Jensen (1995)...
 - Verhoogen (2008)
 - Amity and Davis (2011)
 - AKM (1999) estimation used in trade context
- “New view” theory:
 - Feenstra and Hanson (1999)...
 - Yeaple (2005)...
 - Egger and Kreickemeier (2009)
 - HIR (2010)...

DATA

Brazilian RAIS Data

- Matched employer-employee data from 1986–1998
 - All workers employed in the formal sector
 - Focus on the manufacturing sector
 - Observe firm, industry and occupation
 - Observe worker education (high school, college degree), demographics (age, sex) and experience (employment history)
 - 5 aggregate and 350 disaggregate occupations
 - 13 aggregate and (from 1994) 250 disaggregate sectors
- Over the period 1986-1998 as a whole, our sample includes more than 7 million workers and 100,000 firms in every year
- Trade transactions data from 1986-1998
 - Merged with the matched employer-employee data
 - Observe firm exports and export products and destinations

STYLIZED FACTS

Within and Between Inequality

Sector-occupation bins

	Level (%)	Change (%)
A. Main Period	1994	1986–95
Within occupation	82	92
Within sector	83	73
Within sector-occupation	68	66
Within detailed-occupation	61	60
Within sector–detailed-occupation	56	54
B. Late Period	1994	1994–98
Within detailed-sector –detailed-occupation	47	141

Fact 1

Within sector-occupation component of wage inequality accounts for over 2/3 of both level and growth of wage inequality

Residual Inequality

Conditional on worker observables

	Level (%) 1994	Change (%) 1986–95
Residual wage inequality	59	49
— within sector-occupation	89	91

Fact 2

- (i) *Residual inequality is at least as important as worker observables for both level and growth of wage inequality*
- (ii) *Almost all residual inequality is within sector-occupations*

Between-firm Inequality

- Mincer log-wage regression with firm fixed effect:

$$w_{it} = z'_{it} \vartheta_{\ell t} + \psi_{j\ell t} + \nu_{it}$$

- i worker
- j firm
- ℓ sector-occupation bin
- $\psi_{j\ell t}$ firm fixed effect includes:
 - Returns to unobserved skill (workforce composition)
 - Worker rents (differences in wage for same workers)
 - Match effects
- Decomposition of within inequality:
 - Observables: $\text{var}(z'_{it} \hat{\vartheta}_{\ell t})$
 - Between-firm component: $\text{var}(\hat{\psi}_{j\ell t})$
 - Covariance: $\text{cov}(z'_{it} \hat{\vartheta}_{\ell t}, \hat{\psi}_{j\ell t})$
 - Within-firm component: $\text{var}(\hat{\nu}_{it})$

Between-firm Inequality

Within sector-occupation bins

	UNCONDITIONAL FIRM WAGE COMPONENT, $\psi_{j\ell t}^U$		CONDITIONAL FIRM WAGE COMPONENT, $\psi_{j\ell t}^C$	
	Level (%) 1994	Change (%) 1986–1995	Level (%) 1994	Change (%) 1986–1995
Between-firm wage inequality	55	115	39	86
Within-firm wage inequality	45	-15	37	-11
Worker observables			13	2
Covar observables–firm effects			11	24

Fact 3

Between-firm component account for about half of level and the majority of growth of within sector-occupation wage inequality

Between-firm Inequality

Size and exporter wage premia

	UNCONDITIONAL FIRM WAGE COMPONENT, $\hat{\psi}_{jt}^U$	CONDITIONAL FIRM WAGE COMPONENT, $\hat{\psi}_{jt}^C$
Firm Employment Size	0.122*** (0.010)	0.104*** (0.009)
Firm Export Status	0.262*** (0.042)	0.168*** (0.024)
Sector Fixed Effects	yes	yes
Within R-squared	0.17	0.13
Observations	91,410	91,410

Fact 4

Larger firms on average pay higher wages; exporters on average pay higher wages even after controlling for size. The remaining variation in wages is substantial.

