

**Measuring trade union rights:  
A country-level indicator constructed from coding  
violations recorded in textual sources**

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## Preface

In September of 2004, the Policy Integration Department organized a technical staff seminar bringing together leading experts within and outside the ILO on so-called “qualitative” indicators of international labour standards. Recent years have seen a rapidly growing interest in the construction and use of such qualitative indicators among both researchers and policy-makers. This growth is arguably attributable to several factors, such as debates on the economics of labour standards, growing interest in socially responsible investing, and the recognition that statistics that are commonly used as *quantitative* indicators of labour standards are of limited value in capturing many aspects of labour standards and their application. Qualitative indicators of labour standards and worker rights, while numerical, address things that are intrinsically more qualitative in nature and are based, for example, on methods such as grading by experts and the coding of legislation and other textual sources. The rapidly growing interest in such qualitative indicators raises a number of questions about comparative methods for the construction of these indicators as well as the appropriateness of particular methods for particular uses, and these questions were the focus of the seminar.

“Measuring Trade Union Rights” was one of the papers presented at the seminar and provides a method of constructing an indicator of violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights, as defined in ILO Convention No. 87 and No. 98 and related ILO jurisprudence. The paper compares its method with other indicators related to trade union rights such as constructed by the OECD and the NGO Freedom House, addressing such issues as definitional validity, reproducibility, and problems with information sources. The paper argues that the key bottleneck in improving indicators of trade union rights is the need for information sources that provide systematic and detailed information on trade union rights that is consistent both across countries and over time. The indicators described in the paper were used in Policy Integration Department Working Paper No. 39 by David Kucera and Ritash Sarna, titled “How Do Trade Union Rights Affect Trade Competitiveness.” A journal-length version of this paper is forthcoming in the *Review of International Economics*.

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November 2004





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## 1. Introduction

A number of new country-level “qualitative” indicators of labour standards and workers rights have been developed in recent years. The growing interest in such indicators is likely attributable to several factors, such as the aged but still lively debates on the effects of labour standards on international competitiveness; the growing interest in so-called socially responsible investment; and the sense that more traditional quantitative indicators of labour standards, such as derived from establishment and labour force surveys, are in their existing form too narrow in scope to adequately capture the wide-ranging and inherently qualitative nature of many labour standards and worker rights. “Qualitative” indicators, while having numerical values, are based on such methods as grading by experts, the coding of legislation and the coding of other textual sources addressing violations of a more purely *de facto* nature.

Qualitative indicators of labour standards and worker rights are as necessarily imperfect as the nature of the phenomena they attempt to measure is multifaceted and complex. There are a number of sources of possible measurement error, both random and non-random, that are unique to such indicators. Perhaps the most important bottleneck in moving toward more definitive indicators is the incompleteness of existing information sources, particularly as regards applying consistent and comprehensive evaluation criteria of labour standards and worker rights across countries and over time. This is not such a problem for indicators solely addressing legislation, for it is possible at least in principle to collect for all countries all legislation relevant to a given labour standard or worker right. The problem is acute, however, for qualitative indicators addressing problems of a more *de facto*, on-the-ground nature.

These constraints in mind, this paper describes a method used to construct a country-level indicator of trade union rights based on coding violations recorded in what are regarded as the three best existing textual sources on trade union rights. This indicator was constructed for one purpose only: for use in econometric models of such economic outcomes as wages, foreign direct investment and international trade. Given this end, a certain amount of random measurement error seemed permissible, as such error would tend to lead to attenuated rather than perverse econometric results. Moreover, suspected non-random measurement error, such as by country type, could be addressed to an extent through such econometric methods as specifying models with and without regional dummy variables, dropping a region at a time from samples, incorporating controls for levels of economic development and thus country capacity, and using as many indicators of trade union rights as possible, each having their particular sources of measurement error. Because of the incompleteness of existing information sources and other sources of measurement error, it was never thought that the indicator would be suitable for any application for which each country score must stand on its own, such as for socially responsible investing or monitoring progress in individual countries. The intent in constructing the indicator was, rather, to provide a usable if noisy sense of cross-country variation.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the method of construction by coding text and then converting coded text into an indicator. Section 3 presents the indicator and some descriptive statistics with regional breakdowns, both regarding variation across countries and variation across the thirty-seven evaluation criteria that provide the building blocks of the indicator. Section 4 discusses the strengths and limitations of the method, particularly regarding definitional validity, sufficient grades of variation, reproducibility, transparency, evaluator bias, and information bias and other problems with information sources. Section 5 concludes by arguing – no surprise – for improved information sources, in particular for the closer integration of the construction of indicators with the collection and compilation of information, as well as for incorporating new questions into labour force surveys that address violations of trade union rights.

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## 2. Method of construction

### 2.1 Coding text

This statistical indicator is based on thirty-seven evaluation criteria for assessing trade union rights, shown in table 1 (column A) and grouped into six categories: freedom of association/collective bargaining-related civil liberties; right to establish and join unions and worker organizations; other union activities; right to bargain collectively; right to strike; and export processing zones. The indicator of trade union rights jointly addresses problems regarding legislation as well as more de facto problems, though leaning in emphasis toward the latter. The most fundamental reason for considering both together is that the indicator was intended to evaluate the effects of trade union rights on foreign direct investment and international trade through two main causal channels: through labour costs relative to labour productivity (with higher labour costs hypothesized to have a negative effect) and through stability of labour-management relations and social stability more generally (with greater stability hypothesized to have a positive effect). In this sense, the full range of trade union rights problems were hypothesized to have a stifling effect on the capacity of workers to bargain for wages, with de jure problems not considered to be mutually exclusive from de facto problems. In other words, having a problematic law on the books is taken to signify in and of itself the strength of de facto trade union rights. Consistent with this view, the textual sources used to construct the indicator themselves consider both problems with legislation and problems of a more de facto nature, also leaning in emphasis toward the latter.

These thirty-seven evaluation criteria provide a working definition of trade union rights, insofar as it is possible to define trade union rights by observed violations of these rights and were developed in several stages. The first stage involved coming up with a preliminary list of criteria by reading relevant ILO Conventions and jurisprudence. The most relevant ILO Conventions are No. 87 (“Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise”) and No. 98 (“Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining”). These are the two ILO Conventions providing the foundation of one of the ILO’s four “fundamental principles and rights at work” as regards “freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining” (ILO 1998: 7). Also important in this first stage of developing these evaluation criteria was a reading of related ILO jurisprudence as embodied in *Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO* (1996).

After this first stage and consultation with ILO colleagues having legal expertise in the field, a pilot stage of coding textual sources with preliminary evaluation criteria was done for a sample twelve countries from around the world. The three sources were the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions’ (ICFTU) *Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights*, the United States State Department’s *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, and the ILO’s *Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association* (CFA). These came to be the same sources used in the final construction of the indicators and indeed are the three main sources of country-level information on trade union rights that are available on a regular basis for a close to comprehensive sample of countries. These are the same sources referred to as “comprehensive descriptive labor rights reports” in the recent report of the U.S. National Research Council, *Monitoring International Labor Standards: Techniques and Sources of Information* (2004), which also describes the

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comparative merits and shortcomings of these and others information sources.<sup>1</sup> Problems found regarding the thirty-seven evaluation criteria were coded with letters “a,” “b,” or “c,” indicating each of the different textual sources, respectively, with such coding facilitating the tracing of an observed violation to back a particular textual source.

In order to code the textual sources to satisfy the condition of reproducibility, it was necessary to develop detailed coding rules for each of the evaluation criteria. In particular, coding rules were developed to deal with why an observed problem violated one criterion versus another and whether an observed problem violated more than one criterion. That is, rules for mutual exclusivity and non-exclusivity needed to be developed, as did rules for particular violations that were not specifically referred to in ILO Conventions or jurisprudence. In general, the guiding principle was that an observed problem should be coded as a violation of as many criteria as seemed relevant, just as, by analogy, a given criminal act may lead to multiple counts in an indictment of an accused. These coding rules for each of the thirty-seven evaluation criteria are provided in appendix 1.<sup>2</sup>

After this pilot stage, the ICFTU and U.S. State Department sources were coded by the author for 169 countries, addressing violations observed over the period from 1993 to 1997. In this process as in the pilot stage, the coding rules were amended and clarified to account for observed violations and issues of mutual exclusivity and non-exclusivity that did not arise during the pilot phase. In this sense, the development of the evaluation criteria and coding rules was highly interactive with the coding itself in this first round for a full sample of countries.

After the ICFTU and U.S. State Department sources, coding was next done for the *Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association*. This proved to be considerably more complicated and time-consuming than coding the other two sources. For the ICFTU reports, for instance, the survey for 1996 is meant to refer to events in 1995 and for the U.S. State Department reports, the survey for 1995 is meant to refer to events in 1995. But the CFA reports are case-driven, and cases may run for years without a definitive decision being made on them (with further information on how the CFA works available at: <http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/libsynd/index.cfm?hdroff=1>).