STRUCTURAL MODEL

Model: Extension of HIR

- ① Melitz (2003) product market:

$$R = \Upsilon A y^\beta, \quad \Upsilon \in \{1, \Upsilon_x > 1\}$$

- ② Heterogeneity in fixed cost of exports: $e^\varepsilon F_x$

- ③ Complementarity between productivity and worker ability:

$$y = e^\theta H^\gamma \bar{a}, \quad \gamma < 1$$

- ④ Unobserved heterogeneity and costly screening:

$$e^{-\eta} C \frac{(a_c)^\delta}{\delta} \Rightarrow \bar{a} = \frac{k}{k-1} a_c$$

- ⑤ DMP search friction (cost b per worker) and wage bargaining:

$$W = \frac{\beta\gamma}{1 + \beta\gamma} \frac{R}{H} = b \cdot (a_c)^k$$

Econometric Model

- Empirical model of $X_j = \{h_j, w_j, \iota_j\}_j$:

$$\begin{cases} h_j = \alpha_h + \mu_h \cdot \iota_j + u_j, \\ w_j = \alpha_w + \mu_w \cdot \iota_j + \zeta u_j + v_j, \\ \iota_j = \mathbb{I}\{z_j \geq f\} \end{cases}$$

- Distributional assumption:

$$(u_j, v_j, z_j)' \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \Sigma), \quad \Sigma = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_u^2 & & & \\ 0 & \sigma_v^2 & & \\ \rho_u \cdot \sigma_u & \rho_v \cdot \sigma_v & 1 & \end{pmatrix}$$

- **Selection** (ρ_u, ρ_v) versus **Market access** (μ_h, μ_w)
- Theoretical restriction: $\mu_h, \mu_w > 0$

Identification

① Maximum Likelihood

- under additional orthogonality assumption between structural productivity shocks θ and η :

$$\zeta \leq \frac{\mu_w}{\mu_h} \leq \zeta + \frac{\sigma_v^2}{(1 + \zeta)\sigma_u^2}$$

② GMM Bounds

- based on a subset of moments

③ Semi-parametric estimation

- using alternative instruments for export participation





RESULTS

Coefficient Estimates 1994

	COEFFICIENT	STD ERROR
μ_h	1.992	0.019
μ_w	0.197	0.022
ρ_u	0.023	0.004
ρ_v	0.199	0.024
f	1.341	0.006



Note: Maximum likelihood estimates and robust (sandwich-form) asymptotic standard errors (see the online supplement) for 1994. Number of observations (firms): 91,410.

Employment and Wage Distributions



--- Data (non-exp) --- Data (exporters) — Model (non-exp) — Model (exporters)

Worker Wage Distribution



Counterfactuals

- Estimated model:


$$\begin{cases} h_j = \alpha_h + \mu_h \cdot l_j + u_j, \\ w_j = \alpha_w + \mu_w \cdot l_j + \zeta u_j + v_j, \\ l_j = \mathbb{I}\{z_j \geq f\} \end{cases} \quad (u_j, v_j, z_j)' \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \Sigma)$$

- Parameters (μ_h, μ_w, f) form a **sufficient statistic**:


$$f = \frac{1}{\sigma} \left[\alpha_f + \log F_x - \log \left(\Upsilon_x^{\frac{1-\beta}{\Gamma}} - 1 \right) \right]$$
$$\mu_h + \mu_w = \Upsilon_x^{\frac{1-\beta}{\Gamma}}, \quad \Upsilon_x = 1 + \tau^{-\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} \frac{A_x}{A_d}$$

- Two counterfactuals: variation in F_x and τ

Variation in Fixed Export Cost




Variation in Variable Trade Cost




GMM BOUNDS

GMM Bounds

(a) Autarky counterfactual



(b) τ counterfactual



- Autarky bounds: [6.6%, 9.0%] vs ML estimate 7.6%
- τ bounds: [2.3%, 3.5%] vs ML estimate 2.2%