The CFA reports were dealt with as follows. All case entries between 1993 and 2000 were read (286<sup>th</sup> to 322<sup>nd</sup> report). A total of 611 case entries were reviewed, 217 of them unique cases and the remainder follow-ups to previously filed cases. The only cases considered were where the first communication date of the complaint was between 1993 and 1997 (though the actual incidents referred to may have occurred before then). Evidence is then coded only if the CFA makes a recommendation consistent with the complaint in any report of the reports up to 2000.<sup>3</sup> The CFA cases were first coded by a research assistant

<sup>1</sup> Note that the ILO’s *Report of the Committee of Experts* was not used. This is because information on Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 are available only for countries that have ratified these Conventions. Because these reports tend to focus on problems in a country, this creates a systemic bias against countries that have ratified these Conventions.

<sup>2</sup> Even with the constraint of using the same thirty-seven evaluation criteria and three same textual sources, one could devise different coding rules that might be just as or perhaps more useful. In general, it might be useful to simplify the coding rules and perhaps the evaluation criteria as well, as greater simplicity would facilitate greater reproducibility in the construction of the indicators.

<sup>3</sup> In addition, cases where the Government makes no reply even after urgent appeals by the CFA are coded as violations consistent with the complaint; cases where the Government is still looking into the matter and the CFA has requested to keep it informed are not coded as violations; cases where the statements from the complainant and government are contradictory and the CFA has not made a recommendation consistent with the complaint are not coded as violations.

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with the author then reviewing the relevant texts and preliminary coding to move toward the final coding. This process of having two coders for the CFA reports also resulted in some clarification of the coding rules as they now appear in Appendix 1.

Note that only observations of violations are coded, not observations of good conditions and practices for any given evaluation criteria. The textual sources tend to focus on problems in a country, but there are occasional mentions of good (or improving) conditions and practices. By not being coded, however, these good conditions and practices are effectively treated as if there were no mention of them. In this sense, observations and non-observations of good practices and conditions are treated equivalently.

## 2.2 Converting coded text into an indicator

The basic method of turning the coded text for any given country into an indicator is to add up the number of evaluation criteria, up to thirty-seven, for which violations are observed. This is done in both unweighted (that is, equally weighted) and weighted form, with different weights assigned to the different evaluation criteria.

As noted, observed violations are coded with letters corresponding to textual sources. A dummy variable is then constructed for each country in which an observation of a problem in any of the three textual sources is given a value of 1 and no observations of a problem in any of the three sources is given a value of 0, for each of the evaluation criteria. For the weighted measures, each of the evaluation criteria is assigned a weight of 1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75 or 2, with greater weights indicating more severe problems (based in part on the qualitative language used in the *Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association*). Dummy variables for each country are then multiplied by the weights, and then this product is summed across the evaluation criteria to yield, for each country, a non-scaled raw score.

A hypothetical example of this method is illustrated in Table 1. Column A shows the thirty-seven evaluation criteria. Column B shows the coding of problems according to the textual source and column C the dummy variables derived from column B. Within column C, a look at the two shaded rows indicates a value in the dummy variable of 1 for both rows, even though problems were found in all three textual sources for the upper row and only one source for the lower row. The rationale for treating both rows the same (rather than giving more weight to the upper) is to avoid double counting, for the different sources are often describing the same problem in a country. Indeed, some of these reports are partly based on the others (U.S. National Research Council 2004). Weights are shown in column D. Column E shows the product of the dummy and the weights, the sum of which yields the non-scaled weighted score for a given country. The non-scaled unweighted score is simply the sum of column C. In spite of the differences in construction, the correlation coefficient between the unweighted and weighted measures is 0.99.<sup>4</sup> (For the purposes of

<sup>4</sup> There is also a difference in construction between weighted and unweighted measures as regards the treatment of excluded sectors. It is assumed that there is a hierarchy of violations, such that the exclusion of a sector from union membership (rows 15 and 16 in Table 1) presupposes exclusion from collective bargaining (rows 29 and 30) which itself presupposes exclusion from the right to strike (rows 34 and 35). For the weighted measures, weights are therefore greater for lower-numbered rows and, for example, if problems are found in rows 29 and 34, only row 29 was coded, since the higher weights of lower-number rows addresses the assumed hierarchy of violations. (This holds even if the violations noted in rows 29 and 34 are for different tradeable sectors.) The unweighted measure also assumes this hierarchy of violations but in a different manner. Here, for instance, if a violation is only observed in row 29, both rows 29 and 34 are coded. In practical terms, these differences between weighted and unweighted measures come to little as regards cross-country statistical analysis, given that the correlation coefficient between the two measures is 0.99.

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statistical analysis, one could of course also construct an index from a subset of the thirty-seven evaluation criteria, with the subset depending on the focus of one's research.)

The non-scaled measures are then normalized to range from 0 to 10, with 10 equal to the maximum observed non-scaled score (not maximum *possible* non-scaled score).<sup>5</sup> The same procedure is used for the unweighted measures, aside from multiplying by the weights. These normalized values are then subtracted from 10 for intuitive reasons, so that 0 equals the worst possible score (most violations observed) and 10 the best possible score (fewest violations observed). In addition, any country for which there are general prohibitions of the right to establish and join unions and worker organizations (row 6), general absence of the above resulting from socio-economic breakdown (row 7), or general prohibitions of the right to collectively bargain (row 24) receive a default worst possible score of 0.

### 3. Descriptive statistics

The unweighted and weighted versions of the indicators are shown in appendix table 1, with the sample of countries in alphabetical order within eight regions. (Coding of text by evaluation criteria and textual sources and documentation tracing CFA cases is available from the author upon request.) These are the pre-1990s OECD region (excluding Turkey), Latin-America and the Caribbean, the non-OECD East Asia-Pacific, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the transition countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc, sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East-North Africa (including Turkey).<sup>6</sup>

Also shown in the table for the sake of comparison are the Freedom House civil liberties and political rights indices, based on annual averages for 1993 to 1997, which are available for a similar number of countries. These indicators provide a sense of the broader rights context within which worker rights are situated. Freedom House describes its rating method as follows: "The survey rates political rights and civil liberties on a seven-category scale, 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. A country is assigned to a particular numerical category based on responses to the checklist and the judgments of the Survey team at Freedom House" (Freedom House 1999: 549). For appendix table 1, the Freedom House indices are normalized to be directly comparable with the trade union rights indicators such that 0 equals least free and 10 equals most free.

Regarding the civil liberties index, the checklist referred to in the above quote consists of fourteen items in four categories: "freedom of expression and belief," "association and organizational rights," "rule of law and human rights" and "personal autonomy and economic rights." Under "association and organizational rights," one of the checklist items relates directly to FACB rights: "Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?" Under the category "personal autonomy and economic

<sup>5</sup> This means that if these measures are constructed for future periods, the mid-1990s measures might need to be rescaled.

<sup>6</sup> Nine countries were coded but dropped from the sample as it was felt that there was not sufficient textual information to derive an adequate score. These were the nine countries for which there was no ICFTU report (perhaps the richest of the textual sources) and which were 3.0 or more points greater than either the Freedom House civil liberties or political rights indices, on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 indicating weakest rights and 10 indicating strongest. (Countries that had scores that were 3.0 or more points less than the Freedom House indices were not dropped, as such scores do not suggest that there was not sufficient textual information.) The nine excluded countries are Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Kyrgyzstan, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Mozambique, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

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rights,” another checklist item refers to “freedom from exploitation” regarding employers and union leaders: “Is there equality of opportunity, including freedom from exploitation by or dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats, or other types of obstacles to a share of legitimate economic gains?” The political rights index addresses questions relating to free and fair elections, the competitiveness of political parties, self-determination, and discrimination.

Also shown in the table are GDP per capita in both current U.S. dollar and PPP terms, both annual averages for 1993 to 1997.

Correlation coefficients between each pair of these six variables are shown in table 2. Correlation coefficients between GDP per capita (in PPP terms) and the Freedom House indices hovers around 0.60 and for the trade union rights indices around 0.35. This suggests that there may be a developmental aspect to democracy (civil liberties and political rights taken together) and trade union rights, with a tendency for democracy and trade union rights to be stronger in more economically developed countries, though the pattern is clearly less strong for trade union rights. The correlation coefficient between the Freedom House and trade union rights indices is around 0.60.

Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for these six variables broken down into eight regions and then for all regions. Note that in the right-hand panel that there is considerable similarity for all regions among the Freedom House and trade union rights indicators regarding means, standard deviations and coefficients of variation.

The difference between regional means and the mean for all regions is shown in the lower panel of the table. For the Freedom House and trade union rights indices, the most striking differences from the mean for all regions are for the OECD region with scores above average and the Southeast Asia, South Asia and Middle East-North Africa regions with scores below average. Patterns are more mixed for four other regions, both in terms of differences between the Freedom House and trade union rights indices and differences between regional means and means for all regions.

Also worth noting is variation in observed violations among the thirty-seven evaluation criteria. For all 169 countries coded, the 1,351 observed violations are shown by percent distribution across the thirty-seven evaluation criteria in figure 1.<sup>7</sup> The most commonly observed violations (above 5.0 percent) are for:

- Arrest, detention, imprisonment, or forced exile for union membership or activities
- Interference with union rights of assembly, demonstration, free opinion, free expression
- Dismissal or suspension for union membership or activities
- Right to elect representatives in full freedom
- Intervention of authorities [in collective bargaining]
- Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from right to strike
- Exclusion of other [non-tradeable/non-industrial] sectors or workers from right to strike

<sup>7</sup> This includes implied violations regarding exclusion of sectors, as per the construction of the unweighted union rights indicator as described above.

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The least frequently observed violations (below 1.0 percent) are for:

- General absence [of right to establish and join unions and worker organizations] resulting from socio-economic breakdown
- Only workers' committees & labour councils permitted
- Exclusion of other [non-tradeable/non-industrial] sectors or workers from union membership
- Previous authorization requirements [regarding right to establish and join federations or confederations of unions]
- Right to establish constitutions and rules
- General prohibitions [of the right to collectively bargain]
- Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from right to collectively bargain
- Previous authorization required by authorities [regarding the right to strike]

Percent distributions of observed violations among the thirty-seven evaluation criteria are shown broken out by the eight regions in Figures 2 and 3.

#### 4. Strengths and limitations of the method

There are several criteria that are useful in assessing qualitative indicators, which together provide a sense of the accuracy or conversely measurement error of an indicator (Cf. Bollen and Paxton 2000). Among these are:

- **Definitional validity:** Is the definition used to construct the indicator consistent with the phenomena it aims to measure?
- **Sufficient grades of variation:** Is the indicator sufficiently finely graded to capture important dimensions of variation?
- **Reproducibility:** To what extent will different evaluators be able to consistently arrive at the same results?
- **Transparency:** How well can a score and its constituent elements be traced back to individual information sources?
- **Evaluator bias:** Do scores reflect the bias of evaluators, with, for example, evaluators favoring countries that are more like their own?
- **Information bias and other problems with information sources:** For example, do textual sources contain systematically more information on some groups of countries than others, such as by region or language? Is there systematically more information on some sectors within a country, such as the formal sector? Are textual sources consistent across countries and over time in the criteria by which they evaluate countries?

Each of these criteria is considered in turn. Because comparisons are made with the OECD trade union rights indicator and the Freedom House civil liberties index, a schematic survey of them is included in appendix 2, categorized by method, definition, period

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considered, country coverage and information sources. To facilitate comparison, also included in this schematic survey are our own trade union rights indicators.

### ***Definitional validity***

The trade union rights indicators seem well-defined, as they are based on ILO Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 and related jurisprudence. This is not necessarily the case for other indicators related to trade union rights. For instance, whereas the OECD trade union rights indicator is based on essentially this same definition, this does not appear to be the case for the Freedom House civil liberties index (OECD 1996; OECD 2000; Freedom House 1999).

Another fundamental issue, though, is how well the strength of de facto trade union rights can be defined by observed violations without accounting for the latent, underlying rights context in which these violations occur. There are clearly cases, for instance, when observed violations are a reflection of a vibrant trade union movement and, conversely, where violations are not observed and indeed do not occur because the trade union movement is suppressed and under threat. This reveals an intrinsic limitation to any method based solely on observed violations of trade union rights and suggests that a fuller sense of the strength of de facto trade union rights must be complemented by other approaches and measures.

### ***Sufficient grades of variation***

Given the nature of their construction based on thirty-seven evaluation criteria, the trade union rights indicators seem sufficiently finely graded to capture important differences among countries. This contrasts to an extent with the OECD trade union rights indicator, with its scores of 1, 2, 3 or 4 (OECD 1996; OECD 2000). For the pre-1990s OECD countries, for example, all countries but Turkey get the best possible score. By our indicators, in contrast, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. get scores of fair to middling, which seems consistent with a more impressionistic sense of the de facto strength of trade union rights in these countries in the mid-1990s.<sup>8</sup>

### ***Reproducibility***

In constructing these indicators, a premium was put on satisfying the condition of reproducibility. There were two linked reasons for this: first, because it was not clear whether it would be possible to make the indicators publicly available and, second, because the indicators were constructed not as ends in themselves but rather for use in econometric models of wages, foreign direct investment, and international trade (Kucera 2001; Kucera and Sarna 2004). Therefore, the credibility of the econometric results depended on the reproducibility of the indicators. Reproducibility is, of course, a testable proposition, and the construction of these indicators has not been fully tested in this regard, such as via a comparison of the results of two evaluators working independently. However, the detail and explicitness of the coding rules as well as the comparison of the results of two coders of the Committee on Freedom of Association reports suggests that the method of construction does indeed lend itself to attaining reproducible results.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> The OECD approach could be modified, though, along the lines of the Freedom House approach, by having more possible scores, which would probably require more clearly delineated and thus more transparent scoring criteria.

<sup>9</sup> There may be a difference with Compa's assessment of the method in this regard (Compa 2002). Compa writes, for instance: "No purely quantifiable system for assessing countries' compliance with freedom of association standards is possible. Even the three most sophisticated efforts at



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When it comes to addressing intrinsically qualitative phenomena such as the de facto strength of trade union rights, however, reproducibility may trade off against accuracy. That is, the method is reproducible because it is rigid, but this very rigidity forecloses the sorts of nuanced judgements that may result in greater accuracy. Consider the problem of dismissal for union activities. This method treats one dismissal the same as a thousand (and the textual sources do not come close to providing such information systematically), whereas such approaches as the OECD's and Freedom House's need not.<sup>10</sup> Rather than coding with a binary dummy variable, one could alternatively code observed violations using a three or four point system. But then different evaluators may well disagree on how to make these assessments, which are no longer a question of no or yes but rather of no or what sort of yes. This too illustrates the potential trade-off between reproducibility and accuracy.

## ***Transparency***

Because of the detail and explicitness of coding rules and because the violations for each evaluation criteria are coded by textual source, the method seems sound in terms of transparency. Country scores are defensible in that their constituent elements can be readily traced back to a textual source.

## ***Evaluator bias***

In an important study, Bollen and Paxton provide evidence that evaluator bias is a significant source of systematic measurement error for a number of indicators of democracy, including the Freedom House indices (2000). That is, evaluators are biased by what Bollen and Paxton call "situational closeness," the extent to which the countries being scored are more or less alike the evaluators' own countries. But because it appears to do well in terms of reproducibility, this indicator of trade union rights does not seem problematically vulnerable to evaluator bias.

## ***Information bias and other problems with information sources***

As the U.S. National Research Council report notes, the information used in the three textual sources tends to focus on the formal sector and is thus not representative of trade union rights in the economy as a whole (National Research Council 2004: 120). However, these indicators were constructed and used to evaluate the effects of trade union rights on primarily formal sector phenomena, such as wages in registered manufacturing establishments, foreign direct investment and international trade, and so such sectoral bias does not appear a serious concern in this regard.

quantifying labor rights compliance – the OECD, Kucera, and Verité schemes – acknowledged that in the end someone sitting in a room in Paris or Geneva or Boston said '2 points? 3 points? Let's give it a 3,' or something like that, in constructing their country scores. One had to read closely to find these admissions. Kucera used the passive voice to describe his scoring method: 'with greater weights indicating what are judged to be more severe problems'" (ibid: 55). However, the mention of the severity of problems refers not the coding as such, but rather to the weighting scheme of the evaluation criteria, which is in a sense prior to the coding. Different evaluators could, of course, use different weighting schemes, and while such a choice is ultimately subjective, this does not imply that the scores would not be reproducible by different evaluators for any given weighting scheme.

<sup>10</sup> Because they leave room for more nuanced judgments, the OECD and Freedom House approaches might also enable one to better assess the broader underlying rights context in which violations of trade union rights are observed.

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The National Research Council report also notes that there is a regional bias in the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association reports, stating that “Approximately half of all CFA complaints come from Latin American countries, in part reflecting the fact that Latin American unions have grown accustomed to using this mechanism” (*ibid.*: 123-124). This regional bias is suggested as well by the figures in table 4, which shows that for the Latin America-Caribbean region, 41 percent of observed violations from the three textual sources originate from the Committee on Freedom of Association reports. This is a higher share than for any of the other seven regions considered. However, this and other regional biases can be and indeed were addressed in econometric analysis by such methods as specifying models with and without regional dummy variables, dropping a region at a time from the sample, and using indicators related to trade union rights that do not rely on the Committee on Freedom of Association reports, such as the Freedom House civil liberties index.