Semi-parametric


Two-stage estimation

	BUSINESS PROCEDURES	FOREIGN WORKERS			BOTH EXCLUDED VARIABLES
	(1)	FIRM (2)	MESO (3)	LAYOFF (4)	(5)
PANEL A: SELECTION					
Business Procedures	-0.139*** (0.025)	—	—	—	-0.139*** (0.025)
Foreign Worker	—	0.070*** (0.008)	0.129*** (0.034)	0.022** (0.010)	0.019* (0.010)
First-stage F -statistic [p -value]	30.60 [0.000]	85.96 [0.000]	14.56 [0.000]	4.36 [0.037]	37.36 [0.000]
PANEL B: EMPLOYMENT					
Employment premium (μ_h)	2.004*** (0.031)	1.997*** (0.034)	2.032*** (0.034)	2.039*** (0.033)	2.012*** (0.032)
Second-stage F -statistic [p -value]	16.57 [0.000]	83.40 [0.000]	2.69 [0.045]	2.18 [0.088]	14.37 [0.000]
PANEL C: WAGES					
Wage premium (μ_w)	0.361*** (0.016)	0.343*** (0.015)	0.312*** (0.012)	0.356*** (0.016)	0.361*** (0.017)
Second-stage F -statistic [p -value]	4.07 [0.007]	59.70 [0.000]	171.67 [0.000]	2.30 [0.075]	4.00 [0.007]

MULTIDESTINATION

Multidestination Model

Counterfactuals



► Show the model

Conclusions

- Neoclassical trade theory emphasizes wage inequality between occupations and industries
- In contrast, new theories of firm heterogeneity and trade point to wage dispersion within occupations and industries
- Using matched employer-employee data for Brazil, we show:
 - Much of the increase in wage inequality since the mid-1980s has occurred **within sector-occupations**
 - Increased **within-group wage inequality**
 - Increased wage dispersion **between firms**
 - Between-firm wage dispersion related to **trade participation**
- Develop a framework for the structural estimation of a model with firm heterogeneity and wage dispersion across firms
- Use this framework to quantify the effect of trade on wage dispersion

Model Predictions

- A firm with idiosyncratic shock $\{\theta, \eta, \varepsilon\}$:

$$R(\theta, \eta, \varepsilon) = \kappa_r \Upsilon^{\frac{1-\beta}{\Gamma}} (e^\theta)^{\frac{\beta}{\Gamma}} (e^\eta)^{\frac{\beta(1-\gamma k)}{\delta \Gamma}}$$

$$H(\theta, \eta, \varepsilon) = \kappa_h \Upsilon^{\frac{(1-\beta)(1-k/\delta)}{\Gamma}} (e^\theta)^{\frac{\beta(1-k/\delta)}{\Gamma}} (e^\eta)^{\frac{\beta(1-\gamma k)(1-k/\delta)}{\delta \Gamma} - \frac{k}{\delta}}$$

$$W(\theta, \eta, \varepsilon) = \kappa_w \Upsilon^{\frac{k(1-\beta)}{\delta \Gamma}} (e^\theta)^{\frac{\beta k}{\delta \Gamma}} (e^\eta)^{\frac{k}{\delta} \left(1 + \frac{\beta(1-\gamma k)}{\delta \Gamma}\right)}$$


- Market access variable

$$\Upsilon = 1 + \iota \cdot (\Upsilon_x - 1), \quad \Upsilon_x = 1 + \tau^{-\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} \frac{A_x}{A_d}$$


- Selection into exporting

$$\iota = \iota(\theta, \eta, \varepsilon) = \mathbb{I} \left\{ \kappa_\pi \left(\Upsilon_x^{\frac{1-\beta}{\Gamma}} - 1 \right) (e^\theta)^{\frac{\beta}{\Gamma}} (e^\eta)^{\frac{\beta(1-\gamma k)}{\delta \Gamma}} \geq F_x e^\varepsilon \right\}$$