There is also a likely problem using this method in attempting to assess variation over time. This is because country write-ups in our textual sources have tended to become longer and more detailed over time. Because these sources tend to focus on problems, this can create a systematic bias over time, making it appear that an increasing number of trade union rights violations are occurring when in fact there may only be an increasing number of trade union rights violations reported. One consequence is that it would seem prudent that panel data analyses using an indicator constructed by this method (or an indicator using these sources) focus on cross-country variation rather than variation over time.

These points aside, a fundamental source of measurement error for this indicator and those based on the same sources derive from the shortcomings of existing information sources. The basic problem is that existing sources do not consistently apply, by and large, a systematic and detailed definition of what constitutes trade union rights as well as violations of these rights, either across countries or over time. Neither is it clear the extent to which those involved in constructing the sources have access to relevant information even if they did endeavor to apply a consistent and detailed definition of trade union rights. The sources are, in many respects, anecdotal in nature, and it is not clear how telling and representative are these anecdotes. It is not difficult to imagine, for instance, that there might have been in nearly every country in the world at least one dismissal of an employee for union-related activities in the 1993 to 1997 period, while such violations are only reported for a smaller share of countries in our three sources. More generally, it is unclear the extent to which the report of violation in a country is indicative of what actually occurred in that country as compared to a country for which no such violation is reported. A similar assessment of existing information sources is made in the U.S. National Research Council’s report *Monitoring International Labor Standards: Techniques and Sources of Information* (2004). Indeed the opening sentences of the report’s “conclusions and recommendations” are, “The committee [responsible for the report] concludes that the informational base for assessing compliance with international labor standards is very far from ideal. This chapter has presented examples, which can be multiplied, indicating why it is difficult for an observer to decide on the severity of a problem or its evolution” (*ibid.*: 29). Moreover, all five general recommendations of the committee are in regard to improving information sources on labour standards.

## 5. Moving forward

A key bottleneck in moving toward more definitive qualitative indicators of trade union rights is improved information sources. The above and similar methods could be amended by adding information from additional sources that are less comprehensive by country coverage. But using these sources comes with its own set of problems, such as possibly introducing bias depending on country selection in these additional sources. It would be better, if anything, to have fewer but more definitive sources. This could provide the basis

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for qualitative indicators constructed by a number of plausible methods, and from the viewpoint of econometric analysis and assessing the robustness of results, the more reasonable indicators the better. It would be useful, in particular, if the construction of such indicators were more closely integrated with the collection and compilation of information so that country reports provided well-defined, consistent, detailed and clearly structured information regarding what constitutes trade union rights and violations of these rights, in both the negative and positive senses and addressing the latent, underlying rights context. A welcome initiative in this regard is the WebMILS Monitoring International Labor Standards website, an outcome of the U.S. National Research Council project on monitoring international labor standards.<sup>11</sup> The ultimate usefulness of this initiative depends, however, on how the templates for country reports come to be filled out and how this information is updated.

Another potentially promising route for improving the measurement the strength of trade union rights is through incorporating a small number of carefully designed questions into labour force surveys – that is, by developing quantitative indicators of trade union rights.<sup>12</sup> Labour force surveys have of course the tremendous advantage of providing a more precise sense of how representative violations of trade union rights are in the context of a relevant population. One such question might be “*Have you been* negatively affected for being a union member or for trying to organize a union?” Such a question might constitute a problematically rare event, particularly in countries having low union membership or small shares of formal employees. As such, it might be preferable to modify the question to ask, “*Do you know of anyone who has been* negatively affected for being a union member or for trying to organize a union?” The challenge in this approach would be to have such questions introduced into labour force surveys for a sufficiently large sample of countries and to have such questions continue to be asked over time.

<sup>11</sup> Available: <http://www.trikat.com/WEBMILS/>

<sup>12</sup> Thanks to Farhad Mehran and the participants in an ILO Turin Center workshop in July 2004 for valuable discussions on such use of labour force surveys.



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## **Tables & Figures**

**Table 1: Indicator of trade union rights**  
(hypothetical example for a single country)

A	B	C	D	E
Thirty-seven evaluation criteria	Source coding	Dummy variable	Weights	Dummy *
(0=no evidence, (1, 1.25, 1.5, 1=evidence) 1.75 or 2)				
<b>Freedom of association/collective bargaining-related civil liberties</b>				
1 Murder or disappearance of union members or organizers		0	2	0
2 Other violence against union members or organizers	ab	1	2	2
3 Arrest, detention, imprisonment, or forced exile for union membership or activities	a	1	2	2
4 Interference with union rights of assembly, demonstration, free opinion, free expression	ab	1	2	2
5 Seizure or destruction of union premises or property		0	2	0
<b>Right to establish and join unions and worker organizations</b>				
6 General prohibitions		0	default	na
7 General absence resulting from socio-economic breakdown		0	default	na
8 Previous authorization requirements		0	1.5	0
9 Employment conditional on non-membership in union		0	1.5	0
10 Dismissal or suspension for union membership or activities	abc	1	1.5	1.5
11 Interference of employers (attempts to dominate unions)	a	1	1.5	1.5
12 Dissolution or suspension of union by administrative authority		0	2	0
13 Only workers' committees & labour councils permitted		0	2	0
14 Only state-sponsored or other single unions permitted		0	1.5	0
15 Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from union membership		0	2	0
16 Exclusion of other sectors or workers from union membership	ab	1	2	2
17 Other specific de facto problems or acts of prohibition	a	1	1.5	1.5
18 Right to establish and join federations or confederations of unions		0	1.5	0
19 Previous authorization requirements regarding evaluation criteria 18		0	1	0
<b>Other union activities</b>				
20 Right to elect representatives in full freedom	ab	1	1.5	1.5
21 Right to establish constitutions and rules		0	1.5	0
22 General prohibition of union/federation participation in political activities	b	1	1.5	1.5
23 Union control of finances	c	1	1.5	1.5
<b>Right to bargain collectively</b>				
24 General prohibitions		0	default	na
25 Prior approval by authorities of collective agreements		0	1.5	0
26 Compulsory binding arbitration		0	1.5	0
27 Intervention of authorities		0	1.5	0
28 Scope of collective bargaining restricted by non-state employers		0	1.5	0
29 Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from right to collectively bargain		0	1.75	0
30 Exclusion of other sectors or workers from right to collectively bargain		0	1.75	0
31 Other specific de facto problems or acts of prohibition	ab	1	1.5	1.5
<b>Right to strike</b>				
32 General prohibitions		0	2	0
33 Previous authorization required by authorities		0	1.5	0
34 Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from right to strike		0	1.5	0
35 Exclusion of other sectors or workers from right to strike		0	1.5	0
36 Other specific de facto problems or acts of prohibition	ac	1	1.5	1.5
<b>Export processing zones</b>				
37 Restricted rights in EPZs	a	1	2	2
<b>Non-scaled (raw) weighted score:</b>				<b>22</b>

**Sources:**

- a: International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), *Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights*.  
b: U.S. State Department, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*.  
c: ILO, *Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association*.

**Note:** na indicates not applicable; default indicates a minimum scaled country score of 0 on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 equals worst and 10 equals best possible score.



**Table 2: Correlation coefficients (Pearson) between GDP per capita and Freedom House and trade union rights indices: mid-1990s**

	<i>GDP per capita, USD</i>	<i>GDP per capita, PPP</i>	<i>FH civil liberties index</i>	<i>FH political rights index</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, unweighted</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, weighted</i>
<i>GDP per capita, USD</i>	1.00					
<i>GDP per capita, PPP</i>	0.96	1.00				
<i>FH civil liberties index</i>	0.55	0.64	1.00			
<i>FH political rights index</i>	0.47	0.57	0.94	1.00		
<i>Trade union rights index, unweighted</i>	0.33	0.34	0.61	0.57	1.00	
<i>Trade union rights index, weighted</i>	0.35	0.36	0.64	0.60	0.99	1.00


**Note:** The critical two-tailed values for 98 degrees of freedom (100 observations) are 0.164, 0.195 and 0.254 at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.


Table 3: Descriptive statistics for GDP per capita and Freedom House and trade union rights indices: mid-1990s

	No. of obs.	OECD	Latin America- Caribbean	Non- OECD East Asia- Pacific	Southeast Asia	South Asia	Transition countries	Sub- Saharan Africa	Middle East- North Africa	All regions 169				
Number of countries		23	27	8	10	8	27	45	21					
		Means								Mean	Std. dev.	Coeff. of var.	Max.	Min.
<i>GDP per capita, USD</i>	161	24'112	3'073	5'489	5'430	521	1'964	741	6'538	5'828	9'049	1.55	40'463	104
<i>GDP per capita, PPP</i>	155	21'383	5'584	7'020	5'373	1'988	5'460	1'905	8'746	7'161	7'475	1.04	32'075	473
<i>FH civil liberties index</i>	168	9.35	6.45	5.00	2.54	2.92	5.06	3.84	2.96	5.03	3.09	0.61	10.00	0.00
<i>FH political rights index</i>	168	9.96	7.10	5.71	2.63	4.22	5.42	3.72	2.92	5.33	3.64	0.68	10.00	0.00
<i>Trade union rights index, unweighted</i>	160	8.41	4.55	4.23	2.38	2.68	6.45	5.27	3.65	5.19	3.24	0.62	10.00	0.00
<i>Trade union rights index, weighted</i>	160	8.62	4.82	4.55	2.70	2.79	6.62	5.43	3.90	5.40	3.17	0.59	10.00	0.00
Difference between regional means and mean for all regions														
<i>FH civil liberties index</i>		4.32	1.42	-0.03	-2.49	-2.11	0.03	-1.18	-2.07					
<i>FH political rights index</i>		4.63	1.77	0.38	-2.71	-1.11	0.08	-1.61	-2.42					
<i>Trade union rights index, unweighted</i>		3.22	-0.64	-0.96	-2.81	-2.51	1.26	0.08	-1.54					
<i>Trade union rights index, weighted</i>		3.22	-0.58	-0.85	-2.70	-2.61	1.21	0.03	-1.51					


**Table 4: Regional comparison of number of observed violations from Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) reports versus other information sources**

	OECD	Latin America- Caribbean	Non- OECD East Asia- Pacific	Southeast Asia	South Asia	Transition countries	Sub- Saharan Africa	Middle East-North Africa
Number of observed violations from CFA reports	21	124	17	20	19	20	68	20
Number of observed violations from all three information sources	77	300	80	100	66	153	380	195
Percentage of observed violations from CFA reports	27.3	41.3	21.3	20.0	28.8	13.1	17.9	10.3





**Figure 3: Percent distribution of observed violations of trade union rights by region: mid-1990s**



## Appendix 1: Textual sources and coding rules

### Textual sources

- a. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), *Annual Survey of Trade Union Rights* for 1996 (referring to developments in the year 1995) or nearest available year when no country report was available in 1996.
- b. U.S. State Department, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* for 1995 (referring to developments in the year 1995), based on sections 6a and 6b of these reports and other relevant sections referred to in sections 6a and 6b.
- c. ILO, *Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association* for 1993 to 2000, reports 286-322.

### Coding rules

Note: For the sake of documenting the construction of the trade union rights indicator, these coding rules are presented as they were used in coding. They could, however, be edited for clarity and simplicity without substantively changing their content.

Freedom of association/collective bargaining-related civil liberties	
1-5	As defined in chapter 2 on “Trade Union Rights and Civil Liberties” of <i>Freedom of Association: Digests of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO</i> (1996).
1	<p>Murder or disappearance of union members or organizers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Includes violence to family members.</li></ul>
2	<p>Other violence against union members or organizers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Includes violence to family members.</li><li>▪ Includes coercion under threat of force (other than for <b>3</b> regarding forced exile or flight from country under threat) but not threats themselves or unspecified harassment. Does not include use of tear gas unless this results in injury.</li><li>▪ Double counts with <b>1</b> in cases of murder or disappearance but not other violence.</li></ul>

3	<p>Arrest, detention, imprisonment or forced exile for union membership or activities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Includes prosecution and flight from country under threat.</li> <li>▪ Includes laws that indicate sanctions for participating in union activities that may be illegal but that should not be illegal according to ILO Conventions.</li> </ul>
4	<p>Interference with union rights of assembly, demonstration, free opinion and free expression</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Includes interference with freedom of movement, except as regards 5, and also includes surveillance.</li> <li>▪ Includes problems with “access of trade union representatives to workplaces” (CFA 295th Report, p. 141).</li> <li>▪ Includes search or entry without warrant and search or entry with warrant unless the latter is for illegal non-union related activities;</li> <li>▪ Search or entry with warrant for illegal union related activities are also included for activities that should not be illegal according to ILO Conventions.</li> <li>▪ Includes interference with general, protest and solidarity strikes when these involve assembly or demonstrations (otherwise included under 36, with double-counting allowed between 4 and 36, for such strikes involving assembly and demonstrations).</li> </ul>
5	<p>Seizure or destruction of union premises or property</p>
<p>Right to establish and join unions and worker organizations</p>	
6-23	<p>As defined in articles 2 to 7 of Convention No. 87, with unions broadly defined to include all independent workers' organisations, as per Article 10 of Convention No. 87.</p>
6	<p>General prohibitions</p>
7	<p>General absence resulting from socio-economic breakdown</p>
8	<p>Previous authorization requirements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Including that the “acquisition of legal personality by workers’...organisations, federations and confederations shall not be made subject to conditions such as to restrict the application of the provisions of Articles 2, 3 and 4” of Convention No. 87 (Article 7 of Convention No. 87), e.g., includes problems with registration or official recognition of unions and</li> </ul>



	<p>workers organizations by authorities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Also including regulations regarding the minimum number of members being set at “obviously too high a figure,” as per paragraph 255 of <i>Freedom of Association</i> (1996).</li> <li>Deregistration of an already existing union is included in <b>12</b> and not <b>8</b>.</li> </ul>
9	<p>Employment conditional on non-membership in union</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As defined in Article 1 (2a) of Convention No. 98. Involves new hires and non-union membership as an express condition (by employers) of continued employment. Double counts with <b>10</b> if dismissal results from these conditions.</li> </ul>
10	<p>Dismissal or suspension for union membership or activities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As defined in Article 1 (2b) of Convention No. 98.</li> </ul>
11	<p>Interference of employers (attempts to dominate unions)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As defined in Article 2 of Convention No. 98, particularly regarding attempts by employers to place unions “under the control of employers or employers’ organisations...” (not noted under other evaluation criteria).</li> <li>Includes the establishment or attempted establishment of parallel unions by employers.</li> <li>Includes the government when it is an employer.</li> </ul>
12	<p>Dissolution or suspension of union by administrative authority</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Deregistration of an already existing union.</li> </ul>
13	<p>Only workers’ committees &amp; labour councils permitted</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refers only to economy as a whole, not particular sectors/workers. (Do <i>not</i> also check <b>8</b> for a problem regarding <b>13</b>).</li> </ul>
14	<p>Only state-sponsored or single unions permitted</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refers only to economy as a whole, not particular sectors/workers. As per paragraph 277 of <i>Freedom of Association</i> (1996) regarding single union structure. Analogous restrictions on national federations or international confederations are included in <b>18</b> but not <b>14</b>. In cases of state sponsored single unions/union structures associated with an absence of independent unions, this is counted in both <b>14</b> and <b>6</b>. (Do <i>not</i> also check <b>8</b> for a problem regarding <b>14</b>).</li> </ul>

15	<p>Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from union membership</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Refers to when sectors/workers are generally excluded, not to other more incidental problems involving these sectors/workers.</li> <li>▪ Tradeable/industrial sectors defined to include manufacturing, mining, construction, utilities (industrial sectors) and agriculture, forestry, and fishing (additional tradeable sector).</li> </ul>
16	<p>Exclusion of other sectors or workers from union membership</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Refers to when sectors/workers are generally excluded, not to other more incidental problems involving these sectors/workers. Except regarding armed forces and police.</li> <li>▪ “Essential services” not specifically defined are included. If evidence of excluded sectors does not allow one to distinguish between “tradeable/industrial” and “other” sectors, it is included in “other” sectors.</li> </ul>
17	<p>Other specific de facto problems or acts of prohibition</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Includes problems/prohibitions for general union activities not specifically related to collective bargaining or right to strike.</li> <li>▪ Includes blacklisting and unspecified interference in a worker organization’s internal affairs.</li> <li>▪ Double counts with <b>37</b> regarding EPZs, in part since the latter is used as a stand-alone measure. This effectively gives more weight to problems in EPZs if the information for all four evaluation criteria is used in a single measure.</li> <li>▪ Other than noted in evaluation criteria under <i>same</i> headings (right to establish... for <b>17</b>, right to collectively bargain for <b>31</b>, right to strike for <b>36</b>). Note: for <b>31</b> and <b>36</b>, not other than noted in <b>1-5, 10</b> or <b>12</b>. <b>31</b> and <b>36</b> indicate prohibited act and <b>1-3, 5, 10</b> or <b>12</b> indicate sanctions for act, de jure or de facto. <b>17, 31</b> and <b>36</b> also indicate lesser sanctions, such as transfers and fines, but not threats themselves nor unspecified harassment.</li> </ul>
18	<p>Right to establish and join federations or confederations of unions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ As per paragraph 613 of <i>Freedom of Association</i> (1996) regarding single union affiliation with national or international federations or confederations of unions; or regarding single federations or confederations as per paragraph 277 of <i>Freedom of Association</i> (1996). If there are problems with the registration or official recognition of a federation or confederation resulting from restrictions regarding single federations or confederations, this is included in <b>18</b> but not <b>19</b>.</li> </ul>
19	<p>Previous authorization requirements regarding evaluation criteria 18</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ As per paragraph 613 of <i>Freedom of Association</i> (1996) regarding single</li> </ul>