Wage Inequality



Trade Openness




Regional Robustness

	OVERALL		RESIDUAL	
	INEQUALITY		INEQUALITY	
	Level 1994	Change 1986–95	Level 1994	Change 1986–95
Within sector-occupation	68	66	89	91
Within sector-occupation, São Paulo	64	49	89	71
Within sector-occupation-state	58	38	76	56
Within sector-occupation-meso	54	30	72	49

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Estimation Results

Parameters



Model Fit

Firm-level moments

	All firms	Non-exp.	Exporters
	DATA		
Mean h	2.96	2.78	4.82
Mean w	-0.33	-0.37	-0.01
Std deviation h	1.20	1.00	1.46
Std deviation w	0.43	0.43	0.38
Correlation h & w	0.33	0.24	0.32
Fraction of exporters	9.0%		
	MODEL		
Mean h	2.96	2.78	4.83
Mean w	-0.33	-0.37	0.00
Std deviation h	1.20	1.05	1.05
Std deviation w	0.43	0.42	0.42
Correlation h & w	0.32	0.25	0.24
Fraction of exporters	9.0%		

Model Fit

Worker wage dispersion

	DATA	MODEL
Std deviation	0.42	0.46
— non-exporters	0.42	0.42
— exporters	0.35	0.42
Gini coefficient	0.23	0.25
90/10-ratio	2.95	3.23
— 90/50	1.63	1.80
— 50/10	1.81	1.80

Model Fit

Worker wage dispersion

	DATA	MODEL
Std deviation	0.42	0.46
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— exporters	0.35	0.42
Gini coefficient	0.23	0.25
90/10-ratio	2.95	3.23
— 90/50	1.63	1.80
— 50/10	1.81	1.80

Size and exporter wage premia

	DATA	MODEL
Employment premium	0.10	0.10
Exporter premium	0.16	0.16
<i>R</i> -squared	0.11	0.11

Likelihood Function

$$\mathcal{L}(\Theta|X_j) = \prod_j \mathbb{P}\{(h_j, w_j, \iota_j)|\Theta\}$$

$$\mathbb{P}\{(h_j, w_j, \iota_j)|\Theta\} = \frac{1}{\sigma_u} \phi(\hat{u}_j) \frac{1}{\sigma_v} \phi(\hat{v}_j) \left[\Phi \left(\frac{f - \rho_u \hat{u}_j - \rho_v \hat{v}_j}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_u^2 - \rho_v^2}} \right) \right]^{1-\iota_j} \left[1 - \Phi \left(\frac{f - \rho_u \hat{u}_j - \rho_v \hat{v}_j}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_u^2 - \rho_v^2}} \right) \right]^{\iota_j}$$

$$\hat{u}_j = \frac{h_j - \alpha_h - \mu_h \iota_j}{\sigma_u},$$

$$\hat{v}_j = \frac{(w_j - \alpha_w - \mu_w \iota_j) - \zeta(h_j - \alpha_h - \mu_h \iota_j)}{\sigma_v}$$

GMM Bounds


- We drop the orthogonality assumption and use the following set of moments:
 - (a) conditional first moments: $\mathbb{E}\iota$, $\mathbb{E}\{h|\iota\}$ and $\mathbb{E}\{w|\iota\}$
 - (b) unconditional second moments: $\text{var}(h)$, $\text{var}(w)$ and $\text{cov}(h, w)$
 - (c) size and exporter wage premia λ_s and λ_x , and R^2 from:

$$\mathbb{E}\{w|h, \iota\} = \lambda_0 + \lambda_s h + \lambda_x \iota$$

- In addition, we impose $|\rho_u|, |\rho_v| < 1$ and $\sigma_u, \sigma_v > 0$
- and $\text{corr}((1 + \zeta)u + v, z) = (1 + \zeta)\rho_u\sigma_u + \rho_v\sigma_v > 0$
- We check that $\mu_h, \mu_w > 0$
- This identifies a uni-dimensional interval in the 10-dimensional parameter space, the **GMM identified set** [▶ Show the iSet](#)
- For each element of this set we conduct:
 - (a) autarky and
 - (b) variable trade cost counterfactual:
 - $\tau \uparrow$ to generate a 10p.p. \downarrow in exporter employment share