	<p>union affiliation with national or international federations or confederations of unions; or regarding single federations or confederations as per paragraph 277 of <i>Freedom of Association</i> (1996). If there are problems with the registration or official recognition of a federation or confederation resulting from restrictions regarding single federations or confederations, this is included in <b>18</b> but not <b>19</b>.</p>
Other union activities	
20	<p>Right to elect representatives in full freedom</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Including the absence of eligibility requirements for union leaders, as per paragraphs 350 - 367 of <i>Freedom of Association</i> (1996).</li> <li>▪ Includes dismissal or suspension of union leaders and representatives for union-related activities (which counts under both <b>10</b> and <b>20</b>), but not general civil liberties violations under <b>1-3</b>.</li> </ul>
21	<p>Right to establish constitutions and rules</p>
22	<p>General prohibition of union/federation participation in political activities</p>
23	<p>Union control of finances</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Including collection of union dues.</li> </ul>
Right to bargain collectively	
24-31	<p>As defined in chapter 14 of <i>Freedom of Association</i> (1996).</p>
24	<p>General prohibitions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ As defined in chapter 14 of <i>Freedom of Association</i> (1996).</li> </ul>

25	<p>Prior approval by authorities of collective agreements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ For non-government employees only.</li> </ul>
26	<p>Compulsory binding arbitration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ As per paragraphs 860-865 of <i>Freedom of Association</i> (1996) and applying to right to strike as well, but excepting when problem is exclusively for sectors excluded from collective bargaining and right to strike (<b>29, 30, 34, 35</b>).</li> <li>▪ Includes cases where compulsory arbitration is or can be used to prevent a strike from occurring altogether or to end an ongoing strike (even if only for the period of arbitration) as this is taken to imply “binding.”</li> <li>▪ Does not include cases where compulsory arbitration not indicated as binding is required prior to a strike’s occurrence. Not double-counted with <b>27</b> or <b>28</b>.</li> </ul>
27	<p>Intervention of authorities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ As per paragraphs 866-903 and 806 &amp; 811 of <i>Freedom of Association</i> (1996), particularly regarding “wages, working hours, leave and conditions of work....”</li> <li>▪ For <b>27</b>, includes when the government is the employer and unilaterally sets wages (including maximum wages or wage increases), working hours, etc. (which is <i>not</i> double-counted with <b>25</b>) or when prior approval by authorities is required when the government is the employer.</li> <li>▪ For <b>27</b>, includes de facto exclusion of public sector from collective bargaining, as when government unilaterally sets wages; this is not included under <b>30</b>, for which public sector employees are included only for general de jure exclusion of the sector from collective bargaining (this is the only case for which de jure and de facto problems are treated differently regarding excluded sectors or groups of workers).</li> <li>▪ Regarding <b>28</b>, if the scope of collective bargaining is restricted by non-state employers as a result of the intervention of the state or by legislation, this is included in <b>27</b> but not <b>28</b>.</li> </ul>
28	<p>Scope of collective bargaining restricted by non-state employers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ As per paragraphs 866-903 and 806 &amp; 811 of <i>Freedom of Association</i> (1996), particularly regarding “wages, working hours, leave and conditions of work....”</li> <li>▪ Regarding <b>28</b>, if the scope of collective bargaining is restricted by non-state employers as a result of the intervention of the state or by legislation, this is included in <b>27</b> but not <b>28</b>.</li> </ul>

29	<p>Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from right to collectively bargain</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Refers to when sectors/workers are generally excluded, not to other more incidental problems involving these sectors/workers.</li> <li>▪ Tradeable/industrial sectors defined to include manufacturing, mining, construction, utilities (industrial sectors) and agriculture, forestry, and fishing (additional tradeable sector).</li> </ul>
30	<p>Exclusion of other sectors or workers from right to collectively bargain</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Refers to when sectors/workers are generally excluded, not to other more incidental problems involving these sectors/workers. Except regarding armed forces and police.</li> <li>▪ “Essential services” not specifically defined are included. If evidence of excluded sectors does not allow one to distinguish between “tradeable/industrial” and “other” sectors, it is included in “other” sectors.</li> </ul>
31	<p>Other specific de facto problems or acts of prohibition</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Includes failure to recognize existing bargaining agreements and refusal of employer to bargain or participate in mediation, but not other or unspecified delay or non-payment of earnings.</li> <li>▪ Double counts with <b>37</b> regarding EPZs, in part since the latter is used as a stand-alone measure. This effectively gives more weight to problems in EPZs if the information for all four evaluation criteria are used in a single measure.</li> <li>▪ Other than noted in evaluation criteria under <i>same</i> headings (right to establish... for <b>17</b>, right to collectively bargain for <b>31</b>, right to strike for <b>36</b>). Note: for <b>31</b> and <b>36</b>, not other than noted in <b>1-5, 10</b> or <b>12</b>. <b>31</b> and <b>36</b> indicate prohibited act and <b>1-3, 5, 10</b> or <b>12</b> indicate sanctions for act, de jure or de facto. <b>17, 31</b> and <b>36</b> also indicate lesser sanctions, such as transfers and fines, but not threats themselves or unspecified harassment.</li> </ul>
Right to Strike	
32-37	As defined in chapter 9 of <i>Freedom of Association</i> (1996).
32	General prohibitions
33	Previous authorization required by authorities

34	<p>Exclusion of tradeable/industrial sectors from right to strike</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Refers to when sectors/workers are generally excluded, not to other more incidental problems involving these sectors/workers.</li> <li>▪ Tradeable/industrial sectors defined to include manufacturing, mining, construction, utilities (industrial sectors) and agriculture, forestry, and fishing (additional tradeable sector).</li> </ul>
35	<p>Exclusion of other sectors or workers from right to strike</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Refers to when sectors/workers are generally excluded, not to other more incidental problems involving these sectors/workers. Except regarding armed forces and police.</li> <li>▪ “Essential services” not specifically defined are included. If evidence of excluded sectors does not allow one to distinguish between “tradeable/industrial” and “other” sectors, it is included in “other” sectors.</li> </ul>
36	<p>Other specific de facto problems or acts of prohibition</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Double counts with <b>37</b> regarding EPZs, in part since the latter is used as a stand-alone measure. This effectively gives more weight to problems in EPZs if the information for all four evaluation criteria are used in a single measure.</li> <li>▪ Other than noted in evaluation criteria under <i>same</i> headings (right to establish... for <b>17</b>, right to collectively bargain for <b>31</b>, right to strike for <b>36</b>). Note: for <b>31</b> and <b>36</b>, not other than noted in <b>1-5, 10</b> or <b>12</b>. <b>31</b> and <b>36</b> indicate prohibited act and <b>1-3, 5, 10</b> or <b>12</b> indicate sanctions for act, de jure or de facto. <b>17, 31</b> and <b>36</b> also indicate lesser sanctions, such as transfers and fines, but not threats themselves nor unspecified harassment.</li> </ul>
Export processing zones	
37	<p>Restricted rights in EPZs</p>

## General coding rules

Regarding year of problem in source, all de facto problems evidence occurring between 1993 and 1997 (inclusive) are included.

Contrary evidence within a source is excluded. For contrary evidence across sources, evidence of problems is included if it seems credible on its own terms.

When a violation of trade union rights occurs but is remedied, it is nonetheless still coded as a violation. There are several reasons for this approach. For instance, union premises are destroyed and then, afterwards, there is a process through which there is compensation to the union, this is not equivalent to the union premises not having been destroyed in the first place. This approach seems

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reasonable in light of the main causal channels through which trade union rights are hypothesized to affect foreign direct investment and trade – through labour costs and through social stability. Violations of trade union rights, even when afterwards remedied, are likely to contribute to social instability. And even eventually remedied violations of trade union rights are likely to hinder workers' sense of strength and thus their willingness and ability to bargain for higher wages. An alternative approach would be to double the number of evaluation criteria to account for remedied versus non-remedied violations of trade union rights. In addition to being unwieldy, however, the information sources tend to be anecdotal rather than systematic in reporting whether a violation was remedied and thus this alternative approach was not adopted.

Evaluation criteria **1, 2, 3, 5, 10** and **12** indicate sanctions, for which double-counting of a problem is likely. E.g., dismissal for strike activity counts in both **36** (prohibited act) and **10** (sanction for the act, de jure or de facto). In general, such double-counting is done throughout, with evaluation criteria generally not mutually exclusive, unless specifically indicated otherwise.

Sanctions and violations against non-unionized workers are also included, if these workers are wrongfully prevented from unionizing and are punished for carrying out union-like activities or for providing worker voice (except of military and police). Particularly relevant for **1-3, 5, 10** and **12**. Includes sanctions and violations against excluded sectors/workers noted in **15, 16, 29, 30, 34** and **35**.





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## Appendix 2: Schematic survey of three qualitative indicators pertaining to freedom of association and collective bargaining rights

- OECD trade union rights indicator
- Freedom House civil liberties index
- Kucera trade union rights indicator

### OECD trade union rights indicator

#### Method:

The OECD created 3 tables with up to one paragraph of text on three aspects of FACB rights:

“Restrictions on the right to establish free unions”

“Restrictions on the right to strike”

“Protection of union members and collective bargaining rights”

“[B]ased on [OECD] Secretariat judgment,” an overall score of 1, 2, 3 or 4 is given for each country based on text in tables (in OECD 1996, 1 = strongest rights, 4 = weakest rights, with order reversed in OECD 2000).

#### Definition:

Based on ILO Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 and related ILO jurisprudence.

#### Period considered:

Mid-1990s (OECD 1996) and late-1990s (OECD 2000).

#### Country coverage:

Available for up to 79 countries.

#### Information sources:

ILO, various sources.

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), *Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights*.

U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

### Freedom House civil liberties index

Freedom House is a non-profit organization based in the U.S. that describes itself as follows: “Non-partisan and broad based, Freedom House is led by a Board of Trustees composed of leading Democrats, Republicans, and independents; business and labor leaders; former senior government officials; scholars; writers; and journalists.”

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## Method:

Freedom House describes its method as follows: “The survey rates political rights and civil liberties on a seven-category scale, 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. A country is assigned to a particular numerical category based on responses to the checklist and the judgments of the *Survey* team at Freedom House.”

Regarding the civil liberties index, the checklist referred to in the above quotation consists of 14 items in four categories: “freedom of expression and belief,” “association and organizational rights,” “rule of law and human rights” and “personal autonomy and economic rights.” Under “association and organizational rights,” one of the checklist items relates directly to FACB rights:

“Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?”

Under the category “personal autonomy and economic rights,” another checklist item refers to “union leaders”:

“Is there equality of opportunity, including freedom from exploitation by or dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats, or other types of obstacles to a share of legitimate economic gains?”

Each of the 14 items is assigned 0 to 4 “raw points,” with more points indicating a judgment of stronger civil liberties. These “raw points” are then summed across the 14 checklist items and the civil liberties index based on the total number of “raw points” as follows:

Raw points	Civil liberties index
50 to 56	1
42 to 49	2
34 to 41	3
26 to 33	4
17 to 25	5
9 to 16	6
0 to 8	7

Note that the score on the checklist item relating to FACB makes up only 1/14 of the overall civil liberties index and that scores are not available for individual checklist items.

In explaining its judgments in the construction of the civil liberties index, Freedom House writes:

“When analyzing the civil liberties checklist, Freedom House does not mistake constitutional guarantees of human rights for those rights in practice. For states and territories with small populations, particularly tiny island nations, the absence of trade unions and other types of association is not necessarily viewed as a negative situation unless the government or other centers of domination are deliberately blocking their formation or operation.”

## Definition:

Definitions are not made explicit except insofar as noted above under “method.” No reference is made to ILO Conventions or related ILO jurisprudence.

## Period considered:

Annual data from 1972 to present, updated annually.

## Country coverage:

Available for 201 countries and territories.

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## Information sources:

Approximately 120 publications and 120 organizations are consulted. These are listed in the “Sources” section of *Freedom in the World*. However, none of these are ILO publications and the ILO itself is not consulted.

## Kucera trade union rights indicator

### Method:

Established 37 evaluation criteria providing classification of types of FACB violations. See table 1. Each of the evaluation criteria are based on a detailed set of definitions and decision rules, indicating relevant ILO Convention articles and jurisprudence passages; how to classify the diverse range of problems noted in the information sources; and how the various evaluation criteria relate to each other. The aim is to have a sufficiently detailed set of definitions and decision rules that different evaluators would arrive at the same results.

Assign value of 0 for no evidence found and 1 for evidence found for each of 37 evaluation criteria, creating a country dummy variable.

Constructed in two versions: **unweighted** (that is, equally weighted) and **weighted**. Weights purport to indicate the severity of violations (weights: 1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2, with 1 = least severe and 2 = most severe).

For the weighted version, country dummy variable is multiplied by weighting scheme.

Overall country score (non-normalized) is given by summing across 37 evaluation criteria (unweighted and weighted).

“Default” worse possible scores are given to countries for which sources indicate general prohibitions of the right to establish and join unions and other worker organizations or general prohibitions of collective bargaining.

### Definition:

Based on ILO Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 and related ILO jurisprudence and violations observed in information sources.

### Period considered:

Mid-1990s (based on violations occurring between 1993 and 1997 inclusive).

### Country coverage:

Available for 160 countries.

### Information sources:

ILO, Report on the Committee on *Freedom of Association*.

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), *Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights*.

U.S. State Department, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*.

Appendix Table 1: GDP per capita and Freedom House and trade union rights indices: mid-1990s

OECD	<i>GDP per capita, USD</i>	<i>GDP per capita, PPP</i>	<i>FH civil liberties index</i>	<i>FH political rights index</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, unweighted</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, weighted</i>
Australia	20'649	21'272	10.00	10.00	7.62	7.44
Austria	26'357	22'384	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00
Belgium	24'425	22'683	9.58	10.00	9.05	9.10
Canada	19'810	23'122	10.00	10.00	8.57	8.65
Denmark	31'420	23'257	10.00	10.00	8.10	8.20
Finland	22'151	19'184	10.00	10.00	9.52	9.55
France	24'689	20'753	8.33	10.00	9.05	8.95
Germany	26'952	21'660	8.33	10.00	9.05	9.47
Greece	10'689	13'318	6.67	10.00	9.05	9.10
Iceland	25'433	23'624	10.00	10.00	9.05	9.10
Ireland	17'987	17'734	9.17	10.00	10.00	10.00
Italy	19'260	20'499	7.92	10.00	9.52	9.55
Japan	36'556	23'879	8.33	9.17	5.71	6.39
Luxembourg	40'463	32'075	10.00	10.00	9.52	9.55
Netherlands	24'364	21'025	10.00	10.00	9.52	9.55
New Zealand	15'589	17'318	10.00	10.00	9.05	9.10
Norway	32'038	25'297	10.00	10.00	8.57	8.65
Portugal	10'126	13'767	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00
Spain	14'063	15'375	8.33	10.00	7.14	8.05
Sweden	25'870	20'089	10.00	10.00	9.52	9.55
Switzerland	38'633	25'758	10.00	10.00	9.52	9.55
United Kingdom	19'183	19'629	8.33	10.00	3.33	4.14
United States	27'871	28'116	10.00	10.00	2.86	4.74
Latin America-Caribbean	<i>GDP per capita, USD</i>	<i>GDP per capita, PPP</i>	<i>FH civil liberties index</i>	<i>FH political rights index</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, unweighted</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, weighted</i>
Argentina	7'585	11'264	6.67	8.33	2.38	2.56
Bahamas	12'389	14'869	8.33	10.00	8.10	8.95
Barbados	7'116	12'446	10.00	10.00	8.57	8.65
Belize	2'711	4'730	10.00	10.00	3.81	4.59
Bolivia	908	2'177	6.25	8.33	0.48	1.43
Brazil	4'101	6'625	5.00	7.92	3.33	3.83
Chile	4'287	7'635	8.33	8.33	4.76	5.86
Colombia	2'251	5'863	5.00	6.25	0.00	0.00
Costa Rica	3'360	6'714	8.33	10.00	2.38	2.56
Cuba			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Dominican Republic	1'544	4'381	6.67	5.83	4.76	4.29
Ecuador	1'530	3'198	6.25	8.33	2.38	2.78
El Salvador	1'624	3'923	6.67	6.67	2.38	2.78
Guatemala	1'452	3'378	3.75	5.42	2.86	2.48
Guyana	740	3'332	8.33	8.33	8.57	8.65
Haiti	341	1'441	2.50	2.92	6.67	6.24
Honduras	696	2'392	6.67	6.67	2.38	3.08
Jamaica	1'930	3'688	6.67	8.33	8.57	8.50
Mexico	4'051	7'453	5.42	5.00	1.90	2.63
Nicaragua	430	2'292	4.58	5.42	6.19	6.09
Panama	3'020	5'167	6.67	7.92	4.76	5.19
Paraguay	1'778	4'501	6.67	5.42	1.90	2.33
Peru	2'107	4'237	5.00	3.75	1.43	2.03
Suriname	876	2'394	6.67	6.67	9.52	9.55
Trinidad and Tobago	4'196	6'958	8.75	10.00	9.52	9.55
Uruguay	5'624	8'141	8.33	8.75	8.57	8.65
Venezuela	3'251	5'986	6.67	7.08	6.67	6.92