GMM Identified Set

- Main idea: $\bar{h}_1 - \bar{h}_0 = \mu_h + \rho_u \sigma_u (\lambda_1 - \lambda_0)$



Multidestination Model

$$\begin{cases} h &= \alpha_h + \mu_{h,1}l_1 + (\mu_{h,2} - \mu_{h,1})l_2 + (\mu_{h,3} - \mu_{h,2})l_3 + u, \\ w &= \alpha_w + \mu_{w,1}l_1 + (\mu_{w,2} - \mu_{w,1})l_2 + (\mu_{w,3} - \mu_{w,2})l_3 + \zeta u + v, \\ l_\ell &= \mathbb{I}\{f_{\ell-1} \leq z \leq f_\ell\}, \quad \ell = 1, 2, 3, \end{cases}$$

$$\mu_{h,\ell} = \frac{\delta - k}{\delta} \log \Upsilon_{x,\ell}^{\frac{1-\beta}{\Gamma}}, \quad \mu_{w,\ell} = \frac{k}{\delta - k} \mu_{h,\ell},$$

$$f_\ell = \frac{1}{\sigma} \left[-\alpha_\pi + \log F_{x,\ell} - \log \left(\Upsilon_{x,\ell}^{\frac{1-\beta}{\Gamma}} - \Upsilon_{x,\ell-1}^{\frac{1-\beta}{\Gamma}} \right) \right],$$

$$\Upsilon_x = 1 + \tau^{-\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} \sum_{\ell=1,2,3} l_\ell \left(\frac{A_{x,\ell}}{A_d} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}$$

$$l_\ell = \mathbb{I} \left\{ \kappa_\pi \left[\Upsilon_{x,\ell}^{\frac{1-\beta}{\Gamma}} - \Upsilon_{x,\ell-1}^{\frac{1-\beta}{\Gamma}} \right] (e^\theta)^{\frac{\beta}{\Gamma}} (e^\eta)^{\frac{\beta(1-\gamma k)}{\delta\Gamma}} \geq e^\varepsilon F_{x,\ell} \right\}, \quad \ell = 1, 2, 3$$

Sectors

- Twelve aggregate sectors (IBGE) 1986-1998

	Industry	Empl't share (%)	Rel. mean log wage	Fraction Exporters	Exporter Empl't %
2	Non-metallic mineral products	5.5	-0.12	2.3	32.3
3	Metallic products	9.8	0.27	6.1	49.9
4	Machinery, equipment & instr.	6.6	0.38	12.3	54.1
5	Electrical & telecomm. equip.	6.0	0.37	11.8	56.3
6	Transport equipment	6.3	0.61	11.2	70.6
7	Wood products & furniture	6.5	-0.48	3.2	23.5
8	Paper, publishing & printing	5.4	0.14	2.5	30.6
9	Rubber, tobacco, leather & fur	7.0	-0.04	8.6	50.8
10	Chemical & pharma. products	9.9	0.40	11.2	50.6
11	Apparel & textiles	15.7	-0.32	2.5	34.8
12	Footwear	4.4	-0.44	12.2	65.7
13	Food, beverages & alcohol	16.9	-0.30	3.9	38.0

- More than 250 disaggregated industries (CNAE) 1994-1998

Occupations

- Five aggregate occupations 1986-1998

	Occupation	Employment share (%)	Relative mean log wage
1	Professional and Managerial	7.8	1.08
2	Skilled White Collar	11.1	0.40
3	Unskilled White Collar	8.4	0.13
4	Skilled Blue Collar	57.4	-0.15
5	Unskilled Blue Collar	15.2	-0.35

- More than 300 disaggregated occupations (CBO) 1986-1998