<b>Non-OECD East Asia-Pacific</b>	<i>GDP per capita, USD</i>	<i>GDP per capita, PPP</i>	<i>FH civil liberties index</i>	<i>FH political rights index</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, unweighted</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, weighted</i>
China	563	2'639	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Fiji	2'502	4'598	6.67	5.00	4.29	5.19
Hong Kong (China)	23'039	22'162			4.76	5.04
Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Korea, Republic of	9'928	13'515	8.33	8.33	1.43	2.93
Mongolia	373	1'485	6.67	8.33	7.14	7.14
Papua New Guinea	1'166	2'521	5.00	8.33	8.57	8.65
Solomon Islands	850	2'221	8.33	10.00	7.62	7.44
<b>Southeast Asia</b>	<i>GDP per capita, USD</i>	<i>GDP per capita, PPP</i>	<i>FH civil liberties index</i>	<i>FH political rights index</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, unweighted</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, weighted</i>
Brunei Darussalam	16'702		2.50	0.00		
Cambodia	255	1'269	2.50	3.33	6.19	5.94
Indonesia	1'010	2'879	2.08	0.00	0.48	0.98
Lao People's Democratic Rep.	357	1'213	1.67	0.00	0.00	0.00
Malaysia	4'182	7'461	3.33	5.00	0.48	2.18
Myanmar			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Philippines	1'047	3'619	5.42	7.50	1.90	1.95
Singapore	22'410	19'001	3.33	3.75	8.10	8.20
Thailand	2'629	6'060	4.58	6.67	4.29	5.04
Viet nam	273	1'486	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>South Asia</b>	<i>GDP per capita, USD</i>	<i>GDP per capita, PPP</i>	<i>FH civil liberties index</i>	<i>FH political rights index</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, unweighted</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, weighted</i>
Afghanistan			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bangladesh	314	1'273	5.00	7.92	1.43	1.73
Bhutan	444	1'168	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
India	374	1'846	5.00	5.83	5.71	5.34
Maldives	1'131	4'003	1.67	1.67	0.00	0.00
Nepal	203	1'136	5.00	6.67	6.67	6.39
Pakistan	476	1'730	3.33	6.25	1.43	2.78
Sri Lanka	703	2'759	3.33	5.42	6.19	6.09
<b>Transition countries</b>	<i>GDP per capita, USD</i>	<i>GDP per capita, PPP</i>	<i>FH civil liberties index</i>	<i>FH political rights index</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, unweighted</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, weighted</i>
Albania	658	2'659	5.00	6.67	4.76	5.49
Armenia	568	1'940	5.00	5.42		
Azerbaijan	460	2'233	2.08	1.67	9.05	9.10
Belarus	2'166	5'746	3.75	3.33	4.29	3.98
Bosnia and Herzegovina	648		2.08	2.08		
Bulgaria	1'277	5'225	7.92	8.33	6.19	6.24
Croatia	3'457	5'955	5.00	5.00	6.19	6.77
Czech Republic	4'624	12'268	8.33	10.00	7.14	7.29
Estonia	2'931	6'751	8.33	7.92	8.10	8.05
Georgia	515	2'169	3.75	4.17	9.52	9.55
Hungary	4'218	9'465	8.33	10.00	6.67	6.84
Kazakhstan	1'381	4'673	3.75	1.67	6.19	6.24
Kyrgyzstan	626	2'287	5.83	4.58		
Latvia	2'098	5'142	7.92	7.50	9.05	9.10
Lithuania	1'929	5'836	7.50	10.00	6.67	6.84
Macedonia, The Former Yugoslav Rep. of	1'388	4'361	6.67	5.42		
Moldova, Rep. of	642	2'512	4.58	5.00		
Poland	2'993	6'746	8.33	9.17	8.10	8.20
Romania	1'346	6'290	6.25	5.83	3.33	4.29
Russian Federation	2'574	7'403	5.00	6.67	3.33	3.98
Slovakia	3'210	8'640	5.83	7.92	8.10	8.20
Slovenia	8'353	13'147	8.33	10.00	8.10	8.05
Tajikistan	283		0.00	0.00		
Turkmenistan	772	3'422	0.00	0.00		
Ukraine	1'122	4'044	5.00	6.25	5.24	5.04

<b>Transition countries (cont.)</b>	<i>GDP per capita, USD</i>	<i>GDP per capita, PPP</i>	<i>FH civil liberties index</i>	<i>FH political rights index</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, unweighted</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, weighted</i>
Uzbekistan	814	2'115	0.42	0.00	9.05	9.10
Yugoslavia			1.67	1.67	0.00	0.00
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	<i>GDP per capita, USD</i>	<i>GDP per capita, PPP</i>	<i>FH civil liberties index</i>	<i>FH political rights index</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, unweighted</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, weighted</i>
Angola	542	1'872	0.83	0.83	6.67	6.69
Benin	364	842	7.50	8.33	8.10	8.20
Botswana	3'210	5'878	7.50	8.33	5.71	7.44
Burkina Faso	224	841	5.00	3.33	7.62	8.50
Burundi	153	644	0.00	0.83	6.67	7.44
Cameroon	697	1'464	3.33	0.83	2.38	3.08
Cape Verde	1'188	3'788	8.33	10.00	7.62	7.44
Central African Republic	325	1'071	4.58	6.67	6.67	6.69
Chad	215	815	3.33	1.67	2.86	3.23
Comoros	435	1'601	5.00	5.00	7.14	6.84
Congo	863	916	5.42	5.42	6.67	6.24
Côte d'Ivoire	711	1'535	3.33	1.67	5.71	5.34
Democratic Republic of Congo	146	907	1.67	0.00	2.38	2.93
Equatorial Guinea	600	1'930	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Eritrea	155	764	4.17	1.67	9.52	9.55
Ethiopia	104	572	3.33	3.33	1.90	2.33
Gabon	4'498	6'104	5.00	3.33	9.05	9.10
Gambia	344	1'464	3.33	2.08	7.62	8.20
Ghana	373	1'702	5.00	4.58	8.10	7.89
Guinea	548	1'742	3.33	1.67	7.14	6.99
Guinea-Bissau	233	846	4.58	5.42	8.57	8.35
Kenya	305	1'023	1.67	1.25	3.81	4.44
Lesotho	472	1'563	5.00	5.42	4.29	5.19
Liberia			1.67	0.42	0.00	0.00
Madagascar	256	792	5.00	8.33	7.62	8.35
Malawi	198	535	5.83	6.67	5.24	5.04
Mali	249	670	6.67	8.33	7.62	7.59
Mauritania	451	1'523	1.25	0.83	5.71	5.34
Mauritius	3'394	7'588	8.33	10.00	5.71	6.39
Mozambique	167	661	4.17	5.42		
Namibia	1'968	5'209	6.67	8.33	7.62	7.59
Niger	194	723	3.75	5.00	7.14	6.99
Nigeria	260	831	1.67	0.00	1.43	2.03
Rwanda	209	765	1.67	0.42	0.00	0.00
Senegal	542	1'277	3.75	5.00	6.19	5.94
Sierra Leone	193	646	2.08	1.25	7.62	7.59
Somalia			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
South Africa	3'630	8'598	7.08	7.92	5.71	5.49
Sudan	306		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Swaziland	1'300	4'097	3.33	1.67	3.33	3.23
Tanzania, United Rep. of	190	473	2.92	2.50	6.67	6.69
Togo	316	1'342	3.33	1.25	5.71	5.49
Uganda	264	982	4.17	3.33	5.71	6.09
Zambia	385	793	5.00	5.83	2.86	2.48
Zimbabwe	688	2'604	3.33	3.33	3.81	4.44

<b>Middle East-North Africa</b>	<i>GDP per capita, USD</i>	<i>GDP per capita, PPP</i>	<i>FH civil liberties index</i>	<i>FH political rights index</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, unweighted</i>	<i>Trade union rights index, weighted</i>
Algeria	1'626	4'649	1.25	0.83	6.19	5.79
Bahrain	9'383	14'129	1.67	1.25	7.14	7.14
Cyprus	10'965	16'377	10.00	10.00	8.57	8.65
Egypt	1'040	2'933	1.67	1.67	3.81	4.59
Iran, Islamic Rep. of	1'460	5'109	0.00	1.67	0.00	0.00
Iraq			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Israel	15'417	17'142	6.67	10.00	6.19	6.69
Jordan	1'582	3'887	5.00	5.00	5.71	6.69
Kuwait	16'939	18'438	3.33	3.33	2.86	3.53
Lebanon	2'784	3'941	3.33	1.67	4.76	5.34
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Malta	8'156	13'027	10.00	10.00	9.52	9.55
Morocco	1'214	3'253	3.33	3.33	3.81	3.68
Oman	6'151		1.67	1.67	8.10	7.89
Qatar	16'125		1.67	0.00	0.00	0.00
Saudi Arabia	7'184	11'091	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Syrian Arab Republic	1'114	3'143	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Tunisia	1'937	5'041	3.33	1.67	6.67	6.54
Turkey	2'814	6'022	3.75	4.17	0.00	0.68
United Arab Emirates	18'012	19'784	3.33	1.25	0.00	0.00
Yemen	320	718	2.08	3.75	3.33	5.04





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